The Federal Priority in Insolvency:  Proposals for Reform by Plumb, William T., Jr.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 70 Issue 1 
1971 
The Federal Priority in Insolvency: Proposals for Reform 
William T. Plumb Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Legislation Commons, and the Secured Transactions Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William T. Plumb Jr., The Federal Priority in Insolvency: Proposals for Reform, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1971). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol70/iss1/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE FEDERAL PRIORITY IN INSOLVENCY: 
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
William T. Plumb, Jr. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. FEDERAL CLAIMS ENTITLED TO PRIORITY • • • • • • • • . . . • • • 10 
II. PROCEEDINGS IN WmcH PRIORITY Is APPLICABLE •..••. 12 
A. Collective Proceedings Only ................... 12 
B. Proceedings Under Bankruptcy Act ............ 14 
c. Insolvency Arising During Proceeding .......... 21 
D. Administrations Not "For the Benefit of Creditors" 31 
III. RECOGNITION OF ANTECEDENT LIENS UNDER STATE LAw 32 
IV. PRIORITIES .AMONG UNSECURED CLAIMS ••••••••••••••• 37 
A. Expenses and Claims That May Be Paid Prior to 
Federal Claims .............................. 37 
I. Administration Expenses ................... 38 
2. Expenses Antecedent to Administration ...... 44 
3. Charges Against Decedents' Estates .......... 52 
4. Taxes Antedating the Proceeding ........... 54 
B. Reconciliation with State Priority Laws ......... 57 
C. Unemployment Taxes: The Monkey Puzzle ...... 71 
v. ANTECEDENT FEDERAL LIENS AND OTHER TAX LIENS •••• 79 
Vl. PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 84 
[I] 
2 Michigan Law Review 
VII. THE FIDUCIARY'S PERSONAL LIABILITY .............. , . 87 
VIII. EFFECTIVE DATE • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . • . . . • . . • • 90 
IX. AMENDING THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT • . . . . . • . • • • . • . • 93 
THE FEDERAL PRIORITY IN INSOLVENCY: 
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
William T. Plumb, Jr.* 
Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, 
or whenever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the 
executors or administrators, is insufficient to pay all the debts due 
from the deceased, the debts due to the United States shall be first 
satisfied .... 1 
Sired by the ancient prerogative of the English Crown,
2 born in 
the earliest days of our Republic,3 and still commonly referred to 
by its designation (as Section 3466) in the Revised Statutes of 1875, 
the virtually absolute statutory priority of the federal government in 
insolvent decedents' estates and in certain other insolvency proceed-
ings has gone too long without significant amendment or recon-
sideration by Congress.4 The legislative neglect of this provision is 
in marked contrast to the frequent congressional re-examinations of 
the priorities established in bankruptcy; indeed the respective prior-
• Member of the D.C. Bar. A.B. 1936, University of Rochester; LL.B. 1939, Cornell 
University.-Ed. 
1. REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1964) (emphasis added). The provision 
continues: 
and the priority established shall extend as well to .cases in which a debtor, not 
having suffici~nt property to pay all, his debts, makes a voluntary assignment 
thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent 
debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases in which an act of bankruptcy 
is committed. . 
A companion provision prescribes: . . 
Every executor, administrator or assignee, or other person, who pays, in whole or 
in part, any debt due by the person or estate for whom or for which he acts, 
before he satisfies and pays the debts due to the United States from such person 
or estate, shall become answerable in his own person and estate to the extent of 
such payments for the debts so due to the United States, or for so much thereof 
as may remain due and unpaid. 
REv. STAT. § 3467 (1875), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 192 (1964). 
2. See United States v. Key, 397 U.S. 322, 324 (1970). The sovereign prerogative, 
while affording the precedent, is not, however, the legal basis for the federal priority, 
which rests entirely on statute. Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492, 499-500 (1926); 
United States v. State Bank of North Carolina, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 29, 34 (1832). 
3. The provision can be traced back to the Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 21, 1 Stat. 
42, the fifth statute enacted by the first Congress. It has been in substanµally its 
present form, since the Act of March 3, 1797, ch. 20, § 5, 1 Stat. 515. The provision 
now found in REv. STAT. § 3467 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 192 (1964), set out in note 1 supra,. 
originated in the Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 65, 1 Stat. 676. 
4. See Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious 
Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905 (1954); Plumb, Federal 
Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 YALE L.J. 228, 233-61 (1967). The 
present paper, while necessarily reiterating some of the background discussion con-
tained in those articles, ,is directed to consideration of a specific proposal for amend-. 
ment approved by the American Bai: Associ.ation in 1.970. 
[3] 
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ity provmons have been characterized as "virtually independent 
statutory provisions enacted with little or no thought to compari-
son."5 
The insolvency priority statute "on its face permits no exception 
whatsoever,''6 although the lower courts and the Internal Revenue 
Service have interpolated exceptions for administration expenses,7 
funeral expenses,8 certain widows' allowances,9 and prior mortgages,1° 
pledges11 and "choate" liens.12 The Supreme Court, however, has 
persistently and pointedly reserved opinion whether a "choate" 
lien,13 or even a mortgage,14 would prevail over the federal priority, 
and has imposed a test of "choateness" so stringent that it is a rare 
competing lien, unless previously enforced by taking title or posses-
sion, that could satisfy the requirements.15 Security assignments,10 
5. Rogge, The Differences in the Priority of the United States in Bankruptcy and 
in Equity Receiverships, 43 HARV. L. REv. 251, 252 (1929). 
6. See United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351, 357 (1964). However, the Govern• 
ment's further argument that, through application of some "federal law of property 
rights," the priority even reaches property not owned by the debtor has been rejected, 
!deco Div. of Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Chance Drilling Co,, 422 F.2d 165, 168,69 (5th Cir. 
1970). 
7. Abrams v. United States, 274 F.2d 8, 12 (8th Cir. 1960); Kennebec Box Co, v. 
O.S. Richards Corp., 5 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1925). 
8. S.M. 5032, V-1 CUM, BULL. 109 (1926). 
9. Postmaster Gen. v. Robbins, 19 F. Cas. 1126 (No. 11,314) (D. Me. 1829); Jessie 
Smith, 24 B.T.A. 807, 811 (1931); I.T. 2712, XII-2 CUM. BuLL. 138 (1933), But cf, Federal 
Reserve Bank v. Smylie, 134 S.W.2d 838, 842 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); In re Estate of 
Ballard, 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,f 9777 (Mich. P. Ct. 1944). 
10. Exchange Bank &: Trust Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 246 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 355 U.S. 868 (1957); United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 33 F,2d 533 (8th Cir, 
1929), affd. on other grounds, 280 U.S. 478 (1930). 
11. In re Decker's Estate, 355 Pa. 331, 340-41, 49 A.2d 714, 719-20 (1946), 
12. United States v. Atlantic Municipal Corp., 212 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1954); United 
States v. South Carolina, 227 S.C. 187, 87 S.E.2d 577 (1955). 
13. See, e.g., United States v. Key, 397 U.S. 322, 332 n.11 (1970); United States v, 
Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361, 365-66 (1953); United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480, 
484-85 (1941). 
14. See New York v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290, 294 (1933). 
15. It is not only necessary that, before the event of insolvency, the identity of the 
lienor, the amount of the lien, and the property to which it attaches be fixed beyond 
possibility of change or dispute (Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 
(1946)) but, at least in the case of personalty, the debtor must have been divested of 
either title or possession, if not both. United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc,, 345 
U.S. 361, 366 (1953). 
16. In re Gruner, 295 N.Y. 510, 68 N.E.2d 514 (1946). Contra, Creditors Exch. 
Serv., Inc. v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 885 (S.D. ~ex. 1967). Those mortgages and 
security interests that were held "inchoate" under the somewhat less stringent test 
formerly applicable as against federal tax liens (see note 45 infra and accompanying 
text), because they secured future obligations, including those arising from later 
obligatory payments by the creditor and foreclosure expenses (United States v. Pioneer 
Am. Life Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963); United States v. R.F. Ball Cpnstr. Co., 355 U,S, 
587 (1958)), would surely fail the test of § 3466, Cf. United States v. Menier Hardware 
No. 1, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 448, 454 (W.D. Tex. 1963). 
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mechanics' liens,17 landlords' liens,18 general judgment liens,19 and 
state and local tax liens20 (except possibly for real estate taxes),21 
although perfected as against everyone else, yield to the federal 
priority when insolvency supervenes, as does an attorney's claim for 
his fee.22 
The supremacy for federal claims provided by the abortive fed-
eral bankruptcy acts of the early and middle nineteenth century,23 
on the other hand, has progressively given way to a "reasonable 
classification of claims as entitled to priority because of superior 
equities."24 Federal claims other than tax claims were reduced to 
parity with the claims of general creditors in bankruptcy by the 
Act of 1898.25 However, the change may have been the result of 
a drafting inadvertence since Congress in 1926, soon after the Su-
preme Court so construed the law, restored such claims to priority 
although subordinating them to administration and other expenses, 
certain wage claims, and state, local, and federal taxes, and placing 
them on a parity with claims enjoying priority under state law.26 
17. W.T. Jones & Co. v. Foodco Realty, Inc., 318 F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1963). Cf. United 
States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956). 
. 18. United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945); United 
States v. Saidman, 231 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 
19. Thelusson v. Smith, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 396 (1817). See New York v. Maclay, 288 
U.S. 290, 293 (1933). But cf. Muniz v. United States, 129 Ind. App. 433, 155 N.E.2d 140 
(1958); In Te Meyer's Estate, 159 Pa. Super. 296, 48 A.2d 210 (1946). See Kennedy, supm 
note 4, at 908-09. 
20. Illinois ex Tel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946); United States v. Texas, 
314 U.S. 480 (1941). 
21. See United States v. Atlantic Municipal Corp., 212 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1954); 
United States v. South Carolina, 227 S.C. 187, 87 S.E.2d 577 (1955). 
22. In Te Holly Knitwear, Inc. v. Solomon, 71•2 U.S. Ta.x Cas. 1[ 9654 (N.J. P. Ct. 
1971). 
23. Act of April 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 62, 2 Stat. 36 (repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, 
ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248); Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 5, 5 Stat. 444 (repealed by Act of 
March 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614); Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 28, 14 Stat. 531 
(repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 170, 20 Stat. 99). The pertinent provisions of the 
old bankruptcy acts are quoted in United States v. Anderson, 334 F.2d 111, 114-15 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964). 
24. Carpenter v. Wabash Ry., 309 U.S. 23, 28 (1940). Accord, United States v. 
Randall, 401 U.S. 513, 516 (1971). 
25. Section 64b(5) of the National Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 
563, embraced "debts owing to any person who by the laws of the States or the United 
States is entitled to priority," and ranked such debts behind taxes and certain wage 
claims but ahead of general creditors. See Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guar. & 
Sur. Co., 224 U.S. 152 (1912). In Davis v. Pringle, 268 U.S. 315, 318-19 (1925), a 
unanimous Court held that federal nontax claims were not even qualified for that 
level of priority but ranked with the claims of general creditors since the United 
States was not a "person" within the meaning of § 64b(5). 
26. Act of May 27, 1926, ch. 406, § 15, 44 Stat. 667. The Chandler Act of June 22, 
1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 874, amending § 64a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, eliminated 
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Federal 'tax claims were placed.on a parity with state and local tax 
claims by the 1898 Act,27 but continued to outrank all other claims28 
until 1926 when taxes were demoted below certain wage claims.20 
The Chandler Act of 1938 introduced the concept of postponing 
perfected federal and other statutory liens on personalty in favor of 
administration expenses and wage claims if such liens were not ac-
companied by possession and had not been enforced by sale prior 
to bankruptcy.30 And, in 1966, Congress not only confirmed the pre-
viously debated point that a tax lien not perfected by filing of notice 
was invalid in bankruptcy31 but also reduced to general creditor 
status, with some exceptions, federal, state, and local tax claims that 
were more than three years old if not secured by perfected liens.82 
With exceptions designed to exclude preferential transfers and 
disguised rules of priority, prior mortgages and liens have, for more 
than a century, been recognized under the federal bankruptcy acts,33 
since "[p ]roperty interests in a fund not owned by a bankrupt at 
priorities granted by state law, other than those for landlords, from their previous 
parity with federal nontax claims. 
27. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 64a, 30 Stat. 544. See Missouri v. Ross, 299 U.S. 
72, 74-75 (1936); New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U.S. 483, 489 (1906). 
28. Oliver v. United States, 268 U.S. 1 (1925) (wages held subordinate to taxes), In 
United States v. Randall, 401 U.S. 513, 516 (1971), it is stated categorically that 
,"[u)ntil 1926 claims for administration expenses were subordinate, to tax claims," 
although, in fact, the contemporary decisions were in conflict. See BA W. COLLIER, 
BANKRUPTCY 1111 64.01, .402 (14th ed. rev. 1969); Colin, The Priority of the United 
States in the Payment of Its Claims Against a Bankrupt, 24 Cow11r. L. REv. 360 (1924). 
29. Act of May 27, 1926, ch. 406, § 15, 44 Stat. 666. 
30. Act of June 22, 1938, -eh. 575, 52 Stat. 877, amending § 67c of the Bankruptcy 
Act (now, as further amended, 11 U.S.C. § I07(c)(3) (Supp, V, 1965-1969)). 
31. Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-495, § 5, 80 Stat. 269, amending § 70c of the 
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. '§ ll0(c) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). While the bill was pending, 
the Supreme Court decided that the law had been $e same all along. United States v. 
Speers, 382 U.S. 266 (1965). 
32. Act -0f July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-496, 80 Stat. 270-71, amending §§ 17a and 
64a(4) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 35(a) and 104(a)(4) (Supp. V, 1965-1969); 
In re Autorama Tool S: Die Co., 412 F.2d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 
U.S. 1043 (1970). See Mars,h, Triumph or Tragedy? The Bankruptcy Amendments of 
1966, 42 WASH. L. REY. 681, 682-97 (1967); notes 299-302 infra and accompanying text. 
33. Although the Act of April 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 31, 2 Stat. 30, prescribed paying 
nonfederal creditors proportionately, without regard to their liens (Harrison v. 
Sterry, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 289, 301 (1809)), subsequent acts have, with the exceptions 
indicated, recognized perfected liens. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 2, 5 Stat. 442 
(Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 ,How.) 612 (1849)); Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, §§ 14, 20, 
14 Stat. 523, 526 (Doe v. Childress, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 642 (1875)); Act of July 1, 1898, 
ch. 541, § 67(d), 30 Stat. 564; Act of June 22, 1938, ch •. 575, § 67b, 52 Stat. 876 (now, 
as further amended, 11 U.S.C. § l0Z(b) (Supp. V, i965-1969)). "[T]he Bankruptcy Act 
has traditionally recognized that a, lien is a valid property right which must be 
satisfied out of the assets to which it attaches before any part of those assets becomes 
available for distribution to unsecured creditors." H.R. REP. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st 
sess. 2 (1965). _ · 
November 1971] Insolvency 7 
the time of adjudication, whether complete or partial, legal or equit-
able, mortgages, liens, or simple priority of rights, are . • • not a 
part of the bankrupt's property and do not vest in the trustee."34 
Rights of a mortgagee (e.g., to be reimbursed for foreclosure ex-
penses) that would be "inchoate" by the standards of Section· 3466 
if bankruptcy had not supervened prevail against the trustee,35 and 
statutory liens and four-month-old attachment liens that would be 
"inchoate" by Section 3466 standards may be perfected against the 
trustee even after bankruptcy.36 In both cases such claims gain a 
preference over the taxes and other federal claims unsecured by rec-
ognized liens but entitled to priority in the bankrupt estate.37 
Under still another system of priorities, which operates without 
regard to the solvency of the debtor, unpaid federal tax assessments 
have, for more than a century, been l)'.lade liens on "all property and 
rights to property ... belonging to" the taxpayer.38 Originally this 
secret tax lien prevailed even over a bona fide purchaser39 but Con-
gress has shown an ever-increasing awareness of the public importance 
of title security and of the need of certain creditors to be able to 
rely upon the taxpayer's apparently unencumbered ownership of his 
property. Thus in 1913, Congress protected purchasers, mortgagees, 
and judgment creditors40 and, in 1939, pledgees,41 against federal tax 
liens of which notice had not been filed in a duly designated office. 
Nevertheless, in a series of court decisions beginning in 1950, credi-
tors with valid and perfected liens under state law,42 and finally even 
34. Pearlman v. Reliance Ins, Co., 371 U.S. 132, 135 (1962). 
35. Compare Security Mortgage Co. v. Powers, 278 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1928) (recog-
nizing in bankruptcy such a contingent right of a mortgagee), with United States v. 
Pioneer Am. Life Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84, 91 (1963) (holding such -right "inchoate" as 
against a federal tax lien, even under standards that were less strict (see note 45 infra 
and accompanying text) than those applied under Section 3466). 
36. Concerning statutory liens, compare Bankruptcy Act § 67c(l){B), 11 U.S.C. 
§ 107(c)(l}(B) (Supp. V, 1965-1969), with W.T. Jones & Co. v. Foodco Realty, Inc., 318 
F.2d 881, 886-88 (4th Cir. 1963). Concerning attachments, compare In re Consolidated 
Container Carriers, Inc., 254 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Pa. 1966), affd., 385 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 
1967), and Doe v. Childress, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 642 (1875), with United States v. 
Securi_ty Trust & Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 51 (1950). 
37. In re Knox-Powell-Stockton Co., 100 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1939). Cf. City of 
Richmond v. Bird, 249 U.S. 174 (1919). 
38. Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 9, 14 Stat. 107, from which INT. REv. CODE of 1954, 
§ 6321 is derived. See also Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 78, ·13 Stat. 470. 
39. United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893). 
40. Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 166, 37 Stat. 1016. 
41. Revenue Act of 1939, § 401, 53 Stat. 882, now, with further amendments, INT. 
REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323. The same provision protected purchasers of "securities" 
and those who lent on the security of securities from tax liens not actually known to 
them, whether or not notice had been filed. . 
42. Victims included holders of mechanics' liens for work already completed (United 
8 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 70:1 
persons protected by federal law,43 were subjected, as against sub. 
sequently attaching federal tax liens, to a test of "choateness" de• 
rived from,44 but ultimately held to be somewhat less stringent 
than,45 that which had been applied in insolvency under Section 3466. 
In 1959, reacting to those decisions, the American Bar Associa• 
tion (ABA) proposed a comprehensive revision of the law of federal 
liens and priorities. The proposal ultimately led to the enactment 
of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, a major objective of which 
was to restrict, on a selective basis, the unwarranted preference en• 
joyed by the federal tax lien over many othenvise perfected security 
interests and liens under the "choateness" rule.40 The ABA recom-
mendation had also included a proposed amendment to Section 3466 
designed to coordinate the federal priority in insolvency both with 
the general priority policies developed in the Bankruptcy Act and 
with the relief against the federal tax lien proposed for certain liens 
and security interests.47 Since the latter proposal, which affected many 
federal claims in addition to tax claims, fell outside the jurisdiction 
of the congressional committees that considered the tax lien legis-
lation, it had to be put aside for another day. Therefore, as a result 
of the continuing discrepancies between the bankruptcy and insol-
vency rules, some creditors have had a distinct incentive to throw 
States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956), revg. 227 F.2d 359 (7th Cir, 
1955)); attorneys' liens (United States v. Goldstein, 256 F.2d 581 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
358 U.S. 830 (1958), afjg. United States v. Pay-O•Matic Corp,, 162 F, Supp. 154 (S,D.N,Y, 
1958)); landlords' liens perfected by distraint (United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 
(1955)); and attachment and garnishment liens before judgment (United States v. 
Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955); United States v. Liverpool 8: London Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 
(1955)). 
43. United States v. Pioneer Am. Life Ins, Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963) (mortgagee's 
right to recover foreclosure expenses); United States v. R.F. Ball Constr, Co., 355 
U.S. 587 (1958) (surety's security for indemnity against losses not yet incurred): 
Leipert v. R.C. Williams 8: Co., 161 F. Supp. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (contract purchasers 
who had made payments but had not taken title). 
44. See United States v. Security Trust 8: Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 51 (1950). 
45. United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351 (1964). The competing lien was re• 
quired to meet the tests of certainty of the lienor, the property, and the amount, but 
divestment of title or possession was not required, as it was under Section 3466. See 
note 15 supra. Hence, a state tax lien attaching to "all" the debtor's property (like the 
federal tax lien itself) and enforceable without suit was deemed "choate" for this 
purpose. 377 U.S. at 357-59. 
46. INT. R.Ev. ConE OF 1954, § 6323, as amended by Ptra. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat, 1125 
(1966). In varying degrees and subject to specified conditions, protection was extended 
to holders of mechanics' liens, attorneys' liens, certain possessory liens, and real 
property tax liens; to commercial and construction lenders and sureties; to all other-
wise prior lenders and lienors with respect to recovery of their expenses; and to 
contract purchasers, retail purchasers, and certain "casual" purchasers. See ·w. PLUMB 
8: L. WRIGHT, FEDERAL TAX LIENS (3d ed., tent. publication 1971). 
47. Report of the Special Committee on Federal Liens, in 84 ABA ANNUAL REPORT 
645, 731-36 (1959) {hereinafter 1959 REPonT]. 
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into bankruptcy a debtor whose case might have been handled, with 
less expense and less burden on the federal courts, in another form 
of proceeding.48 In those circumstances in which bankruptcy is not 
an available alternative, unjust discrimination against creditors re-
sults from the more stringent priority rule of Section 3466.49 And, 
when federal tax claims are involved, the hard-won and much-needed 
protections provided for secured creditors and certain lienors by 
the Federal Tax Lien Act may be nullified if the debtor becomes 
insolvent but bankruptcy does not ensue-the very circumstance 
in which those protections would become of crucial importance.50 
The readiness of Congress in 1966 to accept equitable limitations 
on the priority of federal tax liens, as well as to restrict further the 
favored position of federal taxes in bankruptcy,51 encourages the hope 
that Congress may now be receptive to review of the third great 
branch of federal priorities. Perhaps the dictum of Justice Holmes, 
that "[p ]ublic opinion as to the peculiar rights and preferences due 
to the sovereign has changed," may at last be confirmed. 52 
In 1970, the ABA approved a revised version of its insolvency 
priority recommendation which is now before the Senate Judiciary 
48. The relative advantages and disadvantages to creditors are detailed in W. PLUMB 
8: L. WRIGHT, supra note 46, at ch. 6. 
49. A decedent's estate cannot become bankrupt (In re Fackelman, 248 Fed. 565 
(S.D. Cal. 1918)) although bankruptcy proceedings do not abate if commenced before 
death. Bankruptcy Act § 8, 11 U.S.C. § 26 (1964). See text accompanying notes 334-40 
infra. Insolvencies of banks, building and loan associations, and insurance companies are 
administered under other state or federal laws rather than in bankruptcy (Bankruptcy 
Act § 4, 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1964)) and, except in the case of national banks (12 U.S.C. 
§ 194 (1964); Cook County Natl. Bank v. United States, 107 U.S. 445 (1883)), are subject 
to the priority rule of § 3466. United States v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544 (1936); Bramwell v. 
United States Fidelity 8: Guar. Co., 269 U.S. 483 (1926). Railroads may not become 
bankrupt (Bankruptcy Act § 4, II U.S.C. § 22 (1964), although they may be re-
organized under§ 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205, (1964), which makes appli-
cable, with respect to unsecured claims, the rules of priority pertaining to equity receiver-
ships-which include § 3466. Bankruptcy Act § 77(b), 11 U.S.C. § 205(b) (1964). See 
note 82 infra. Involuntary bankruptcy may not be instituted by creditors of wage 
earners, farmers, persons owing less than $1,000 (Bankruptcy Act § 4b, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 22(b) (1964)) or of persons whose act of bankruptcy occurred more than four months 
previously (Bankruptcy Act § 3b, 11 U.S.C, § 21(b) (1964)) nor by less than three 
creditors holding net unsecured claims aggregating at least $500 if the debtor has twelve 
or more creditors. Bankruptcy Act§ 59b, 11 U.S.C. § 95(b) (1964)), See International Shoe 
Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 266 (1929). 
50, See H.B. Agsten 8: Sons, Inc. v. Huntington Trust & Sav. Bank, 388 F.2d 156, 
161 (4th Cir. 1967) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1025 (1968). 
51. See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra and note 46 supra and accompanying 
text. 
52. Davis v. Pringle, 268 U.S. 315, 318 (1925). The statement was quoted with 
approval in National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 359 (1955), in 
support of the view that the sovereign's immunity from suit had not been "favored 
by the test of time," but had "increasingly been found to be in conflict with the 
growing subjection of governmental action to moral judgment." 
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Committee as S. 2197, having been introduced by Senator Quentin 
N. Burdick. "by request," for the purpose of inviting public com-
ment.53 The suggestions and criticisms made in the following analysis 
of the proposal are meant to detract nothing from the great desir-
ability of the reform, for which I have worked for many years, but 
are intended to facilitate the kind of accommodation to the legiti-
mate interests of the Government that ultimately paved the way for 
the adoption of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 and which may 
prove even more essential in this instance when there are not one, 
but many federal financial agencies with the power, and perhaps 
the will, to impede enactment. 
I. FEDERAL CLAIMS ENTITLED TO PRIORITY 
The federal priority under Section 3466 is not limited to tax 
claims but applies to debts of every kind, including those arising 
under government contracts and the vast federal programs of loan 
insurance, guaranties, and direct loans.54 Since the Government is 
able to choose its nontax debtors, it is free to exact such security as 
the circumstances require and the policy of the particular program 
53. The proposal is set out and explained in Report of Comm. on Relative Priority 
of Government and Private Liens, Proposed Legislation and Recent Developments on 
Lien Priorities, 4 REAL PROP., PROB. &: TR. J. 413 (1969), which was approved by the 
ABA in 1970 [hereinafter 1970 REPORT]. The proposed provisions hereafter quoted are 
from S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), which differs from the ABA draft in minor 
respects, generally not affecting the substance. The resolutions of approval, set out in 
56 A.B.A.J. 991 (1970), stated the objectives: 
(1) to bring the priority provisions in line with the policies expressed in the 
National Bankruptcy Act; 
(2) to provide (and partly to clarify) that the priority conferred is inapplicable 
against competing liens; and 
(3) to limit the priority conferred to tax claims of the United States, thereby 
providing greater equity for other creditors of the insolvent. 
The proposal was endorsed by the National Bankruptcy Conference. NATIONAL DANK• 
RUPTCY CONFERENCE, ANNUAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS, Resolution No. 27, at 11 (1970). 
Although this paper is in the nature of a belated minority report on the draft legisla• 
tion by one who participated in the deliberations (1970 REPoRT, supra at 415), the 
suggestions herein conform to the letter as well as the substance of the principles 
stated in the resolutions, and differ only in the implementation. 
54. Although Congress relinquished the benefit of the insolvency priority in the 
case of the "normal lending operations," but not the "wartime activities," of the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (In re Temple, 174 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1949); Act 
of May 25, 1948, ch. 334, § 3, 62 Stat. 261-62, repealed by § 8(a) of Pub. L. No. 89-554, 
80 Stat. 654 (1966)), it expressly extended the priority to Commodity Credit Corpora• 
tion loans (15 U.S.C. § ·'ll4b(e) (1964)). The Supreme Court has refused, in the silence 
of Congress, to imply an intent to relinquish tlte priority for such unincorporated 
financing agencies as the Small Business Administration, the Farm Credit Administra• 
tion, and the Federal Housing Administration. Small Bus. Admin. v. McClellan, ll64 
U.S. 446, 450 (1960); Dept. of Agriculture v. Redmund, 330 U.S. 539, 544-45 (1947); 
United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423, 433 (1941). 
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permits;55 such security will appear of record for the protection of 
others dealing with the debtor.56 If the federal government does not 
take security, it is ordinarily because the purpose of the program 
would be defeated if a recorded encumbrance discouraged the ex-
tension of credit by others; yet, if insolvency ensues, the Government 
puts in an appearance as a priority creditor. The Government, deriv-
ing its revenue from the entire population, is better able to self-in-
sure such risks than are private parties, for many of whom the 
failure of even a single major debtor may be ruinous. As the Fourth 
Circuit said many years ago in holding that Congress in the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898 had relinquished the priority of federal nontax 
claims in bankruptcy: 
No sound principle of public policy can be invoked in support of 
preference to the federal government . . . over citizens in the col-
lection of ordinary debts. On the contrary, the contractual operations 
of the federal government •.• have become -so extensive and so in-
volved with the business of private citizens that priority to the federal 
government •.. , except for taxes, would operate as an oppressive 
hardship on other creditors of bankrupts.57 
The tremendous expansion of federal-financing programs since 
the priority of nontax claims in bankruptcy was restored by Con-
gress in 192668 compels reconsideration of whether it is sound gov-
ernment policy to attempt to bolster the economy by federal loans 
and guaranties, frequently involving marginal debtors, and at the 
same time to discourage uninsured credit by making it more hazard-
ous. 09 The 1970 ABA proposal-making a bold but justifiable step 
55. See Recent Development, 64 MICH. L. REv. 944, 948-49 (1965). 
56. For the proposition that the Government must comply with state recording laws, 
see United States v. Union Livestock Sales Co., 298 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1962). The record 
of a mortgage may not, however, disclose that the United States is a guarantor, and thus 
may entrap those who, under state law, would be superior to a private mortgage. See 
W.T. Jones & Co. v. Foodco Realty, Inc., 318 F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1963), discussed in 
Comment, The Relative Priority of Small Business Administration Liens: An Un-
reasonable Extension of the Federal Preference'!, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1107, 1120-22, 1133-34 
(1966). 
57. Davis v. Pringle, 1 F.2d 860, 864 (4th Cir. 1924), affd., 268 U.S. 315 (1925). 
See note 25 supra. Although the priority of the English Crown had extended to con-
tract claims, it is reported that since 1947 England has limited the priority to obliga-
tions arising from "public acts." Salter, Priority Accorded the Sovereign in Bankruptcy: 
The American and British Views, 63 C9ll!. L.J. 354 (1958). The majority of tlie· states, 
which inherited the priority rule as part of the common law, rejected its application to 
contract claims as inappropriate to our society. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. 
v. Carter, 161 Va. 381, 403, 170 S.E. 764, 772 (1933). 
58. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. 
59. See United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 280 U.S. 478, 485 (1930). See also 
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fonvard from its 1959 recommendation-would accordingly limit 
the federal priority in insolvency and bankruptcy to tax claims.00 
II. PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH PRIORITY Js .APPLICABLE 
A. Collective Proceedings Only 
Although the first clause of Section 3466 appears to give the Gov-
ernment priority "[w]henever any person indebted to the United 
MacLachlan, Improving the Law of Federal Liens and Priorities, 1 B.C. IND. &: CoM. L. 
REv. 73, 74-76 (1959); Comment, supra note 56. 
60. 1970 REPORT, supra note 53, at 414-15. The proposal, in S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1971), reads: 
[Sec. 3466J (c) OTHER CLAIMS.-Except as provided in subsection (d) [relating 
to penalties and forfeitures], all claims of the United States other than those 
referred to in paragraph (4) of subsection (b) [relating to taxes] shall be paid 
without priority along with all claims not otherwise entitled to priority under 
subsection (b). 
(Bracketed explanations added.) Although only § 3466 would be so amended, the 
effect would be also to demote federal nontax claims from fifth priority to parity with 
general creditors in bankruptcy since § 64a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act incorporates the 
insolvency priority. See Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next 
Decade, 77 YALE L.J. 228, 244-46 (1967), for a further development of the argument 
for the proposal. 
If Congress should reject this limitation, consideration should be given to bringing 
about some consistency and uniformity in the application of the priority to federal 
nontax claims. As the law stands, if a government agency insures or guarantees a 
loan and the obligation on default is assigned to the United States before a bankruptcy 
or insolvency proceeding is instituted, the federal priority is given effect. United 
States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423 (1941). But if the assignment of the defaulted claim is 
delayed until after proceedings have begun, the priority does not apply. United States 
v. Marxen, 307 U.S. 200 (1939) (bankruptcy); Engleman v. Commodity Credit Corp., 
107 F. Supp. 930 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (assignment for creditors). Cf. In re Miller, 105 F.2d 
926, 929 (2d Cir. 1939) (Government may not prove a priority claim under the debtor's 
agreement to indemnify it on the guaranty). In a Chapter X reorganization, however, 
by virtue of Bankruptcy Act § 201, 11 U.S.C. § 601 (1964), the Government has until 
the qualification of a receiver or trustee (or the order approving the petition and 
continuing the debtor in possession), rather than until the filing of the petition, to 
obtain an assignment and qualify the obligation for priority. United States v. Ander• 
son, 334 F.2d 111, 117-18 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964), Concerning the 
situation when the Government's protection of the lender takes the form of a 
percentage "participation" in the loan, sec Small Bus. Admin. v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 
446 (1960); Comment, supra note 56, at 1133. The ABA proposal approves the Marxen 
rule, supra (see 1970 REPORT, supra note 53, at 422), and thus, if the denial of priority 
of federal nontax claims is not accepted, would serve to perpetuate those irrational 
distinctions. See S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), which provides: 
[Sec. 3466] (g) DEFINITIONS.-For the purposes of this section and section 
3467-
(2) "claims" means claims found to be legally due and owing by the debtor as 
of the date of the divestment of his property in the manner prescribed in subsec-
tion (a) [see note 74 infra] (or as of the date of death in the case of an insolvent 
estate) •••• 
Since the Government's exposure to loss is the same in either case, whether it stands 
as the legal or beneficial owner of the claim or is still merely an insurer or guarantor 
at the moment of bankruptcy or insolvency, its priority (or lack thereof) should be the 
same. For further development of this and related suggested amendments for con• 
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States is insolvent," the Supreme Court, viewing the provision as a 
whole,61 has determined that, except in the case of a decedent's estate, 
something more than insolvency is required. The insolvency of a liv-
ing debtor must have been manifested by (I) a "voluntary assignment" 
made by one not having sufficient property to pay his debts, (2) the 
attachment of the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or 
absent debtor, or (3) the commission of an act of bankruptcy (even 
though not followed by a bankruptcy proceeding).62 These acts, in 
general, involve a divestment of the debtor's property for the benefit 
of his creditors; the Supreme Court has therefore generalized in 
repeated dicta that the "priority does not attach while the debtor 
continues the owner and in possession of the property,"63 but applies 
only "when the possession and control of the estate of the insolvent 
is given to any person charged with the duty of applying it to the 
payment of the debts of the insolvent, as the rights and priorities of 
creditors may be made to appear.''64 Hence, outside of bankruptcy,65 
the federal insolvency priority has been applied almost exclusively to 
insolvent decedents' estates, general assignments for creditors, general 
receiverships,66 liquidations of insolvent corporations,67 and compar-
sideration in the event the priority of federal nontax claims is continued, see Plumb, 
supra at 246-48. 
61. Section 3466, 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1964), provides in full: 
Priority established. · 
Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever 
the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or administrators, 
is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the 
United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority established shall extend as 
well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all his debts, 
makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an 
absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases 
in which an act of bankruptcy is committed. 
62. United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253, 262 (1923). 
63. Bramwell v. United States Fidelity &: Guar. Co., 269 U.S. 483, 488 (1926). 
64. Bramwell v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 269 U.S. 483, 490 (1926). See also 
King v. United States, 379 U.S. 329, 336 (1964); United States v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544, 552 
(1936); United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253, 260 (1923). 
65. For a discussion of proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act, see pt. II. B. infra. 
66. Although the Supreme Court views the question as an open one (Illinois ex rel. 
Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 368-69 (1946)), it is generally considered that only 
a general receivership of all the debtor's property within the jurisdiction for the 
benefit of all his creditors will constitute an act of bankruptcy (see I W. COLLIER, 
BANKRUPTCY ,i 3.502 (14th ed. rev. 1971)) that will make the Section 3466 priority 
applicable. A receivership in aid of foreclosure of a mortgage or lien, or other limited 
receiverships, ordinarily would not have that effect (Elfast v. Lamb, lll F.2d 434 (2d 
Cir. 1940); In re Clement-Rowe Press, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); contra, 
In re 211 East Delaware Place Bldg. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Ill. 1936)) unless ex-
tended generally to all creditors. Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946); 
United States v. Clover Spinning Mills Co., 373 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1966). 
67. Such liquidations include not only state-supervised liquidations of banks and 
insurance companies (Bramwell v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 269 U.S. 483, 
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able collective proceedings for the administration of the assets of an 
insolvent. 
Nevertheless, some lower courts have applied the insolvency 
priority to situations in which acts of bankruptcy68 have been com-
mitted that did not involve or lead to collective proceedings of any 
kind-e.g., a debtor making a fraudulent conveyance69 or a prefer-
ential transfer,70 or the Government71 or another creditor72 obtaining 
a lien through legal proceedings or distraint that has not been duly 
vacated or discharged. Since a statutory rule of priority that creates 
no lien73 but simply provides the order of distribution of the debtor's 
assets is appropriately applicable only in collective proceedings in-
volving administration of all or substantially all of a debtor's assets, 
the ABA proposal would make clear that it is so confined.74 
B. Proceedings Under Bankruptcy Act 
The proposed amendment would make the insolvency priority 
rules applicable to administrations "otherwise than in bankruptcy."76 
The exclusion is desirable in order to avoid conflict between the pro-
posed system of priorities in insolvency and the system established 
by the Bankruptcy Act, to the extent that it is not deemed feasible 
to eliminate the differences.76 Nevertheless, the areas in which Sec-
tion 3466 has heretofore been applied in bankruptcy should be ex-
489-90 (1926); United States v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544 (1936)), but also the winding up of 
any insolvent corporation by its directors or others as trustees in liquidation. In re 
Bonnie Classics, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
68. See Bankruptcy Act § 3a, 11 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1964), which defines acts of bank-
ruptcy. · 
69. United States v. Mr._Hamburg Bronx Corp., 228 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). 
70. Lakeshore Apartments, Inc. v. United States, 351 F.2d 349, 353 (9th Cir. 1965). 
71. United States v. Menier Hardware No. 1, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 448 (W.D. Tex. 
1963). · 
72. W.T. Jones &: Co. v. Foodco Realty, Inc., 318 F.2d 881, 885-86 (4th Cir. 1963). 
73. See United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253, 259-60 (1923). 
74. See 1970 REPORT, supra note 53, at 419. S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Scss. (1971), pro-
vides: 
[Sec. 3466] (a) APPLICABILITY.-This section shall apply (1) whenever any J,>er• 
son indebted to the United States is divested of the title or right to possession, 
or both title and right to possession, of all or substantially all of his property for 
the purpose of effecting a general administration for the benefit of creditors other• 
wise than in bankruptcy if, at the time of such divestment, such property is insuf• 
ficient to pay his debts, or (2) whenever the estate of a deceased debtor of the 
United States is at the time of death insufficient to pay the debts of that estate. 
Consideration might be given, however, to whether the scope of Section 3466 ought 
to be broadened to embrace administrations of "all or a greater portion of the prop· 
erty," rather than "substantially all." CJ. Bankruptcy Act § 131, 11 U.S.C. § 531 (1964), 
75. See proposed § 3466(a)(l), set out in note 74 supra, 
· 76. See pt. IV. B. infra. 
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plored to determine whether the· exclusion shou.Ia be qualified in 
any way.77 
Section 3466 does at present serve an essential function in con-
ventional bankruptcies in that Section 64a(5) of the Bankruptcy 
Act78 incorporates it by reference by providing fifth priority for 
"debts other than for taxes owing to any person, including the 
United States, who by the laws of the United States is entitled to 
priority."79 If, as proposed, "debts other than for taxes" owing to 
the United States are to be excluded from the priority, there will be 
no further need for reference to Section 3466 in conventional bank-
ruptcies since the Bankruptcy Act contains its own provisions for 
the priority status of federal taxes.80 
In railroad reorganizations under Section 77 and in other cor-
porate reorganizations under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 
priorities are not governed by Section 64 of the Act, which applies in 
conventional bankruptcies;81 instead, the rules of priority in equity 
77. The frequent judicial statements that Section 3466 "does not apply in bank-
ruptcy" are misleading and should be read in light of the issue decided. Most of the 
cases involved the priority of nonfederal statutory liens which, under Bankruptcy Act 
§ 67b S: c, 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) S: (c) (Supp. V, 1965-1969), are valid or perfectible against 
the trustee and hence against the Government if it claims through the trustee rather 
than under an antecedent lien of its own and which cannot be displaced by the 
super-priority which federal taxes would enjoy under Section 3466, and in the absence 
of bankruptcy. United States v. First Natl. Bank &: Trust Co. of Fargo, 386 F.2d 646, 
648 (8th Cir. 1967); Adams v; O'Malley, 182 F.2d 925, 927 (8th Cir. 1950); In re Taylor-
craft Aviation Corp., 168 F.2d 808, 810 (6th Cir. 1948); United States v. Sampsell, 153 
F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 1946); In re Knox-Powell-Stockton Co., 100 F.2d 979, 982 (9th 
Cir. 1939). . 
78. 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(5) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
79. It was with reference to the demotion of federal taxes to fourth and of other 
federal claims to fifth priority, if bankruptcy ensues, that the court in United States 
v. Gargill, 218 F.2d 556, 559 (1st Cir. 1955), declared that Section 3466 "is not appli-
cable in proceedings in bankruptcy." But it was only the incorporation of Section 
3466 by § 64a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act that assured federal nontax claims even fifth 
priority. Cf. Davis v. Pringle, 268 U.S. 315 (1925), discussed in note 25 supra. 
80. The 1959 ABA proposal, which did not undertake to exclude nontax claims 
from priority, would have qualified the exclusion of bankruptcy proceedings from 
Section 3466 by providing: 
[Sec. 3466(c)] (6) RULE IN BANKRUPTCY.-This section is a law of the United 
States entitling the United States to priority within the meaning of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, and in proceedings under that Act the claims of the United States 
shall have the degree of priority therein specified. 
1959 REPORT, supra note 47, at 735. If Congress declines to relinquish the priority of 
federal nontax claims, such language might be adopted, although a more direct approach 
would be to amend the first part of § 64a(5) of the . Bankruptcy Act itself, 11 
U.S.C. § 104(a)(5) (Supp. V, 1965-1969), to read, "debts other than for taxes owing 
to the United States," since apparently nothing else is in fact embraced by the present 
more general terms thereof. In re Chicago Express, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 566,571 (S.D.N.Y. 
1963), affd., 332 F.2d 276 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964). 
81. Bankruptcy Act § 102, 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1964), expressly excludes the application 
of § 64 of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (Supp. V, 1965-1969), in corporate reorganizations 
under Chapter X unless the reorganization fails and liquidation follows. Section 77 
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receiverships, which include the rule of Section 3466 if the debtor 
is insolvent, are controlling.82 Since the Bankruptcy Act itself pre-
contains no comparable provision and it has often been said that "Section 64 • • , 
is applicable to a proceeding under Section 77" (In re New York, O. &: W, Ry., 25 
F. Supp. 709, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1937)) or that the question is an open one (Gardner v. 
New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 578 n.7 (1947)); however, the cases involved not the priority 
scheme of § 64 but a misplaced proviso, since transferred to the jurisdictional 
section where it belongs (Bankruptcy Act § 2a(2A), 11 U.S.C. § lla(2A) (Supp. V, 1965• 
1969)), giving the court power to hear and determine any question concerning the 
amount or legality of any unpaid tax. See Lyford v. City of New York, 137 F.2d 782, 
785 (2d Cir. 1943). Such a jurisdictional provision may well be incorporated under Sec-
tion 77 by Bankruptcy Act § 77(1), 11 U.S.C. § 205(1) (1964), but the priority system of 
§ 64 seems clearly inconsistent with that of § 77(b), 11 U.S.C. § 205(b) (1964)[dis• 
cussed in note 82 infra], and has been said to be incompatible with a proceeding that 
deals with secured debts. United States v. Anderson, 334 F.2d 111, 115-16 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964); In re New York, O. &: W. Ry., 59 F. Supp. 865, 868-69 
(S.D.N.Y. 1943), modified sub nom. Lyford v. New York, 140 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 714 (1944). See T. FINLETIER, THE LAw OF BANKRUPTCY REonoA• 
NIZATION 344 (1939). It may also be significant that Bankruptcy Act § 67c, 11 U.S,C. 
§ 107(c) (1964), which makes the priorities of § 64 predominant over certain invalidated 
or postponed liens, is e.xpressly made inapplicable not only under Chapter X but in 
railroad reorganizations as well. Cf. 5 W. COLLIER, BANKRUl'TCY ,i 77.21, at 569 (14th 
ed. rev. 1970); T. FINLETIER, supra at 359-60. 
On the other hand, the special proceedings under Chapters XI and XIII do, in 
general, incorporate the priorities of § 64. Bankruptcy Act §§ 302, 659(6), 11 
U.S.C. §§ 702, 1059(6) (1964); and Bankruptcy Act § 337(2), 11 U.S.C. § 737(2) (Supp, V, 
1965-1969); In re Belkin, 358 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1966); In re Chicago Express, Inc., 332 
F.2d 276 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964). Whether § 64 is incorporated in 
Chapter XII is unclear from the language of § 402 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 802 (1964). See T. FINI.ETIER, supra at 345-46. 
82. The applicability of Section 3466 to insolvent Chapter X reorganizations is 
settled by United States v. Key, 397 U.S. 322 (1970); United States v. Anderson, 334 
F.2d 111 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964). The Court in Key, in referring 
to the railroad reorganization law that was the precursor of the general corporate 
reorganization provisions, stated that "[n]othing in § 77 casts any doubt upon the 
continued priority of the United States under § 3466." 397 U.S. at 330. One court, 
however, has dismissed that statement as "clearly dictum" (which it was) and has 
refused to apply Section 3466 in an insolvent railroad reorganization, at least in the 
case of secured federal claim. In re Tennessee Cent. Ry., 316 F. Supp. 1103 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1970), appeal docketed, No. 71-1228, 6th Cir., 1971. The court, in so holding, 
referred to Bankruptcy Act § 77(b), 11 U.S.C. § 205(b) (1964), which prescribes that 
"unsecured claims, which would have been entitled to priority if a receiver in equity 
••• had been appointed by a Federal court ••• shall be entitled to such priority • , , ," 
(emphasis added) as evidence that, if applicable at all, Section 3466 did not apply to 
secured federal claims in such a proceeding. Section 77(b), however, was not designed, 
except perhaps incidentally, either to incorporate or to limit the application of Sec• 
tion 3466. In its original form, in § 77(c) (as added by the Act of March 3, 19ll3, ch. 
204, § 1, 47 Stat. 1467), it related only to "unsecured claims, which would have had 
priority over existing mortgages •• .'' (emphasis added) and was plainly designed to 
incorporate the equitable priority of certain operating expenses incurred within sL"' 
months before a railroad receivership (see notes 238-41 infra and accompanying text). 
In that form, § 77 probably did not, in itself, incorporate Section 3466 at all. Sec 
Rodgers 8: Groom, Reorganization of Railroad Corporations Under Section 77 of the 
Bankruptcy Act, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 571 (1933). The provision was broadened in 1935 
by deletion of the words, "over existing mortgages," so that it incorporated the whole 
spectrum of priorities of unsecured claims in equity receiverships to the exclusion of 
the rules of Bankruptcy Act § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1964) (see note 81 supra) and in• 
cidentally embraced Section 3466 with respect to unsecured federal claims, But no 
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eludes approval of any reorganization plan that does not provide for 
full payment of federal taxes and customs duties (unless the Govern-
ment agrees to a compromise),88 the principal function of Section 
3466 in such reorganizations, as in the case of conventional bank-
ruptcies, relates to federal nontax claims which, if the proposal is 
adopted in this respect, would no longer be within the priority at all. 
However, the Supreme Court has recently relied upon Section 3466 
to supplement the specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Act with 
respect to full payment of taxes in reorganizations by requiring that 
federal taxes be paid not only fully but also first in time. 84 Perhaps 
the ABA proposal to exclude proceedings "in bankruptcy" from the 
scope of Section 3466 would not have the effect of precluding its 
application in such reorganizations, since a "proceeding to reor-
ganize is not a bankruptcy, though an amendment to the bankruptcy 
act creates and regulates the remedy."85 But, assuming the desir-
ability in reorganization plans of requiring payment of federal taxes 
first in time (even if assets suffice to assure ultimate full payment),86 
express reference thereto was necessary, any more than in Chapter X, to make Sec-
tion 3466 apply to all federal claims whether secured or not (see text accompanying 
note 395 infra) since the appointment of a trustee to take charge of the railroad's 
property supplies the act of bankruptcy requisite to the application of Section 3466 
(assuming insolvency also exists). It is immaterial for this purpose that the railroad 
was ineligible to become bankrupt. Bramwell v. United States Fidelity &: Guar. Co., 
269 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1926). It must be admitted, however, that there is contrary legis-
lative history in connection with a further amendment by the Act of June 26, 1936, 
ch. 833, 49 Stat. 1969, which added to Bankruptcy Act § 77(e), 11 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1964), 
the prescription, next discussed in the text, that no railroad reorganization plan could 
be approved unless it provided for either the full payment or compromise of federal 
taxes and customs duties. The reports declared that the section as amended would 
be "much more flexible and less drastic than ••• section 3466" because "[t]he bill 
entitles the Government to preferred treatment only as to claims for taxes and cus-
toms duties. Such treatment is not accorded other debts due the United States, in spite 
of the fact that Congress' continued policy would so warrant." S. REP. No. 1985, 74th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936); H.R. REP. No. 2926, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1936). Although 
the Court in Key (397 U.S. at 327-29, 331-32) concluded that the comparable provi-
sion of Chapter X, Bankruptcy Act § 199, 11 U.S.C. § 599 (1964), supplemented rather 
than excluded the application of Section 3466, there were not the same contrary indi-
cations in the legislative history in that instance. 
83. Bankruptcy Act §§ 77(e), 199; 11 U.S.C. §§ 205(e), 599 (1964). See also Bank-
ruptcy Act § 455, 11 U.S.C. § 855 (1964), regarding real property arrangements under 
Chapter XII. 
84. United States v. Key, 397 U.S. 322 (1970). 
85. See Lowden v. Northwestern Natl. Bank 8: Trust Co., 298 U.S. 160, 163 (1936). 
86. Since interest ceases to run on the federal claims at the commencement of the 
proceeding (United States v. Edens, 189 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1951), affd., 342 U.S. 912 
(1952)), deferral of payment of the Government's claim while other claimants are paid 
deprives the federal claim of part of its value even though ultimate full payment is 
assured. In conventional bankruptcies, in which liquidation is the objective, payment 
of priority debts "in advance of the payment of dividends to creditors" is required 
by Bankruptcy Act§ 64a, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (Supp. V, 1965-1969), and Bankruptcy Act 
§ 65b, 11 U.S.C. 105(b) (1964). The ABA did not consider the merit of the "first in 
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the matter should be dealt with directly and not left to construc-
tion. 87 
The ABA proposal would not alter the above-mentioned man-
date that no plan of reorganization shall be confirmed by the court 
unless it provides for "payment" of federal ta.~es and customs duties 
or unless the Government is willing to accept "a lesser amount." 
On the face of it, the Government now has, and would continue to 
have, the power to circumvent the purposes of the proposal in this 
major area of insolvency administration by exacting full payment 
of federal taxes as a condition to its acquiescence in any plan, even 
if the amount of senior mortgages and of the liens and priorities that 
would be recognized by the proposed legislation exhausts the value 
of the debtor's property.88 In practice, the exercise of such power 
may be restrained by the Government's realization that it will be 
subordinated to those mortgages, liens, and priorities if obstruction 
of the confirmation of a plan forces an adjudication of bankruptcy,80 
and perhaps also by its recognition of "the objective of Congress ... 
to enable enterprises which are in trouble to get back onto their 
feet.'' 90 It seems desirable, however, to provide a statutory guideline 
time" rule as applied to reorganizations since the committee reported before Key was 
decided. 
87. The National Bankruptcy Conference in 1964 (after the decision in United 
States v. Anderson, 334 F.2d 111 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964), discussed 
in note 82 supra), resolved that Section 3466 should be made entirely inapplicable in 
Chapter X proceedings. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, ANNUAL MEETING PnoCEED• 
INGS, Resolution No. 7 at 11 (1964). The main objectives of that proposal may be 
achieved by the ABA proposal's exclusion of federal nontax claims from priority and 
its placing of state and local taxes on a parity with federal taxes even in cases gov-
erned by Section 3466. 
88. "The priority thus conferred [by the full payment requirement] is superior to 
all other claims against the estate, even to existing and perfected liens which might 
otherwise be prior." 6A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ,I 9.17, at 269-70 (14th ed. rev, 1969). 
"Indeed, the preference over secured claims provided by Section 199 .[11 U.S.C. § 599] 
exceeds the general preference given by Section ·3466." Brief for United States at 26, 
United States v. Key, 397 U.S. 322 (1970). 
89. Bankruptcy Act § 236, 11 U.S.C. § 636 (1964). See text accompanying notes 23-37 
supra, concerning liens and priorities in a liquidating bankruptcy. The possibility of 
conversion to a straight bankruptcy proceeding is not open, however, in the case of a 
railroad reorganization that fails to result in an acceptable plan (Bankruptcy Act § 4, 
11 U.S.C. § 22 (1964); see Fooshee &: Billyou, Amendments to Federal Railroad Reor-
ganization Statutes Proposed by the American Bar Association, 16 Bus. LAW. 543, 547 
(1961)}, although theoretically the proceeding may be dismissed and followed by 
.foreclosure of the prior liens (see In re New York, O. &: W. Ry., 59 F. Supp. 865, 871 
(S.D.N.Y. 1943), affd. sub nom. Lyford v. New .York, 140 F.2d 840 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
323 U.S. 714 (1944)} or by an equity receivership in which Section 3466 would apply. 
Bankruptcy Act § 77(i), 11 U.S.C. § 205(i) (1964). 
90. Hearings on the Revision of the Bankruptcy Act Before the House Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. !350-51 (1937) [hereinafter Hearings]. It was rcpre• 
sented to Congress at that time, after two years' experience with the predecessor of Bank-
'ruptcy Act § 199, 11 U.S;C. § 599 (1964), that "there is not a single case in which a rcorga• 
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for the "lesser ainou:nt," which the ·Government may be expected; cir 
preferably required by the court, to accept. This amount should be 
equal to the value of the Government's interest, if any, in the debt-
or's property (measured by the standards of the "full priority" rule 
applicable in receiverships and reorganizations)91 after deducting all 
liens and claims having priority over the taxes under the proposed 
revision of Section 3466.92 
Finally, the application of existing Section 3466 to proceedings 
under the Bankruptcy Act has the effect of subjecting trustees, re-
ceivers, and distributing agents operating under the Act to Section 
3467,93 the "policeman" of Section 3466, which imposes personal 
liability for knowingly94 making payments in disregard of the Gov-
ernment's priority.95 The ABA proposal to confine Section 3466 to 
administrations "othenvise than in bankruptcy," and Section 3467 
to payments of other claims before federal claims "which under the 
preceding section are entitled to priority over the claims so paid,"96 
would preclude the use of this remedy for mispayments at least in 
conventional bankruptcy cases,91 if not in special proceedings under 
nizing debtor has been forced into liquidation because of inability to arrive at a fair 
and proper settlement of the governmental tax claim with the officials of the Trea-
sury Department." The hearings indicated, however, that any concessions made by 
·the Government were guided by its judgment of whether full payment could be 
exacted without stripping the business of working capital or unduly jeopardizing its 
future success, rather than by recognition of the priority rights of the mortgagees. See 
text accompanying notes 6-10 supra. 
91. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); Kyser v. 
MacAdam, 117 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1941). It may be appropriate to require that 
the amount so determined be paid to the Government in cash rather than in securi-
ties of a business corporation. 
92. See Hearings, supra note 90, at 44 (Assn. of the Bar of the City of N.Y., opposing 
enactment of Bankruptcy Act § 199: "If the property is·found by the court to be worth 
more than the liens, senior to that of the Government, the Government should not 
be entitled to more than the amount of the excess ••• .'').Cf.INT. REv. CODE of 1954, 
§ 6325(b)(2), which provides for discharge of tax liens on mortgaged property upon pay-
ment of the value of the Government's interest or for no payment if there is no 
equity for the Government. Although such discharges are discretionary (Treas. Reg. 
§ 301.6325-l(b)(2) and (3) (1964)), the judicial supervision of the reorganization would 
seem to make it appropriate here to require acceptance of an amount determined by 
the court in conjunction with the valuations it must make in ascertaining that the 
plan is "fair and equitable" to all. Of course, if old stockholders receive anything in 
the reorganization, other than for new capital, the taxes should be paid in full. Cf. 
Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939). 
93. REv. STAT. § 3467 (1875), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 192 (1964), set out in note 1 
5upra. 
· 94. See text accompanying notes 430-38 infra. 
95. See text accompanying notes 138-62 infra. 
96. 1970 REPoRT, supra note 53, at 416, 418 (emphasis added). See proposed § 3467, 
set out in note 427 infra. 
97. If this is a "boohoo," the writer, as draftsman of the 1959 ABA recommenda-
tion that contained 1iUbstantially the same language~ must·accept the responsibility. 
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the Act.98 However, under the present Bankruptcy Act, it is difficult 
to conceive of circumstances in which mispayments made with 
knowledge of a federal claim would occur without subjecting the 
trustee to a surcharge-with an effect similar to that of Section 3467 
although administered by the bankruptcy court.99 The trustee who 
prematurely pays claims of lower priority without the protection of 
a court order, with the result that a federal claim remains unsatisfied, 
would surely be surcharged,1°0 even if he subsequently obtained the 
referee's approval.101 Likewise, although a dividend to creditors has 
been duly ordered, a trustee's nondisclosure of a known federal 
claim or his disregard of instructions to provide for it would vitiate 
the protection of the order.102 In the unlikely event that after "candid 
disclosure to creditors [ and] to the court," the court nevertheless 
erroneously gives instructions that would protect the trustee from 
surcharge,103 the same court order would also protect him from 
98. See Lowden v. Northwestern Natl. Bank &: Trust Co., 298 U.S. 160 (1936). 
99. Of the four reported cases in the last century in which Section 8467 liability 
was imposed on a trustee or other officer in bankruptcy, three involved conventional 
bankruptcies in which the United States had filed no proof of its claim but distribu-
tion was made with knowledge of the claim and without obtaining a bar order. Lewis 
v. United States, 92 U.S. 618 (1876); United States v. Kaplan, 74 F.2d 664 (2d Cir, 
1935); United States v. Barnes, 31 F. 705 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887). The possibility of such a 
situation arising was minimized by the Chandler Act of 1938 which subjected the 
United States to the general requirement that claims be filed within a prescribed 
time if they are to be allowed for payment (Bankruptcy Act § 57n, 11 U.S.C. § 93n 
(1964)), although conceivably a dividend depleting the fund available for a federal 
claim (known to the trustee) might be declared and paid before the time for filing 
claims expires (Bankruptcy Act § 65b, 11 U.S.C. § 105(b) (1964)) or the trustee might 
fail to provide, from the proceeds of property, for a perfected federal lien for which 
no proof of claim need be filed. DeLaney v. City and County of Denver, 185 F.2d 246 
(10th Cir. 1950). The fourth and most recent reported instance of the application of 
Section 3467 in bankruptcy involved an arrangement under Chapter XI in which a 
plan had been confirmed on the condition that funds be reserved for a known but 
unliquidated federal claim. The available funds instead were dissipated in payments 
to general creditors, pursuant to specific court orders and with the countersignature 
of the referee, before the expiration of the time set by the court for filing proof of 
the federal claim. Although the bankruptcy court approved the distributing agent's 
account and discharged him, Section 3467 liability was thereafter imposed in a sepa-
rate suit on the ground that it was the agent's responsibility to object to payments 
of deposited funds, pursuant to the plan, before the federal claim was definitely pro-
vided for. King v. United States, 379 U.S. 329 (1964). For additional facts, see the de-
cision below at 322 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1963), and the prior proceeding, In re Seeley Tube 
&: Box Co., 120 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.J. 1954), revd., 219 F.2d 389 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 350 
U.S. 821 (1955). . 
100. In re Lambertville Rubber Co., 111 F.2d 45 {3d Cir. 1940). 
101. Distributions to creditors are the responsibility of the referee, not the trustee, 
but the referee's adoption of the trustee's act as his own docs not relieve the trustee, 
In re Prindible, 115 F.2d 21 (3d Cir_. 1940). 
102. In re B.A. Montgomery &: Sons, 17 F.2d 404 (N.D. Ohio 1927). Cf. King v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 329 (1964), discussed in note 99 supra, to the same effect under 
Section 3467. 
103. See Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 274 (1951). Cf. In re Mississippi Valley 
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liability under Section 3467, at least if the United States had sub-
jected itself to the court's jurisdiction by proving its claim.104 
When available, the remedy of surcharging the trustee would 
seem more in keeping with the purpose of vesting in the bankruptcy 
court exclusive jurisdiction of "the supervision and control of the 
trustees and others who are employed to assist them."105 If situations, 
within the reach of Section 3467, are anticipated in which the sur-
charge would not be an available remedy, specific amendment of the 
Bankruptcy Act might be more appropriate than continuing the ap-
plication of the independent remedy to bankruptcy cases. 
C. Insolvency Arising During Proceeding 
The federal priority under the present Section 3466 applies (in 
the prescribed forms of proceedings) "whenever" a living debtor "is 
insolvent" or the estate of a deceased debtor "is insufficient to pay 
all the debts due from the deceased."106 Insolvency in the bankruptcy 
sense of having debts in excess of assets, rather than in the equity 
sense of inability to pay debts as they mature, is prerequisite.107 Ex-
cept as may be inferred from the use of the word "whenever" and 
of the present tense ("is"), the law gives no clue to whether the condi-
tion of insolvency or insufficiency must exist at the commencement 
of the proceeding or only at distribution. The 1959 ABA proposal 
sought to establish a point of reference for the determination of 
such insolvency or insufficiency of assets by defining a debtor or 
estate as insolvent if the "property which is subject to general ad-
Iron Co., 58 F. Supp. 222, 228 (E.D. Mo. 1944), which held that an act of the trustee 
pursuant to court order, even though initiated by him, is the act of the court and 
cannot subject the trustee to liability to parties injured thereby. 
104. Cf. United States v. Pate, 47 F. Supp. 965, 968 r,"1 .D. Ark. 1942). See King v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 329, 338-39 (1964), which stated that if the court had ordered the 
improper payment in the face of objection, "a very different case" would have been 
presented under Section 3467. 
105. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Bray, 225 U.S. 205, 217 (1912). In 
some cases, the surcharge remedy may be more effective than that under Section 3467. 
A trustee may be surcharged for failure to seek out prior liens of record (In -re 
Prather, 138 F. Supp. 433 (S.D. Ill. 1956); see In -re Woodmar Realty Corp., 294 F.2d 
785, 793 (7th Cir. 1961)), whereas constructive notice of filed liens has not been charged 
to fiduciaries under Section 3467. Livingston v. Becker, 40 F.2d 673 (E.D. Mo. 1929). 
106. 31 u.s.c. § 191 (1964). 
107. United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253, 259-60 (1923). The ABA proposal 
would reaffirm this rule. See S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), which reads: 
[Sec. 3466] (g) DEFINITIONS.-For the purposes of this section and section 3467 
(4) "insolvent" refers to a condition in which the debtor's property which is 
subject to general administration for the benefit of creditors, or the property of 
the estate of a decedent is insufficient to pay all the debts of that debtor or es-
tate •••• 
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ministration ... is insufficient, either at the commencement of the 
proceedings or during pendency thereof, to pay all his debts."108 
The 1970 version takes the opposite tack and proposes that the 
priority apply only if, at the time of divestment of the property of a 
living debtor or at the time of death, the property of the debtor or 
decedent was insufficient to pay all his debts;100 the report states 
that this position "is believed [to be] a codification of existing 
law."110 
The report cites as its authority for the "existing law" a 1933 
Recent Case note111 that was critical of a Second Circuit decision 
that reached the opposite result and which, to this day, stands as 
the only federal court authority squarely in point. That case, Hatch 
v. Morosco Holding Co.,112 involved a consent receivership, based 
upon an allegation of "solvency but temporary financial embarrass-
ment,"113 for the purpose of conserving the assets of the debtor 
corporation. Although insolvency was not shown to have existed at 
the inception, it did exist when distribution was ordered six years 
later.114 The court unanimously held that the Section 3466 priority 
applied "to debts owed the government by a debtor in receivership 
who becomes insolvent after the receiver is appointed if the statute 
would have been applicable had the debtor been insolvent at the 
time the receiver was appointed."115 Certain superficially contrary 
statements of the Supreme Court, to the effect that the priority 
attaches at the time the receiver or other person takes over the 
property,116 were explained as referring to situations in which in-
solvency did then exist,117 but not as excluding the possibility of its 
later attachment.118 On the other hand, the Second Circuit found 
108. 1959 REPORT, supra note 47, at 732, 734 (emphasis added). 
109. See proposed § 3466(a), set out in note 74 supra. 
U0. 1970 REPORT, supra note 53, at 419-20. 
lll. 46 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1342 (1933). 
ll2. 61 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 613 (1933). 
ll3. 61 F .2d at 945. 
ll4. 61 F.2d at 945. In Hofmann v. United Welding &: Mfg. Co., 140 Conn. 597, 
602, 102 A.2d 878, 881 (1954), the opinion incorrectly states that in Morosco "the receiver 
conceded that on the date of his appointment the corporate estate was insolvent." 
The concession in fact related to the distribution date. 
115. 61 F.2d at 946. 
U6. E.g., in County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929), the debtor 
was insolvent from the inception, and the Court was saying that no then inchoate 
lien could defeat the priority. The same may be said of the later similar declarations 
in Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 617 n.8, 626 (1948). 
117. 61 F.2d at 946. 
118. In United.States v. Okla1?-om11, 261 U.S. 253, 260 (1923), the Court said that 
"If priority in favor of the United States attaches at all, it takes effect immediately 
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inferential Supreme Court support for its position in Price v; United 
States,119 in which a consent receivership had been commenced upon 
an allegation of solvency although in fact the debtor "was in a failing 
condition'' and "was found to be insolvent within a short• time after 
the appointment of the receiver"; the Supreme Court had declared 
that "[w]hen the assets turned out to be less than the debts, the 
creditors were entitled to have them dealt with as a trust fund and 
distributed among them according to their rights and priorities," 
with the United States coming first.120 
The Recent Case note, which is cited as indicating "existing 
law" to the contrary, actually directed its criticism of Morosco to 
a point that has been irrelevant for the past third of a century .. We 
have seen that, in the case of a living debtor, the present Section 3466 
priority is conditioned not only upon the existence of insolvency 
(at some time not clearly specified) but also upon the occurrence 
of certain events of which the pertinent ones are a "voluntary as-
signment" by a debtor "not having sufficient property to pay all 
his debts," and the commission of "an act of bankruptcy."121 In-
solvency at the time of the triggering event is plainly an integral 
part of such an assignment but is not in all cases a necessary in-
cident of an act of bankruptcy, the meaning of which has varied 
through the years with amendments of the bankruptcy laws.122 At 
upon the taking over of the bank." (Emphasis added.) In that case the state asserted a 
lien in favor of its depositors' guaranty fund. The Court said that the lien could 
not exist before the taking of possession by the bank commissioner at which time, 
according to the Court, the Government's· priority must have attached if it attached 
at all. Therefore, the lien did not antedate the Government's priority, if any. The 
Court then found that insolvency in the sense required by Section 3466 had not been 
a prerequisite to the takeover of the bank and that its existence had not been shown. 
As the Government brought the suit, apparently early in the proceeding, to obtain 
an order for payment of the federal claim in advance of the making of any other 
distribution, the question of insolvency in the prescribed sense "subsequently aris-
ing" was not presented. 
119. 269 U.S. 492 (1926). 
120. 269 U.S. at 502 (emphasis added). The Morosco court felt that if insolvency 
need not exist at the very inception of the receivership it ·can make no difference 
whether insolvency follows "within a short time" or after a period of years. The 
court granted that the Supreme Court's language could be construed to mean merely 
that insolvency found to exist shortly after the receiver was appointed had "some 
evidential force to show actual insolvency" from the inception. 61 F.2d at 947. But 
if that hiatus weakens the Price case as precedent, it takes nothing from the authority 
of the Morosco decision itself, in which the estate was solvent at the outset and the 
issue was squarely presented and decided. 
121. See text accompanying notes 61·62 supra. 
122. Although there was no federal bankruptcy law when the predecessor of Sec-
tion 3466 was enacted in 1797, or for much of the century that followed, the reference 
therein was to acts of bankruptcy under the applicable 'State laws, or under any future 
bankruptcy laws that might. be passed· by Congress.· See Conard v. Nicoll,' 29 U.S. (4· 
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the time of the Morosco case, and until 1938, the appointment of 
a receiver,. as such, was an act of bankruptcy only if the debtor, 
"being insolvent, applied for a receiver" or if "because of insolvency 
a receiver ... [had] been put in charge of his property.''128 Solvency 
having been found at the time of appointment of the receiver,124 
that test for an act of bankruptcy was not met.125 However, the law 
defined another act of bankruptcy as the debtor's making of "a 
general assignment for the benefit of his creditors," 126 regardless of 
whether he was solvent or insolvent at the time thereof.127 The argu-
ment had been frequently advanced that a debtor's participation in 
a consent receivership-by which friendly creditors, with the con-
currence of the debtor, enabled him to hold off all creditors while 
attempting rehabilitation-was an act of bankruptcy equivalent to 
a general assignment for the benefit of creditors. Although the lower 
courts were divided, the prevailing view was that a consent receiver-
ship was not an act of bankruptcy.128 If Morosco was in error, there-
fore, it was only because the court slighted the threshold question 
in applying Section 3466 to a case in which there was neither a 
"voluntary assignment" while insolvent nor, in the absence of in-
solvency at the time, any occurrence which was then regarded as an 
act of bankruptcy. 
One state court decision, Hofmann v. United Welding & Manufac-
turing Co.,129 has also been cited, although not in the ABA report, as 
authority for the assertion that the Section 3466 priority can apply 
only if insolvency exists at the time of divestment.130 But the case 
Pet.) 291, 307-08 (1830), In Illinois ex rel, Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 868 
(1946), for example, the Court cited a 1938 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act as 
identifying the act of bankruptcy that made the ancient priority applicable. 
123. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, § 2, 32 Stat. 797, amending Bankruptcy Act of 
1898, § 3 (emphasis added). There was some authority that, even if insolvency in the 
bankruptcy sense in fact existed, a receivership did not constitute this act of bank• 
ruptcy if such insolvency was not alleged in the petition or relied upon by the court 
in appointing the receiver. In re Valentine Bohl Co., 224 F. 685 (2d Cir. 1915): In re 
Wm. S. Butler & Co., 207 F. 705 (1st Cir. 1913). But see Davis v. Michigan Trust Co,, 
2 F.2d 194, 196 (6th Cir. 1924). 
124. 61 F.2d at 945. 
125. See Nolte v. Hudson Navigation Co., 8 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1925). 
126. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 3a(4), 30 Stat, 546, as amended, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 2l(a)(4) (1964). 
127. West Co. v. Lea, 174 U.S. 590 (1899). 
128. United States v. Middle States Oil Corp., 18 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1927); Vac-
caro v. Security Bank of Memphis, 103 F. 436 (6th Cir. 1900). But cf. Davis v. Miller-
Link Lumber Co., 296 F. 649 (5th Cir. 1924). 
129. 140 Conn. 597, 102 A.2d 878 (1954). 
130. See Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Perni-
cious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905, 906 n.8 (1954), 
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does not so hold. Hofmann involved a receiver appointed in a stock-
holder's suit to dissolve a solvent corporation whose assets were 
alleged to be in danger of being wasted. The Government based its 
priority claim on the fifth act of bankruptcy, which had been ex-
panded by the Chandler Act of 1938 to include a receivership 
"procured, permitted, or suffered voluntarily or involuntarily" by 
the debtor "while insolvent or unable to pay his debts as they 
mature."131 Although the funds available at the time of distribution 
were inadequate to pay debts, there was no finding that either in-
solvency or inability to pay maturing debts had existed when the 
receiver was appointed six years earlier. The court remanded the case 
for findings thereon, declaring that "[o]nly if the court finds that 
the company was insolvent under the Bankruptcy Act, or was unable 
to pay its maturing debts can the court conclude that an act of bank-
ruptcy was committed, and only upon that conclusion may priority 
attach to the federal claims. "132 
In the case of a decedent's estate, the sole statutory prerequisite 
for federal priority is insufficiency of assets to pay debts; the courts 
have held that the priority applies to an estate that was solvent at 
the time of death but subsequently became insolvent.133 
"Existing law," therefore, may fairly be stated as follows: Insol-
vency, in the sense of insufficiency of assets to pay debts, must exist 
at the time of divestment only if the Government relies upon the 
"voluntary assignment" clause of Section 3466,134 or if the particular 
act of bankruptcy relied upon embraces a requirement of insolvency. 
But a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, even by a 
debtor who at the time is solvent in every sense, a general receiver-
ship or proceeding for reorganization of a solvent debtor who is 
merely unable to meet his debts as they mature, or the administra-
tion of the estate of a solvent decedent will also be subject to the 
federal priority, provided only that insolvency in the bankruptcy 
sense exists by the time of distribution. The 1959 ABA proposal, 
although shifting the focus from the technical acts of bankruptcy to 
any divestment of title or possession for the purpose of effecting a 
131. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 3a(5), 52 Stat. 844, 11 U.S.C. § 2l(a)(5) (1964) 
(emphasis added). 
132. 140 Conn. at 604, 102 A.2d at 882 (emphasis added). 
133. In re Williams' Estate, 189 Misc. 210, 68 N.Y.S.2d 840 (Surr. Ct. 1947). Cf. 
:Bowes v. United States, 127 N.J. Eq. 132, 11 A.2d 720 (1940). See also Viles v. Com-
missioner, 233 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956); Leroy K. New, 48 T.C. 671 (1967) (applying 
the companion provision, Section 3467). 
134. In view of the expansion of the acts of bankruptcy, this clause of Section 
3466 probably serves little, if any, purpose today. 
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general administration for the benefit of creditors, would have con-
firmed existing law in this respect. The 1970 ABA proposal, in 
denying priority in all cases unless assets at the time of divestment 
or at the time of death were insufficient to pay debts, would have 
changed existing law, despite protestation to the contrary. 
This criticism, however, is by no means a conclusive objection 
to the revised proposal. Since the whole objective of the legislative 
proposal is to change and improve existing law, we may take a 
pragmatic approach, with the precedents serving only to illuminate 
the problems to be considered. Important as "a page of history" 
may be, it might well be overcome in this situation by "a volume 
of Iogic."185 Is there, then, some logical reason to deny the federal 
priority if, at the time of divestment or death, the debtor had 
$101,000 in assets and $100,000 in debts, and to apply the priority 
where he had $99,000 in assets and $100,000 in debts-if in either 
case there is $50,000 left for distribution to creditors at termination? 
The system of priorities in proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act 
applies whether the estate was solvent or insolvent in its inception 
and whether or not there is first an attempt, through one of the 
special proceedings (analogous to equity receiverships), to rehabili-
tate the debtor.136 Since one of the announced objectives of the 
reform is "to bring the priority provisions in line with the policies 
expressed in the National Bankruptcy Act,"187 the burden is on the 
proponents to justify such a departure from bankruptcy principles 
in the final distribution of an initially solvent, but terminally in-
s,olvent, decedent's estate, receivership, liquidation, or assignment for 
creditors. 
The one persuasive reason suggested for the proposed change 
is that the application of Section 3466 carries with it the personal 
liability that Section 3467, the "policeman" of the priority, imposes 
upon the fiduciary,138 a risk which may, in some circumstances, impose 
135. See New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.). 
136. Voluntary bankruptcies, involuntary bankruptcies based on certain acts of 
bankruptcy (West Co. v. Lea, 174 U.S. 590 (1899)), and proceedings for reorganization 
or relief of debtors may be commenced when the debtor is not insolvent in the bank• 
ruptcy sense. Bankruptcy Act §§ 3, 77(a), 130, 323, 423 &: 623, 11 U.S.C. §§ 21, 205(a), 
530, 723, 823 &: 1023 (1964). The rules for priority of distribution under § 64 
of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (Supp. V, 1965-1969), make no distinction based on whether 
the debtor was solvent at the inception. If a proceeding under Chapters X-XIII fails, 
it is displaced by a liquidating bankruptcy in which the same rules of priority apply. 
Bankruptcy Act §§ 236, 376, 481 &: 666, 11 U.S.C. §§ 636, 776, 881 &: 1066 (1964). 
137, 56 A.B.A.J. 991 (1970). 
138. See text accompanying notes 93-105 supra. A receiver, although an officer of 
the court, is subject to such liability. See King v. United States, 379 U.S. 329, 334•36 
(1964), approving United States v. Crocker; 313 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1963). 
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an unwarranted impediIIient to the continuation and: rehabilitation 
of an apparently solvent enterprise.139 It is no doubt advisable, and 
consistent with the Bankruptcy Act,140 to apply' different operating 
rules to proceedings whose object is the rehabilitation of the debtor's 
business than to those directed solely to the liquidation and distribu-
tion of his assets. But I submit that the proposed rule goes too far. 
Section 3466 embraces liquidation proceedings, such as assignments 
for the benefit of creditors, corporate liquidations, and many ad-
ministrations of decedents' estates, as well as proceedings designed to 
continue and restore a business, yet all would be relieved of the 
operation of the priority rule if the proceeding happens to have 
commenced with the estate in a solvent condition. It imposes no 
undue burden on the liquidating fiduciary, even when the estate 
is honestly thought to be solvent, to. require that he pay known 
claims in their proper order of priority, or at least that he set aside 
sufficient funds to provide for known but unliquidated priority claims 
before paying other claims.141 
Even in the case of an operating receivership or reorganization 
proceeding, or of an estate continuing to conduct a decedent's busi- · 
ness, the impediment to operations attrih1,1ted to the liability imposed 
by Section 3467 may not be as great as is imagined. The fiduciary 
in such cases is at liberty, within the limits of his authority, to incur 
and pay obligations for expenses of operation,142 unimpeded by the 
federal priority, since such expenses are preferred over pre-adminis-
tration claims of the United States.143 
139. 1970 REPORT, supra note 53, at 420. The potential impediment to the opera-
tion of a solvent receivership is illustrated in United States v. Middle States Oil Corp., 
18 F.2d 231, 239 (8th Cir. 1927), in which the Government sought to prevent any 
payments to creditors until the amount of federal taxes could be ascertained, even 
though assets of the receivership far exceeded its debts (including the maximum fed-
eral claim) and a heavy burden of interest was accumulating. Finding the federal 
priority inapplicable for want of an act of bankruptcy (see note 122 supra), the court 
said, "To withhold payment further of claims established with no resulting benefit 
to the government would be an act of gross injustice, which no government should 
desire." Cf. Unit~d States v. Lutz, 295 F.2d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 1961). 
140. See In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 362 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 1966). 
141. Both ABA proposals (see note 151 infra and accompanying text) would relieve 
even the liquidating fiduciary of liability if he proved actual solvency of the estate at 
the time a nonpriority claim was paid; but there is no reason to make his' proof' 
easier by excusing him on grounds of ignorance of insolvency (see text following note 
152 infra) in the case of a liquidating proceeding. Other creditors cannot demand a 
dividend when a priority federal claim, even if unliquidated in amount, remains un-
paid. Pennsylvania Cement Co. v. Bradley Contracting Co., 274 F. 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1920). 
142. Cake v. Mohun, 164 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1896); Chicago Deposit Vault Co. v. 
McNulta, 153 U.S. 554 (1894); Thompson v. Phenix Ins. Co., 136 U.S. 287 (1890); 
Kennebec Box Co. v. O.S. Richards Corp., 7 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1925). 
143. Abrams v. United States, 274 F.2d 8, 12 (8th Cir. 1960); Kennebec Box Co. v. 
O.S. Richards Corp., 5 F.2d 951 (2-d ,Cir. 1925). Concerning the priority of:such e.x-
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However, in order to maintain relations with suppliers and 
employees or to prevent accumulation of interest, the operating 
fiduciary may also desire to avoid prolonged delay in the payment 
of certain obligations that antedate the administration.144 Were it 
not for the effect, if any, of the federal priority statute, the fiduciary 
might be free to pay such claims in the normal course of business, 
without need for simultaneous proportionate ( or priority) payments 
to other creditors, so long as he believes in good faith that all will 
be paid from assets on hand.145 But, even under general law, his 
freedom is not unlimited, and such out-of-order payments may not 
be made after the solvency of the estate is in jeopardy146 and cer-
tainly not after the operation has been discontinued and liquidation 
has commenced.147 No reason is apparent why the initially solvent 
estate should be freed of application of the federal priority, or the 
fiduciary of the obligation to respect it, in any circumstances in 
which general law would require the fiduciary to treat other creditors 
equally or in strict accordance with their priorities. 
I submit that, to the extent that relief may be necessary or de-
sirable, the appropriate remedy is to amend Section 3467 to untie 
the hands of the operating fiduciary of a solvent estate during the 
interval before operations cease or the situation becomes hopeless, 
rather than to make the relative rights of creditors in the ultimate 
distribution depend upon the historical accident of whether adminis-
tration commenced before or after that event. Section 3467, as now 
written, literally imposes liability irrespective of insolvency upon any 
"person who pays, in whole or in part, any debt due by the person 
or estate for whom or for which he acts, before he satisfies and pays 
the debts due to the United States from such person or estate."148 
penses under the ABA proposal, see text accompanying notes 199-216 infra. The 
fiduciary incurs no liability under Section 3467 for paying expenses having priority 
over the federal claim. United States v. Wisconsin Valley Trust Co., 233 F, Supp. 73 
(W .D. Wis. 1964); Jessie Smith, 24 B.T .A. 807 (1931). 
144. United States v. Middle States Oil Corp., 18 F.2d 231,239 (8th Cir.1927), discussed 
in note 139 supra. In limited circumstances, in which the business might be unable 
to continue operating if the pre-administration obligation went unpaid, the payment 
may enjoy the priority of an administration expense, See text accompanying notes 
251-62 infra. 
145. Standard Oil Co. v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 98 F.2d 207, 209-10 (6th Cir. 
1938). 
146. Gutterson &: Gould v. Lebanon Iron &: Steel Co., 151 F. 72, 75-77 (M.D, Pa. 
1907). 
147. Standard Oil Co. v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 98 F.2d 207, 210 (6th Cir. 1938) 
("when operations are discontinued, the doctrine that equality is equity must govern 
the receiver-and no liens or preferences should be recognized unless satisfactorily 
established''). 
148. R.Ev. STAT. § 3467, as amended, 81 U.S.C. § 192 (1964), 
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Only the historic link between that provision and Section 3466149 
has caused judicial rejection of the Government's contention that 
even the officers of a solvent corporation, not under administration, 
may incur personal liability if they pay any other obligations while 
the corporation is indebted to the Government and if the corpora-
tion thereafter becomes unable to pay the federal claim.150 Both 
versions of the ABA proposal would make clear that only the pay-
ment of claims against a then insolvent debtor or estate can subject 
the fiduciary to liability for neglecting to satisfy first the federal claims 
entitled to priority.151 The 1970 proposal would also expressly 
provide-what has heretofore been implicit-that a fiduciary will not 
incur personal liability with respect to federal claims the existence of 
which was unknown to him when he paid other claims.152 A compara-
ble requirement that the fiduciary have knowledge that the estate has 
become insolvent, or at least that he have such information as would 
put a reasonably prudent fiduciary upon inquiry, ought to be im-
posed as a condition to the personal liability of the operating fidu-
ciary of an initially solvent administration who pays nonpriority 
claims in the normal course of business. 
Such protection may be inadequate, however, to remove the im-
pediment to business operation and rehabilitation. The precise point 
in time when an operating estate becomes insolvent may be less 
obvious to the fiduciary and his supervising court than it appears, 
with the benefit of hindsight, to another court in a later suit to 
impose personal liability. Apparently, under present law, not even 
prior court approval of payment of debts in the face of a known 
federal claim would protect the fiduciary from liability if, as is some-
times the case,163 the Government refrained from submitting to the 
149. Before codification in the Revised Statutes of 1875, both provisions were part 
of a single sentence. The division into two sections "did not work any change in the 
purpose or meaning." King v. United States, 379 U.S. 329, 336 (1964), 
150. United States v. Lutz, 295 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1961). 
151. 1959 REPORT, supra note 47, at 733, 735; S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), 
amending REV. STAT. § 3467. Each proposal would substitute the words, "any claim 
against an insolvent debtor or estate" for the present words "any debt due by the 
person or estate." The text of the latter proposal is set out in full in note 427 infra. 
152. S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), amending REV. STAT. § 3467. See text accom-
panying notes 430-38 infra. 
153. Except in proceedings under federal law, the Government need not file its 
claim within the prescribed time limits (United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 
(1940)), but may elect simply to advise the fiduciary of its claim at any time before 
distribution and rely upon his personal liability under Section 3467 (United States v. 
Luce, 78 F. Supp. 241 (D. Minn. 1948)); or it may decide to bring a separate action 
against the debtor or estate in the federal court and then belatedly file the judgment 
as an adjudicated claim. Hart v. United States, 207 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 
347 U.S. 919 (1954); United States v. Peoples Trust &: Sav. Co., 97 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 
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jurisdiction of the court supervising the administration.1G4 It may 
be preferable, therefore, in lieu of an uncertain test of scienter, to 
prescribe a more objective standard of liability under Section 3467. 
To be consistent with the purpose of Section 3466, any such standard 
should require some "notorious manifestation" of insolvency in 
order to provide certainty for those who must observe the priority.1Gli 
In general, personal liability should be imposed upon an operating 
fiduciary of an initially solvent estate, whether or not the United 
States was a party to the proceeding and bound by the court's orders, 
only if (1) before the payment of a nonpriority claim the estate 
had been found by the supervising court to be insolvent or had been 
ordered into liquidation,156 or (2) the payment was made in such 
circumstances that, under the law governing the proceeding, the 
fiduciary was obligated to make provision for the priorities or equal 
rights of other creditors.157 
When an initially solvent operating receivership or other estate 
under administration reaches the point of liquidation and distribu-
tion, there is no more reason to depart from the normally prescribed 
order of distribution than in a reorganization proceeding under the 
Bankruptcy Act that failed and was converted into a liquidating 
bankruptcy.158 The fact that the receivership or estate was solvent 
1938); G.C.M. 9991, XI-1 CUM. BULL. 135 (1932). But cf. Treas. Reg. § 301.687l(a)•2(b) 
(1957), directing the filing of claims in receiverships. 
154. The Government is bound by a court'i; orders approving payment of claims 
if it participated in the proceeding. United States v. Muntzing, 69 F. Supp. 503 (N,D. 
W.Va. 1946); United States v. Pate, 47 F. Supp. 965, 968 (W.D. Ark. 1942). But the 
fiduciary is not protected if the court's approval is merely ex parte (Guttcrson &: 
Gould v. Lebanon Iron &: Steel Co., 151 F. 72, 75 (M.D. Pa. 1907)), or if the Govern• 
ment is not a party to the proceeding. Field v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pct.) 182, 
201 (1835); Viles v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 376, 380 (6th Cir. 1956); John H. Beasley, 
42 B.T .A. 275 (1940). 
155. Cf. Prince v. Bartlett, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 431,434 (1814), which explained the need 
for some overt act of insolvency to make the priority applicable by saying, "Insolvency 
must be understood to mean a legal and known insolvency manifested by some notori-
ous act of the debtor pursuant to law: not a vague allegation, which, in adjusting 
conflicting claims of the United States and individuals, against debtors it would be 
difficult to ascertain." 
156. See Blair, The Priority of the United States in Equity Receiverships, 39 HARV. 
L. REv. I, 17 (1925). 
157. See te."t accompanying notes 146-47 supra. 
158. See note 136 supra. The practical effect of this position (which was the posi-
tion of the ABA in 1959 (see text accompanying note 108 supra)) is to eliminate 
proof of insolvency as a prerequisite to the right to priority of distribution. If assets 
are sufficient at termination of the proceeding, no question of priority will arise (see 
Davis v. Pullen, 277 F. 650, 654 (1st Cir. 1922)); if insufficient, insolvency at that 
time is ipso facto established. The reference to insolvency, however, serves a purpose in 
untying the hands of an operating fiduciary until insolvency appears. See text accom• 
panying notes 138-57 supra. 
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at the outset is irrelevant to the raison d'etre of the federal priority, 
which-aside from the naked exercise of sovereign power that it 
sometimes appears to be159-is that the pendency of the proceedings, 
usually under the protection of judicial custody, ties the hands of 
the tax collector by precluding his availing of the summary collection 
remedies of lien160 and levy161 while the fiduciary vainly seeks to 
preserve the business values for other creditors, stockholders, or leg-
atees.162 
D. Administrations Not "For the Benefit of Creditors" 
It has been held that the present Section 3466 is inapplicable if 
a financially embarrassed debtor gives a mortgage, as distinguished 
from an assignment, to a trustee for creditors, provided that there is 
a realistic equity of redemption and the purpose of the mortgage 
is rehabilitation rather than liquidation.163 There is no substantive 
difference, however, between such an arrangement and the rehabili-
tative receivership which, at least since 1938, has been an act of 
bankruptcy making applicable the federal priority if the proceeding 
terminates in insolvency. The ABA 1959 proposal, therefore, pre-
scribed that a mortgage or pledge, as well as an assignment, of all 
or substantially all of a debtor's property for the purpose of general 
159. See dissenting opinion in Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 6ll, 635 
(1948) ("The statute by which the Federal Government gives its own claims against 
an insolvent priority over claims in favor of a state government must be applied by 
courts, not because federal claims are more meritorious or equitable, but only because 
that Government has more power.") 
160. Byers v. McAuley, 149 U.S. 608, 615-16 (1893). Cf. Lazarus v. Prentice, 234 
U.S. 263 (1914). Concerning reorganization proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act, see 
§§ 77G) &: 116(4) thereof, 11 U.S.C. §§ 205(j) &: 516(4) (1964). 
161. In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164, 181 (1893); Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6331(a)-l(a)(3), 301.6871 
(a)-2 (1957); G.C.M. 9991, Xl-1 CuM. BULL. 135 (1932). Cf. Youngstown Sheet &: Tube 
Co. v. Patterson-Emerson Comstock of Indiana, 227 F. Supp. 208, 215-17 (N.D. Ind. 
1963). Although an assignment for the benefit of creditors may involve no judicial 
custody, the passage of title from the debtor nevertheless may preclude levy on the 
property. Boese v. King, 108 U.S. 379 (1883). 
162. See Dickinson v. Saunders, 129 F. 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1904). Cf. Bowen v. Hockley, 
71 F.2d 781, 784 (4th Cir. 1934); Piedmont Corp. v. Gainesville &: N.W.R.R., 30 F.2d 
525, 529 (N.D. Ga. 1929). 
163. United States v. Cargill, 218 F.2d 556, 560 (1st Cir. 1955); Intermountain Assn. 
of Credit Men v. United States, 14 Utah 2d 389, 384 P.2d 808 (1963). A trust mortgage 
has been held to invoke the priority if its purpose is liquidation rather than rehabilita-
tion (United States v. Davis, 247 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Mich. 1965), a/jd. sub nom. United 
States v. County of Wayne, 378 F.2d 671 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 972 (1967)), 
or if the reversion provided for the debtor is a sham. Wing v. United States, 208 F. 
Supp. 5 (D. Mass. 1962). It is immaterial whether the trust mortgage is ineffective 
under state law (e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5201 (1962)) for failure of the trustee to 
file prescribed information with the court. Maguire v. United States, 71-2 U.S. Tax 
Cas. ~ 9590 (E.D. Mich. 1971). 
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administration for the benefit of creditors should be deemed a "di-
vestment."164 The federal priority would then be applicable whether 
or not a reversion was provided. This change was carried forward by 
the ABA in its 1970 proposal,165 although perhaps uncritically, since 
it seems out of harmony with the principle of that draft that only an 
administration of an estate that is insolvent from the outset will be 
subject to the federal priority rules. 
On the other hand, if as herein proposed the premise of the ABA 
1959 proposal-that the prescribed priorities shall apply in any case 
in which an administration terminates in insolvency-is adopted, 
some of the language common to each proposal may be narrower than 
it should be to carry out that purpose. Both proposals prescribe that 
the divestment of the debtor's title or possession (or the trust mort-
gage or pledge) must be "for the purpose of effecting a general ad-
ministration for the benefit of creditors."166 The element 0£ "benefit 
of creditors" may be deemed lacking, for example, in a receivership 
in a stockholders' suit,167 or perhaps even in an initially solvent con-
sent receivership168 or voluntary reorganization proceeding; yet, in 
such cases as well as in creditor-oriented administrations, the custody 
of the court may stay the use of the usual tax collection weapons as 
the proceeding degenerates into insolvency with no protection £or 
the Government.169 It ought to be made clear that any general ad-
ministration divesting title or possession of the debtor's assets (as 
· well as a trust mortgage or pledge) is one "for the benefit of credi-
tors" from the time the assets become insufficient to pay debts. 
Ill. RECOGNITION OF ANTECEDENT LIENS UNDER STATE LAW 
The ancient sovereign priority of the English Crown applied only 
to the unencumbered assets of the debtor and was subject to specific 
164. 1959 REPORT, supra note 47, at 732. 
165. See 1970 REPORT, supra note 53, at 422. S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), pro• 
vides: 
[Sec. 3466] (g) DEFINITIONS.-For the purposes ot this section and section 3467-
(1) "divestment" includes an assignment, mortgage, or pledge of all or sub-
stantially all of the property of a debtor for the purpose of effecting a general 
administration for the benefit of creditors, whether or not provision is made for 
a revision [sic: should read "reversion'1 to the debtor •••. 
166. 1959 REPORT, supra note 47, at 731; S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess, (1971), amend• 
ing R.Ev. STAT, § 3466(a). The latter proposal is set out in note 74 supra. 
167. See, e.g., Hofmann v. United Welding & Mfg. Co., 140 Conn, 597, 102 A,2d 878 
(1954), discussed in te.xt accompanying notes 129-32 supra. 
168. The court so held in United States v. Middle States Oil Corp., 18 F.2d 231, 
237 (8th Cir. 1927), distinguishing a voluntary assignment from a consent receivership, 
the purpose of which is not to benefit creditors by a distribution of the property, but 
to deter them and enable the corporation to carry on its business. 
169. Cf. Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U.S. 36, 43-45 (1928). But cf. Bank of Andrews -v. 
Gudger. 212 F. 49, 54 (4th Cir. 1914) (involving conflict with the bankruptcy power). 
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liens and encumbrances that existed before the sovereign sought to 
enforce his right.17° In this country, the statutory counterpart of the 
sovereign priority has been construed to be all but absolute and 
operates to deprive, among others, the mechanic's lienor, the land-
lord, and possibly even the mortgage lender of the security relied 
upon in extending credit, as well as to pre-empt the liens of rival 
taxing authorities.171 
The ABA 1970 proposal would provide relief from this harsh 
rule.172 It would preserve, as against unsecured federal claims, any 
mortgage or other contractual security, 173 any statutory, common-law 
or equitable lien, or any lien obtained by judgment, levy, or other 
judicial proceeding or distraint. Although such relief for lien claim-
ants has sound precedent in both the Bankruptcy Act and the Federal 
Tax Lien Act, the 1970 proposal lacks some of the limitations and 
safeguards that Congress built into those enactments. Only two 
limitations on the recognition of antecedent liens in insolvency ad-
m1mstrations are proposed. The first, which may in fact be more 
effective than its counterpart in the Bankruptcy Act, would deny 
170. See Marshall v. New York, 254 U.S. 380, 382 (1920); In re Gruner, 295 N.Y. 510, 
68 N.E.2d 514, 522 (1946). 
171. See text accompanying notes 6-21 supra. 
172. S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), provides: 
[Sec. 3466] (e) CERTAIN LIENS PRESERVED.-Nothing in this section shall-
(2) entitle an unsecured claim of the United States to priority over a com-
peting claim secured by a lien existing at the time of divestment (or at the time 
of death in the case of an insolvent estate) if such lien would be entitled under 
other applicable law to priority over the claim of a general unsecured creditor. 
(g) DEFINITIONS.-For the purposes of this section and section 3467-
(3) a "general unsecured creditor" means a creditor with a claim that is neither 
secured by a lien nor entitled to priority; 
(5) the term "lien" means an interest in real or personal property which 
secures payment or performance of an obligation, whether arising by agreement, 
statute or other rule of law, application of principles of equity, judgment, levy, 
or other judicial proceedings or distraint, but such term does not include any lien 
which first becomes effective upon or after an assignment by the debtor for the 
benefit of creditors, the commencement of any other proceeding intended to 
rehabilitate the debtor or liquidate his property, or upon insolvency of the 
debtor, or execution against his property levied at the instance of one other than 
the lienor, and the holder thereof shall be treated under this section as an un-
secured claimant; and 
(6) "other applicable law" means the law applicable to the proceeding or 
procedure in which the debtor's property is undergoing a general administration 
for the benefit of creditors or the estate is being administered. 
173. Contractual security is included in the term "lien," as defined in proposed 
§ 3466(g)(5), set out in note 172 supra. The definition, however, is more narrowly 
worded than the corresponding definition of a "security interest" in the Federal Tax 
Lien Act of 1966, INT. R.Ev. ConE of 1954, § 6323(h)(l), in that the proposal refers only 
to security for the payment or performance of an obligation and omits reference to 
security for tl1e purpose of "indemnifying against loss or liability." This apparent 
oversight should be corrected. 
34 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 70:1 
lien status to any purported lien, whether created by statute, agree-
ment, or judicial doctrine, if the lien "first becomes effective upon 
or after an assignment by the debtor for the benefit of creditors, 
the commencement of any other proceeding intended to rehabilitate 
the debtor or liquidate his property, or upon insolvency of the 
debtor, or execution against his property levied at the instance of 
one other than the lienor."174 Such purported liens are viewed as 
disguised rules of priority in distribution since the debtor remains 
free to dispose of his property until the crucial event occurs.m 
The second limitation created by the 1970 proposal, which is really 
no limitation at all, is that an otherwise qualified lien would prevail 
over unsecured federal claims in insolvency proceedings only if it 
would be entitled to priority over a general unsecured creditor under 
the law governing the administration of the debtor's or decedent's 
property.176 
Instead of bringing the insolvency priorities "in line with the 
policies expressed in the National Bankruptcy Act," as contemplated 
by the ABA resolution, 177 the provisions of the 1970 proposal grant-
ing recognition to antecedent liens depart from those policies in at 
least three significant respects: 
1. In bankruptcy, statutory liens for rent and liens of distress 
for rent (whether statutory or not) are invalidated against the 
trustee and are reduced to the status of priorities junior to unse-
cured but nondischargeable tax claims178 and on a parity (to the 
extent of three months' rent) with other unsecured federal claims.170 
In proceedings governed by the proposed Section 3466, the landlord 
who enjoys a lien under state law would ordinarily be preferred over 
unsecured federal claims for taxes or othenvise,180 although nondis-
174. The omission of prepositions ("upon" or "upon or after') with respect to two 
of the proscribed categories gives rise to ambiguities that should be clarified. 
175. See proposed§ 3466(g)(5), set out in note 172 supra. Cf. Bankruptcy Act§ 67c(l) 
(A), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(l)(A) (Supp. V, 1965-1969); H.R. REP. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 5-6 (1965). The cited provision of the Bankruptcy Act invalidates only statutory 
purported liens of this nature, not those based upon common law, equity, or agree• 
ment; it refers only to those which first become "effective upon the insolvency of the 
debtor, or upon distribution or liquidation of his property, or upon execution 
against his property levied at the instance of one other than the lienor." 
176. Proposed § 3466(e)(2) &: (g)(6), set out in note 172 supra. 
177. See note 53 supra. 
178. See notes 299-302 infra and accompanying text. 
179. Bankruptcy Act §§ 64a(5), 67c(l)(C) &: 67c(2), 11 U.S.C. §§ 104(a)(5), l07(c)(l)(C) 
&: 107(c)(2) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
180. On the other hand, if the federal tax claim bad become a lien before the pro• 
ceeding, even though after the landlord's lien attached, the federal lien would prevail 
since the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, amending INT. REv. Con£ of 1954, § 6823, did 
nothing to relieve landlords of the effect of decisions holding their liens inchoate as 
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chargeable federal tax claims would prevail over the landlord who 
has only a priority (including a priority disguised as a lien).181 
2. In bankruptcy, a lien obtained by attachment, judgment, 
levy, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding while the 
debtor was insolvent ( or one which was sought and permitted in 
fraud of the Bankruptcy Act) is nullified if a petition under the 
Act is filed within four months.182 Such preferences are valid at 
common law, however,183 and in the absence of an applicable local 
statute to the contrary184 would prevail, under the proposal, over 
federal taxes that had not become liens.185 It is questionable whether 
the Government should be called upon to yield its insolvency priority 
to such preferential judicial liens.186 
3. Perhaps most significantly, a lien is not recognized against a 
trustee in bankruptcy (and hence against unsecured federal claims) 
unless the lien has been so perfected that it would be valid against 
judgment and execution creditors and those obtaining liens by legal 
or equitable proceedings upon simple contracts187 and, even if so 
perfected, a statutory lien will not be recognized against the trustee 
unless it is also perfectible and is in fact perfected against a bona fide 
against a federal ta.'C lien. United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955). The ABA pro-
posal, like the Bankruptcy Act (United States v. First Natl. Bank &: Trust Co. of Fargo, 
386 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1967)), would not alter the relative standing of liens antedating 
the proceeding. 
181. See note 268 infra. 
182. Bankruptcy Act § 67a(I), 11 U.S.C. § I07(a)(l) (1964). Since proceedings "under 
this Act" include reorganizations and arrangements under Chapters X-XIII, such 
preferential liens would be invalidated in those cases as well as in conventional bank· 
ruptcies. 4 w. COLLIER, BANKRUl'TCY 11 67.03[4], at 85 (14th ed rev. 1969). 
183. See Grandison v. Robertson, 231 F. 785, 788 (2d Cir. 1916). 
184. E.g., 39 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 151-52 (1954); WASH. R.Ev. CODE §§ 23.72.010 &: 
.030 (1959). Cf. Tua v. Carriere, II7 U.S. 201 (1886). 
185. An attaclunent or judgment lien arising before the proceeding but after the 
debtor is insolvent would not be one that first becomes effective "upon" insolvency and 
none of the other proposed restrictions (see text accompanying notes 174-76 supra) 
would affect it unless a state statute avoiding preferences makes the lien one which 
is not entitled to priority over unsecured creditors in the ensuing proceeding. 
186. Attachment liens and general judgment liens, of whatever age, are not now 
valid against the federal insolvency priority (see notes 19 &: 36 supra and accompany-
ing te.xt), and it is doubtful that relief should be extended to those that are prefer-
ential by bankruptcy standards. Cf. Lakeshore Apartments, Inc. v. United States, 351 
F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1965). See Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the 
Next Decade, 77 YALE L.J. 228, 256-57 (1967). It may be argued that, in bankruptcy, 
preferences are avoided for the benefit of all creditors and that it is inappropriate to 
avoid them for one favored creditor. But, even in bankruptcy, it is the priority 
creditors, including the United States, who first benefit from the avoidance. If other 
creditors are to enjoy a similar benefit in proceedings governed by state law, it is for 
the states to make appropriate provisions. 
187. Bankruptcy Act § 70c, 11 U.S.C. § llO(c) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
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purchaser, either by the date of bankruptcy or timely thereafter.188 
This standard of perfection contrasts sharply with the proposed in• 
solvency standard, which would be satisfied if the lien were valid 
against general unsecured creditors under the law applicable to the 
proceeding. 
The contrast is even more marked when the proposal is com-
pared with the standards which Congress adopted in dealing not, as 
in bankruptcy, with the relative priorities between liens and a mass 
of creditors that includes the United States, but with the priority 
between liens and federal taxes specifically. In the Federal Tax Lien 
Act of 1966,189 Congress carefully circumscribed the recognition of 
security interests, as against federal tax liens, not only by requiring 
that the security interests be perfected against judgment creditors 
but also by limiting the circumstances in which the priority of a 
security interest might relate to property acquired and advances 
made after the filing of the tax lien.19° Congress also declined to 
recognize the priority of a mechanic's lien unless, in addition to 
satisfying local law requirements for perfection against bona fide 
purchasers (not merely judgment creditors), the lien claimant him-
self had actually begun to furnish services, labor, or materials before 
the· tax lien was filed.191 With respect to landlords' liens, state and 
local tax liens ( other than for real property taxes and the like), and 
a variety of other liens, Congress was unwilling to rela.x the judi-
cially developed standard of "choateness" which denied their prior-
ity unless there was certainty of the lienor, the property, and the 
amount of the lien before the federal tax lien arose.192 In each instance, 
the requirements actually imposed by Congress were stricter than 
those the ABA had previously urged.193 However, in its 1959 pro-
posal the ABA realistically recognized the improbability that Con-
gress would go further in derogating from the heretofore absolute 
federal priority in insolvency than it was willing to go in simple 
contests between liens. It recommended, therefore, that existing liens 
be recognized against the federal insolvency priority only if the liens 
188. Bankruptcy Act § 67c(l)(B), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(l)(B) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). Sec 
Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Amendments of 1966, 1 GA. L. REv. 149, 158-60, 41 REP. J. 5, 
8-9 (1967). 
189. Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (1966). 
190. INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, § 6323(c), (d) &: (h}(l). See W. PLUMB &: L. Wnmm, 
supra note 46, ch. 3, § 2. 
191. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323(h)(2). 
192. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1966). See notes 42 &: 45 supra 
and accompanying text. 
193. See 1959 REPORT, supra note 47, at 684-87. 
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would· have been entitled to priority over the_ federal claim-not 
merely over any unsecured creditor,194 as proposed in 1970--:-imme-
diately before the divestment of the debtor's property. 
It would be a tenable intermediate position, consistent with 
the general purpose of the proposal to place the Government, in 
other insolvencies, in the position it would occupy in bankruptcy, to 
urge that unsecured federal taxes be subordinate to any lien that 
would have been recognized if bankruptcy had ensued, notwithstand-
ing that the Government might have prevailed over such lien if the 
federal claim had itself achieved lien status before the proceeding.195 
To ask for a still more liberal standard is to invite rebuff. 
IV. PRIORITIES AMONG UNSECURED CLAIMS 
A. Expenses and Claims That May Be Paid 
Prior to Federal Claims 
In addition to recognizing antecedent liens, the ABA proposal 
would relax the federal priority rule by prescribing that specified 
expenses and unsecured claims be paid prior to, or on a parity with, 
unsecured federal claims.196 The order of payment of such priority 
items among themselves, however, would be left for determination 
by other governing law. For example, if state law makes certain wage 
claims superior to administration expenses,197 that ranking would not 
be disturbed although the proposal lists wages third and administra-
tion expenses first among the items that "shall be paid prior to 
claims of the United States." Similarly, it would be of no concern 
whether an expense that is to be paid "prior to the claims of the 
United States" is paid before or after a senior mortgage. But cir-
cuity problems will arise when items not preferred over federal 
194. See id. at 732, proposing to provide: 
(b) CERTAIN LIENS PRESERVED. Notwithstanding subsection (a) [establishing 
the federal priority], nothing herein shall impair • • • any other valid lien or 
security interest which would have been entitled to priority over the claim of 
the United States immediately preceding such divestment. 
(Bracketed explanation added.) The provision seems ineptly worded (see note 97 
supra); it fails to make clear the evident intention that the test is to be whether the 
competing lien would have prevailed over the federal ta.'{ if it had become a lien 
immediately preceding the divestment-a test that would incorporate the standards 
of perfection made applicable against federal tax liens. 
195. The federal insolvency priority does not have the effect of a lien. United 
States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253, 259 (1923). 
196. Proposed § 3466(b), in S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
197. See, e.g., Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. Stanley Restaurants, Inc., 228 
F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1955), involving administration expenses of an assignee for the 
benefit of creditors. 
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claims enjoy a higher priority under state law than those that are 
so preferred.198 
I. Administration Expenses 
The first mentioned, and ordinarily the first paid, of the proposed 
priority items would be "[ e ]xpenses of collecting, preserving, and 
distributing the property of the debtor or estate, including federal, 
state, and local taxes incurred during administration."199 In this re-
spect, the proposal is consistent with existing decisions which have 
read into the seemingly absolute terms of Section 3466 a preference 
for administration expenses over the federal priority.200 Once the 
terms of the preference are specifically set out in the statute, 
however, the courts will be limited by the language used, as they are 
under Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act, and will have no "blanket 
authorization for the importation of general equitable doctrines.''201 
This commendable effort to express in twenty-two words a concept 
that is defined with great specificity in several hundred words in 
the Bankruptcy Act raises the question whether the extent of the 
preference may prove to be not only narrower than under that Act 
but also narrower than the courts have heretofore implied in in-
solvency cases.202 In addition, the failure to use, except in the 
caption of the paragraph,203 the familiar term "administration ex-
198. See pt. IV. B. infra. 
199. S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), provides: 
[Sec. 3466] (b) PRIORITY CLAIMS.-The following claims shall be entitled to the 
priority speafied: 
(1) ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.-Expenses of collecting, preserving, and 
distributing the property of the debtor or estate, including Federal, State, and 
local taxes incurred during administration, shall be paid (ratably if the property 
is insufficient to pay all such expenses) prior to the claims of the United States. 
200. Abrams v. United States, 274 F.2d 8 (8th Cir. 1960); Kennebec Box Co. v. 
O.S. Richards Corp., 5 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1925). 
201. See In re Chicago Express, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 566, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), affd., 
332 F.2d 276 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964). Accord, Guerin v. Weit, 
Gotshal & Manges, 205 F.2d 302, 304 (2d Cir. 1953); In re Columbia Ribbon Co., 117 
F.2d 999, 1002 (3d Cir. 1941). But cf. Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 
(1966). 
202. For example, the Section 3466 priority has been judicially subordinated to the 
legal expense incurred by a debtor in the preparation of an assignment for the 
benefit of creditors, although the expense antedates the administration. Abrams v. 
United States, 274 F.2d 8 (8th Cir. 1960). The comparable expense in bankruptcy is 
the expense of preparing and filing a voluntary petition, which the majority of courts 
allowed only as a provable claim, without priority, before it was expressly included in 
the administration expense priority in 1898. In re Gies, 10 F. Cas. 339 (No. 5407) (E.D. 
Mich. 1875); In re Jaycox, 13 F. Cas. 398 (No. 7239) (N.D.N.Y. 1873); In re Evans, 8 
F. Cas. 835 (No. 4552) (W.D. Tex. 1869); In re Hirschberg, 12 F. Cas. 212 (No. 6530) 
(S.D.N.Y. 1868). Contra, In re Kennedy, 14 F. Cas. 309 (No. 7700) (W.D. Pa. 1873). 
203. See note 199 supra. While the caption might be referred to in order to resolve 
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penses"204-which has become the generic designation for the items 
allowed first priority in bankruptcy205-may raise a question whether 
the operating expenses and liabilities incurred by a nonbankruptcy 
fiduciary in continuing a debtor's or decedent's business would enjoy 
preference over the federal priority. The courts have heretofore al-
lowed this preference206 but, under the proposal, it would be condi-
tioned upon the expenses having been incurred in "preserving ... 
the property of the debtor or estate."207 For another purpose, courts 
in receivership cases have drawn a distinction between the expenses 
of "preservation" of the property or business for the benefit of all 
parties in interest and the expenses merely of continued operation 
of a private business in the hope of rehabilitation for the benefit 
of junior creditors and stockholders.208 When that distinction is 
drawn,200 the term "preservation" embraces such things as insuring 
an ambiguity, it could not control "the plain meaning of the text." Maguire v. Com-
missioner, 313 U.S. I, 9 (1941). 
204. For some reason (see note 97 supra), even the caption uses the term "adminis-
trative expenses" rather than the more common term "administration expenses." 
205. Fom1erly, the bankruptcy law listed as separate categories "the actual and 
necessary cost of preserving the estate subsequent to filing the petition" and "the 
cost of administration." Act of July I, 1898, ch. 541, § 64b(l) & (3), 30 Stat. 563. Although 
both categories occupied the same level of priority after 1938 (Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 
575, § I, 52 Stat. 874, amending § 64a(l) of the Bankruptcy Act), ambiguities resulted 
which were ultimately resolved by revising the provision to read, "the costs and 
expenses of administration, including the actual and necessary costs and expenses of 
preserving the estate subsequent to filing the petition." Pub. L. No. 87-681, § 8, 76 
Stat. 570-71 (1962), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(l) (Supp. V, 1965-1969) (emphasis added). See 
H.R. Rfil>. No. 1208, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1961). 
206. Kennebec Box Co. v. O.S. Richards Corp., 5 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1925) (the nature 
of the expenses is indicated in the report of the companion case of the same name in 
7 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1925)); In Te Holmes Mfg. Co., 19 F.2d 239 (D. Conn. 1927). Although 
the cases do not appear to have directly considered the priority of liabilities for torts 
arising during the receivership, in cases in which the federal insolvency priority was 
in issue, it has been held that such tort liabilities rank generally as operating expenses 
of the receiver. Bereth v. Sparks, 51 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1931); Anderson v. Condict, 93 
F. 349 (7th Cir. 1899). 
207. See note 199 supra. 
208. American Engr. Co. v. Metropolitan By-Products Co., 275 F. 34, 38 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 653 (1921); Woodbury v. Pickering Lumber Co., I F. Supp. 
92 (W.D. Mo. 1932); Cody Trust Co. v. Hotel Clayton Co., 293 III. App. I, 16-17, 12 
N.E.2d 32, 38-39 (1937); Cox v. Snow, 47 Idaho 229, 273 P. 933 (1929); Montgomery 
Coal Corp. v. Allais, 223 Ky. 107, 3 S:W.2d 180 (Ky. Ct. App. 1928); U.S. Inv. Corp. v. 
Portland Hosp., 40 Ore. 523, 67 P. 194 (1901). It was held in these cases that the 
e.xpenses of operation of a private corporation, unless involving "preservation," could 
not be given priority over an unconsenting senior lienor. 
209. It was recognized in Cox v. Snow, 47 Idaho 229, 234-35, 273 P. 933, 934-35 
(1929), that in a broad sense everything the receiver does involves "preservation" but 
that when a distinction is drawn between "preservation" and "operation" the former 
is used in a narrow sense. The Government argued in In Te Holmes Mfg. Co., 19 F.2d 
239, 240-41 (D. Conn. 1927), that the federal priority could not be subordinated to operat-
ing expenses not involving "preservation." The court held, 19 F.2d at 242, however (in 
the absence of the statutory guidance which the ABA proposal would provide), that 
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or preventing destruction of the property210 or restoring it to salable 
condition;211 the term generally extends to the operation of the 
business only when necessary to preserve a public service franchise.212 
On the other hand, a recent Supreme Court case indicates that, in 
bankruptcy, operating expenses fall in that category of administra-
tion expenses having to do with "preserving the estate," a category 
that was said to "include the larger objective ... of operating the 
debtor's business with a view to rehabilitating it."213 The statement 
seems something less than dictum, however, for the Court was merely 
reciting a premise upon which the parties were "agreed." The actual 
holding was that tort liabilities qualified for priority as "actual and 
necessary" costs of operating the debtor's business. 
Actually, it is far from clear that Congress would or should agree 
to subordinate the priority of antecedent federal tax claims to the 
ordinary expenses and risks of prolonged operation.214 To do so 
would permit the Government's margin of safety to be dissipated in 
a losing effort to preserve and restore the business while the Govern-
ment is precluded from pursuing its normal collection remedies.2lll At 
least in administrations for the primary benefit of junior creditors, 
the Government, despite its right of priority (which is not a lien but a rule of dis• 
tribution-see United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253, 259 (1923)), was not in the 
position of a senior lienor (see note 208 supra). 
210. American Engr. Co. v. Metropolitan By-Products Co., 275 F. 34, 38 (2d Cir,), 
cert. denied, 257 U.S. 653 (1921); Cox v. Snow, 47 Idaho 229, 231, 273 P. 933, 935 
(1929). 
211. Karn &: Hickson v. Rorer Iron Co., 86 Va. 754, 11 S.E. 431 (1890). 
212. Union Trust Co. v. Illinois Midland Ry., 117 U.S. 434, 455-56 (1886); Wallace 
v. Loomis, 97 U.S. 146, 162 (1878); Jerome v. Mccarter, 94 U.S. 734, 738 (1877). 
213. Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968). The Court also quoted 3A W. COL• 
LIER, BANKRUPTCY ,r 62.15, at 1537 (now 14th ed. rev. 1969) that "continued operation of 
a business is in substance a means of preservation, namely as a going concern, sometimes 
with a view to rehabilitation." 
214. Under the proposed provision for the postponement of tax liens on personalty 
to administration expenses in insolvency, even tax claims secured by antecedent liens 
would be so exposed, except as against realty. See note 404 infra. Since many operating 
administrations are conducted under the Bankruptcy Act, any effective limitation on 
the priority of operating expenses over federal claims would have to be embodied in 
amendments to §§ 64a(l), 77(e), 216(3) &: 461(8) of that Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(l) 
(Supp. V, 1965-1969), 11 U.S.C. §§ 205(e), 616 (3) &: 861(8) (1964), as well as to ru:v. STAT, 
§ 3466. 
215. See text accompanying notes 160-62 supra. The Government's brief in Reading 
Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968), discussed in text accompanying note 213 supra, 
asserted that the forbearance of priority creditors, in the case of an attempted re• 
habilitation of a debtor under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, is "premised on 
the predictability of the nature and extent of the administrative expenses that will 
be incurred and attain first priority," and that they would be more likely to force the 
debtor into bankruptcy if they were exposed to the risk of uncontrollable items of 
expense (i.e., tort claims). Brief for United States at 29-30 n.14. See also Recent Case, 
81 HARV, L. REv. 887, 889 (1968). 
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stockholders, or legatees, it may be appropriate to impose some limitq-
tion. or condition upon the priority of operating expenses over ante-
cedent claims covered by the federal insolvency priority.216 
Some clarification also seems desirable with respect to the priority 
proposed to be provided for "Federal, State, and local taxes incurred 
during administration."217 Courts in receivership cases have com-
monly viewed taxes as expenses of the administration if they fell due 
after its commencement, even if the taxable period had ended before 
that time.218 On the other hand, under the Bankruptcy Act a tax 
216. Even when the administration is for the benefit of a senior creditor, who is, 
therefore, subordinated to operating expenses (Kneeland v. American Loan & Trust 
Co., 136 U.S. 89, 100 (1890)), the first assets dissipated in the rehabilitation effort will 
be the unmortgaged assets to which the federal priority attaches (cf. Pennsylvania 
Steel Co. v. New York City Ry., 216 F. 458, 471 (2d Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 632 
(1915)), and it might be appropriate to condition the federal subordination to operat-
ing expenses, except when an overriding public interest in the operation (see In re 
New York, N.H. 8: H.R.R., 304 F. Supp. ll21, ll34 (D. Conn. 1969)) makes it inap-
propriate to do so. A clearer case for imposing a limitation can be made when the 
United States is senior to the creditors for whose benefit the administration is con-
ducted, since generally the interests of senior creditors who do not invoke the adminis-
tration are not subject to the expenses thereof. Kneeland v. American Loan 8: Trust Co., 
136 U.S. 89, 96 (1890). See also note 208 supra. If the insolvent business is to continue, 
it should not be at the risk of a senior creditor who has nothing to gain from the op-
eration (see In re Prima Co., 88 F.2d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 1937)) but should be at the ex-
. pcnse and risk of those who, in their own interests, thought it wise to continue and 
who should themselves advance the necessary funds if the operation cannot be other-
wise financed without priority over senior creditors. American Engr. Co. v. Metropolitan 
By-Products Co., 275 F. 34, 39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 653 (1921); Hanna v. State 
Trust Co., 70 F. 2, 8-9 (8th Cir. 1895); Cody Trust Co. v. Hotel Clayton Co., 293 Ill. 
App. I, 17-18, 12 N.E,2d 32, 39 (1937). Although senior lienors were affected in those 
cases and we are here dealing with the Government as an unsecured priority creditor 
(In re Holmes Mfg. Co., 19 F.2d 239, 241 (D. Conn. 1927), discussed in note 209 supra), 
the principle is similar (Spackman v. Swan Creek Orchard Co., 274 F. 107 (D. Del. 1921)). 
Congress in legislating on the matter may properly consider whether the Government 
should bear the risks of operation for the benefit of junior, or even senior, interests 
or whether its claims should first be paid or securely provided for as a condition to 
continued operation, unless the Government approves the operation in the hope of 
greater recovery for all. Cf. INT. R.Ev. CooE of 1954, § 6325(d)(2), which permits subordi-
nation of a federal tax lien by agreement where it appears that the chance of ulti-
mate recovery will be thereby improved; Bankruptcy Act § 199, 11 U.S,C. § 599 
(1964), which in effect gives absolute priority to federal taxes in a Chapter X re-
organization unless, in order to enable the reorganization to succeed (see note 90 
supra), the Government accepts "a lesser amount." It should be borne in mind, how-
ever, that the practical effect of subordinating operating expenses to federal claims 
may in fact be to impose the risk and burden of operation on antecedent wage 
claimants, whom the proposed law is designed to favor, rather than on the junior 
creditors, whose claims presumably will have been wiped out before the question of 
priority between federal claims and operating expenses becomes a material issue. The 
operating expenses, even if advanced by the junior creditors for their own benefit, will 
ordinarily be preferred by state law at least over all unsecured creditors, including 
wage claimants (but see Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. Stanley Restaurants, 
Inc., 228 F.2d 420 (9th Cir, 1955)), and, under the circular priority rule (see pt. IV. B. 
infra), would pre-empt the position of the wage claimants preferred by federal law if 
denied priority in their own right. 
217. See proposed § 3466(b)(l), set out in note 199 supra. 
218. Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 286 U.S. 334 (1932); Reconstruction Fin. 
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falling due after bankruptcy is not considered an expense of adminis-
tration if the liability to pay the tax had accrued-in the sense that 
all the facts necessary to determine the tax liability were then known 
or knowable-before the filing of the petition. In some instances 
(e.g., taxes measured by net income) the taxable period must have 
closed but in others it is enough that the triggering event (e.g., doing 
business on the first day of the year) has occurred, while in still others 
(e.g., employment and other excise taxes) the tax for the then cur-
rent taxable period may be apportioned.210 It would seem that the 
bankruptcy rule ought to be applied since taxes based upon trans-
actions and periods antedating the insolvency administration ordi-
narily have nothing to do with the collection, preservation, or 
distribution of the estate220 and should enjoy only the priority 
allowed for taxes, regardless of their due date.221 
The ABA proposal specifies that, if the property of the estate 
proves insufficient to pay all administration expenses, all such ex-
penses shall be paid ratably.222 This provision conforms to the rule 
under Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act that ranks taxes incurred 
during administration no higher than expenses of operation and no 
lower than the trustee's own compensation.223 Although in some cir-
cumstances a similar result has been reached in receivership cases,224 
the courts in such cases more often subdivide the administration ex-
pense category and allow first priority to "judicial costs," which 
include expenses of sales and the compensation of the receiver and 
his attorney and auditor, second priority to federal taxes incurred 
by the receivership, and third rank to state tax liabilities.226 After pro-
Corp. v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 122 F.2d 326, 332-33 (8th Cir. 1941); Wiswall v. 
Kunz, 173 Ill. 110, 50 N.E. 184 (1898). 
219. See Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 
YALE L.J. 228, 272-79 (1967). 
220. An exception might be allowed when payment of past taxes by the fiduciary 
is essential to avoid loss of the privilege to engage in business. See text accompanying 
notes 251-62 infra. Cf. Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 286 U.S. 334, 344-45 (1932): 
United States v. California, 281 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1960). 
221. See In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., 336 F.2d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 1964). 
222. See proposed § 3466(b)(I), set out in note 199 supra. 
223. Bankruptcy Act § 64a(I), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(I) (Supp. V, 1965-1969); United 
States v. Killoren, 119 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1941); In re Columbia Ribbon Co., 117 F.2d 
999 (3d Cir. 1941). See Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678, 691 (1966). 
224. Southern Ry. v. United States, 306 F.2d 119, 126-28 (5th Cir. 1962). Cf. Annot,, 
24 A.L.R. 1174 (1923). 
225. Union Trust Co. v. Illinois Midland Ry., 117 U.S. 434, 481 (1886); Reconstruc-
tion Fin. Corp. v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. 122 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1941); Wire Wheel 
Corp. v. Fayette Bank&: Trust Co., 30 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 873 
(1929); Coy v. Title Guar. &: Trust Co., 220 F. 90, 92 (9th Cir. 1915); Piedmont Corp. v. 
Gainesville&: N.W.R.R., 30 F.2d 525, 528-29 (N.D. Ga. 1929): Parks v. Central Door &: 
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viding for these prerogative rights, the courts follow no inflexible 
rules226 but maintain their freedom to adjust priorities among 
operating liabilities227 in order not only to avoid prejudicing future 
operations228 but also to recognize superior equities.229 Congress, in 
connection with the federal-statutory variants of the equity receiver-
ship, railroad and other corporate reorganizations under the Bank-
ruptcy Act, has recognized the inappropriateness of applying the 
rigid priority framework of that Act280 and has provided for much 
the same flexibility in setting the priorities of trustees' certificates 
for operating expenses that would prevail in equity.231 It is unclear 
whether the proposed rule of proportionate distribution is intended 
wholly to pre-empt state law and judicial discretion in this regard232 
or whether it would be permissible, after setting aside the prescribed 
proportionate share of the available funds for partial satisfaction of 
the fiduciary's federal taxes, to apply the balance toward full pay-
ment of judicial costs and state taxes, and such other expenses as 
the court may choose to favor, at the expense of lesser grades of the 
fiduciary's operating liabilities.233 In this respect the proposal should 
Lumber Co., 164 Ore. 363, 102 P. 706 (1940); Bauer v. Wilkes-Barre Light Co., 274 Pa. 
165, 117 A. 920 (1922). See Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 720, 723-24 (1953); 1 R. CLARK, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRAcrICE OF RECEIVERS§ 646(a) (2d ed. 1929). 
226. See American Trust Co. v. Metropolitan S.S. Co., 190 F. 113, 114 (1st Cir.), 
cert. denied, 223 U.S. 727 (1911). 
227. Receivers' certificates, issued to finance operations, enjoy such priority, with 
respect to operating e.xpenses and other issues of certificates, as the order authorizing 
them may provide. Ball v. Improved Property Holding Co., 247 F. 645, 650 (2d Cir. 
1917); Central Trust Co. v. H.B. Mehring Co., 154 Md. 477, 141 A. 111 (1927). 
228. Central Trust Co. v. Pittsburgh, Shawmut&: N.R.R., 176 F.2d 937, 938 (3d Cir. 
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 903 (1950); Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Missouri-Kansas-
Texas R.R. 122 F.2d 326, 331 (8th Cir. 1941); Anderson v. Condict, 93 F. 349, 353 (7th 
Cir. 1899); Pusey&: Jones v. Pennsylvania Paper Mills, 173 F. 634, 637 (M.D. Pa. 1909). 
229. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 122 F.2d 326, 335 
(8th Cir. 1941) (favoring employee's injury claim over other operating expenses). 
230. See United States v. Anderson, 334 F.2d 111, 115-16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
379 U.S. 879 (1964); T. FINI.ETTER, supra note 81, at 344; notes 81-82 supra. 
231. Bankruptcy Act § 77(c)(3), 11 U.S.C. § 205(c)(3) (1964), permits the court to 
provide that certificates shall have "such priority in payments over existing obliga-
tions, secured or unsecured, or receivership charges, as might in an equity receivership 
be lawful," and in connection with safety equipment, permits priority even over state 
and local, but not federal, taxes. Cf. In re Long· Island R.R., 95 F. Supp. 919 (E.D.N.Y. 
1951). Under Chapter X, such priority may be granted "over existing obligations, 
secured or _unsecured, as in the particular case may be equitable." Bankruptcy Act 
§ 116(2), 11 U.S.C. § 516(2) (1964). Cf. In re Prima Co., 88 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1937). 
232. Concerning the power of Congress to pre-empt state law in setting priorities 
of nonfederal liabilities among themselves, in administrations not under the Bank-
ruptcy Act, see te.xt accompanying notes 323-42 infra. 
233. For e.xample, if the receiver's compensation and other judicial costs are $5x, 
federal taxes $!Ox, state taxes $5x, and other expenses $20x, and the fund available is 
$20x, the ratable shares are 50% of each. If $5x (50%) is then paid on the federal 
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be clarified to preserve desirable flexibility in the operation of busi-
nesses under administration. 
There may, however, be a more fundamental objection to the 
proposal in this regard. Despite the precedent of Section 64, there is 
something to be said for prescribing a hierarchy of priorities among 
administration expenses if all cannot be paid. A court, outside of 
bankruptcy, should perhaps be permitted to preserve the integrity 
of its own "costs" even at the expense of federal taxes. On the other 
hand, placing the fiduciary's own federal taxes only on a parity with 
the ordinary operating expenses of the business under administration 
seems hardly consistent with the general principle of federal priority, 
which the proposal would, of course, modify, but in general would 
not repudiate. It may be more in harmony with the proposal as a 
whole to provide for prior payment of judicial costs, followed by 
wages (subject perhaps to some limitation of amount), after which the 
fiduciary's federal, state, and local taxes would be paid on a parity with 
each other, and then other ordinary operating expenses with such 
priority among themselves as the court in its discretion or the state 
law may determine. The ranking of administration expenses, no 
doubt, gives rise to problems since many will have been paid currently 
during the course of the operation; but so also does a provision that 
all shall be paid proportionately. It is, of course, important to protect 
the fiduciary from personal liability for payments made before he 
knew or should have known that funds would be insufficient.234 
2. Expenses Antecedent to Administration 
The proposed legislation would provide, for the first time,23~ 
that wages shall enjoy the same priority over federal claims in in-
solvency proceedings as is now provided in conventional bankrupt-
taxes, could the court then allow full payment of the costs and of the state taxes, 
leaving only $5x (25%) for the other expenses? That is the solution which proposed 
§ 3466(£)(2), set out in note 348 infra, would apply when state law priorities differ from 
those to be set out in the federal law, but that provision, read literally, applies only to 
the priorities among "claims" which by definition include only amounts "legally due 
and owing by the debtor as of the date of divestment" or death (proposed § 3466(g)(2), 
set out in note 60 supra), thus excluding administration expenses from its terms. 
Conceivably, therefore, the proposed provision (§ 3466(b)(l)) that administration ex• 
penses "shall be paid (ratably if the property is insufficient to pay all such expenses) 
prior to the claims of the United States" could be read as an inflexible mandate for 
proportionate satisfaction of all grades of administration expenses falling within the 
first priority. 
234. See text accompanying notes 151-57 supra. 
235, For the present law to the contrary, see United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423 
(1941); Plantations Indus. Supply v. Cramer Assoc., - Rl. -, 273 A,2d 671 (1971). 
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cies236-i.e,, amounts earned by workmen, servants, clerks, or travel-
ing or city salesmen within three months before the death of the 
debtor or the divestment of title or possession of his property may 
be paid, to the extent of not over $600 for each claimant, ahead of 
federal claims.237 
The 1970 ABA proposal is silent concerning the priority, as 
against federal claims, of liabilities for supplies, materials, and ser-
vices incurred in operating railroads and certain other public service 
businesses238 within a limited period (usually six months) before the 
commencement of an equity receivership or of a reorganization 
under the Bankruptcy Act.239 Such liabilities enjoy priority over gen-
236. S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), provides: 
[Sec. 3466(b)) (3) WAGE CLAIMS.-Claims for wages against the debtor or 
estate to the extent that such claims would be entitled to priority in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding under section 64(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act shall be paid 
prior to claims of the United States. 
• • • In applying sections 64(a)(2) • • • of the Bankruptcy Act for purposes of 
paragraphs (3) • • • of this subsection, the date of divestment of the debtor's 
title or right to possession or both title and right to possession, or the date of 
death in the case of an insolvent estate, shall be regarded as the date of • • • 
"commencement of the proceeding'' •••• 
The ABA proposal referred to the wage priority under the Bankruptcy Act "as 
amended from time to time." 1970 REPORT, supra note 53, at 416. The omission of 
those words in S. 2197 seems unfortunate since the provision will apparently be con-
strued to freeze the wage priority in insolvency as it now exists in bankruptcy rather 
than automatically adjust to keep pace with changes in the bankruptcy law. See 
Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 314 (1938); United States ex rel. Kessler v. Mercur Corp., 
83 F.2d 178, 180 (2d Cir. 1936). Concerning the rule for cases where applicable state 
law is more or less liberal in providing wage priorities, see text accompanying notes 
347-56 infra. 
237. Bankruptcy Act § 64a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). The pro-
posal does nothing to remedy the inequitable rule that, if bankruptcy supersedes a 
receivership or assignment for creditors, the three-month period within which wages 
must have been earned in order to enjoy the preference is measured from the date of 
the bankruptcy proceeding and thus voids the priorities to which the workers would 
have been entitled in the superseded proceeding. In re Ko-Ed Tavern, Inc., 129 F.2d 
806, 810 (3d Cir. 1942); Strom v. Peikes, 123 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1941). Contra, Manly v. 
Hood, 37 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1930). Relief from that rule would require amendment of 
the Bankruptcy Act. 
238. A very few courts have given the principle a broader application with respect 
to private businesses whose inability to operate would have caused loss to creditors 
but not to the public. Dudley v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 268 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 
873 (1945); L'Hote v. Boyet, 85 Miss. 636, 38 S. I (1905); Drennen v. Mercantile Trust 
& Deposit Co., 115 Ala. 592, 23 S. 164 (1897). Where the public interest is not 
involved, however, most courts decline to impose a preference upon senior creditors 
"for their own good" unless they have consented thereto. See In re Pusey & Jones Corp., 
192 F. Supp. 233, 235-36 (D. Del.), affd., 295 F.2d 479, 480 (3d Cir. 1961). 
239. Section 77(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205(b) (1964), specifies that 
"unsecured claims, which would have been entitled to priority if a receiver in equity 
of the property of the debtor had been appointed by a Federal court on the day of 
the approval of the petition, shall be entitled to such priority and the holders of such 
claims shall be treated as a separate class or classes of creditors." This provision 
clearly incorporates the six-month rule for purposes of railroad reorganizations. 
Southern Ry. v. Flournoy, 301 F.2d 847, 850 (4th Cir, 1962), Although former § 77B(b) 
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eral creditors240 and, in limited circumstances, even over mort-
gagees,241 but their priority in relation to federal claims has never 
been resolved by the courts in the nearly a century since the Supreme 
Court gave its blessing to the so-called "six-month rule."242 I£ the six-
(10) of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 Stat. 915 (1934), relating to reorganization of corpora-
tions other than railroads, contained similar language, which was omitted when the 
provision was revised and re-enacted as Chapter X of the Chandler Act of 1938, 
the power of the court to exercise all the powers which it would have if it had 
appointed a receiver in equity (Bankruptcy Act § 115, 11 U.S.C. § 515 (1964)) 
has been regarded as permitting application of the six-month rule in appropriate 
cases. In re North Atlantic &: Gulf S.S. Co., 200 F. Supp. 818, 821 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, on 
other grounds sub nom. Schilling v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 310 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1962); 
Dudley v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 268 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 873 (1945). It has been 
suggested that Chapter X evidences congressional concern with the survival of even 
private businesses so that the reasons for excluding such businesses from the rule may 
no longer apply. T. FINLE1TER, supra note 81, at 383-84. However, when Chapter XI is 
the form adopted, the strict rules of Section 64a of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C, 
§ 104(a) (Supp. V, 1965-1969) preclude priority of six-month claims, which arc not 
mentioned therein. In re Chicago Express, Inc., 332 F.2d 276, 278 (2d Cir.), cert. de11ied, 
379 U.S. 879 (1964); In re Pusey &: Jones Corp., 295 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1961). 
240. Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry., 208 F. 168, 182-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), 
affd., 216 F. 458 (2d Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 632 (1915). But in Whelan v. 
Enterprise Transp. Co., 175 F. 212 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909), it was held that only mort-
gagees, not general creditors, may be subordinated to sLx-month claims. 
241. Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. 235 (1879). As against the mortgagee, however, the 
sLx-month creditors are generally limited to surplus earnings during the six-month 
period and during the proceeding and so much of the mortgaged corpus as equals 
the amounts diverted from income during those periods for the benefit of the 
mortgagee. Gregg v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 197 U.S. 183 (1905); In re New York, 
N.H. &: H.R.R., 278 F. Supp. 592 (D. Conn. 1967), affd., 405 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1968), 
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969). The view of some courts that the corpus may be 
charged for such expenses even in the absence of a diversion of income (Southern Ry. 
v. Flournoy, 301 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1962); In re Tennessee Cent. Ry,, 316 F. Supp. 
1103, 1110 (M.D. Tenn. 1970), appeal docketed, No. 7r-1228, 6th Cir., 1971) results from 
confusion with the distinct, and narrowly limited, "necessity of payment" rule, discussed 
in text accompanying notes 251-62 infra. See In re New York, N.H. &: H.R.R., 278 
F. Supp. 592, 602 n.15 (D. Conn. 1967); Fitzgibbon, The Present Status of the Six 
Months' Rule, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 230 (1934). 
242. Although it is stated categorically in 5 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 11 77.21, at 
576-77 (14th ed. rev. 1970), that taxes having priority under Section 3466 are junior to 
six-month claims, the decision cited (In re Missouri Pac. R.R., CCH BANKR. L, REP. 
11 3780 (Ref., E.D. Mo. 1935), affd. on another issue sub nom. J.P. Morgan &: Co. v. 
Missouri Pac. R.R., 85 F.2d 351 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 604 (1936)) merely 
divided creditors into classes for purposes of Bankruptcy Act § 77(c)(7), 11 U.S.C, 
§ 205(c)(7) (1964), but declared the ranking to be "provisional." In United States v. 
Guaranty Trust Co., 33 F.2d 533, 539 (8th Cir. 1929), affd. on other grounds, 280 U.S. 
478, 483 (1930), the court preferred the six-month claims but only on the ground that, 
since they were superior to the mortgage to which the federal claims were inferior, "it 
would seem illogical" that the six-month claims should be displaced by the federal 
priority. But we now know that problems of circuity are not to be resolved by 
subordinating the Government to both the mortgage and the claims that outrank the 
mortgage and that, unless each on its own merits is superior to the federal claim, the 
only permissible solution is to set aside the amount of the prior mortgage and then 
satisfy from that fund the claims that are superior to the mortgage but inferior to 
the federal claim. United States v. Buffalo Sav. Bank, 371 U.S. 228 (1963); H.B. Agsten 
&: Sons, Inc. v. Huntington Trust &: Sav. Bank, 388 F.2d 156, 158-59 (4th Cir. 1967), 
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1025 (1968). See 2 J. GERDES, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS UNDER 
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month 1·ule is viewed as a mere equitable rule of priority among 
creditors of an insolvent, even though it is a rule developed and ap-
plied by the federal courts,243 it cannot prevail over the statutory pri-
ority of federal claims, either as now in force or as proposed.244 Even 
if, as has sometimes been said, the six-month creditors could be 
deemed to have an "equitable lien" on the income of the debtor and 
of the fiduciary,245 such a claim is the clearest kind of inchoate float-
ing lien,246 which Section .3466 overrides.247 Although the ABA pro-
posal would subordinate the federal priority to any lien that "would 
be entitled under other applicable law to priority over the claim of a 
general unsecured creditor," it expressly excludes "any lien which 
first becomes effective upon or after ... the commencement of any 
... proceeding intended to rehabilitate the debtor or liquidate his 
SECTION 77B OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT § 654 (1936). Although six-month claims were 
preferred over a federal mortgage in In re Tennessee Cent. Ry., 316 F. Supp. 1103 
(M.D. Tenn. 1970), appeal docketed, No. 71-1228, 6th Cir., 1971, that result was premised 
on the court's view that Section 3466 was inapplicable to the mortgage debt. 
243. Cf. In re Chicago E.xpress, Inc., 332 F.2d 276, 279 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 
U.S. 879 (1964), l1olding that the judicially developed six-month rule is not a "law of 
the United States" entitling such claim to parity with federal claims in proceedings to 
which § 64a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a){5) (Supp. V, 1965-1969), is 
applicable. 
244. United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423, 431 (1941). Compare the rule that the 
precise enumeration of priorities under § 64a of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104{a) 
(Supp. V, 1965-1969), leaves no room for implying an additional priority category for 
six-month claims in Chapter XI proceedings, which are governed thereby. See note 
239 supra. With respect to wages incurred within the six-month period, it would be 
inconsistent with the express, but more limited priority, proposed by the ABA. See 
proposed § 3466(b)(3), set out in note 236 supra. Cf. Kavanis v. Mead, 171 F.2d 195 
n.I (4th Cir. 1948). 
245. See Southern Ry. v. Flournoy, 301 F.2d 847, 854 (4th Cir. 1962); United States 
v. Guaranty Trust Co., 33 F.2d 533, 539 (8th Cir. 1929), affd. on other grounds, 280 U.S. 
478 (1930). The Supreme Court, however, while calling the six-month claims "a charge 
in equity on the continuing income" (Burnham v. Bowen, Ill U.S. 776, 782 (1884)), 
has declared that the claimants do not have a lien (Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. 235, 253 
(1879)) and that the rule is "not to be explained in terms of equitable lien in the 
technical sense, as is the case with agreements that particular property shall be applied 
as security for the satisfaction of particular obligations or vendors' liens and the like." 
See New York Dock Co. v. S.S. Poman, 274 U.S. 117, 121 (1927), quoted in In re Chi-
cago Express, Inc., 332 F.2d 276, 278 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964). See also 
2 J. GERDES, supra note 242, § 654 (relying on decisions under state wage priority 
statutes). 
246. Cf. Piedmont Corp. v. Gainesville 8: N.W.R.R., 30 F.2d 525, 530 (N.D. Ga. 
1929) (lien on railroad income for injury claims). While the six-month rule has been 
likened to "an admiralty lien on wheels" (see Larsen v. New York Dock Co., 166 F.2d 
687, 689 n.2 (2d Cir. 1948)) and admiralty liens are specially favored against tax liens 
(United States v. Flood, 247 F.2d 209 (1st Cir. 1957)), although perhaps not against 
Section 3466 (cf. The Melissa Trask, 285 F. 781 (D. Mass. 1923)), nevertheless, both the 
obligation secured and the subject matter of the "lien" are much less fixed than in 
the case of admiralty liens. 
247. United States v. Waddill, Holland 8: Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 357-60 (1945); 
County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U.S. 80, 93-95 (1929). 
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property."248 This exclusion accurately describes any interest or lien 
of the six-month claimants, who have nothing but a general claim in 
the absence of a receivership or its equivalent.24° Congress ought to 
declare expressly whether the public concern in facilitating the con-
tinued operation of railroads and other quasi-public enterprises war-
rants the creation of another "public policy" exception to the federal 
priority. 250 
The related, although actually distinct,201 "necessity of payment" 
rule may qualify some pre-administration liabilities for priority of 
payment, even under the terms of the ABA proposal, as expenses of 
"preserving" the property in cases "where failure to make such pay-
ment would result in injury to, or would make it difficult to carry on 
the business of, the estate."252 If the tests of this rule are met, the 
priority attaches whether or not the situation is one to which the six-
month rule would be applicable.253 Thus, if essential workers 
are unwilling to serve unless paid their arrears, the payment thereof 
may be a necessary cost of preservation of the estate204 and would 
248. Proposed § 3466(e)(2) &: (g)(5), in S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), discussed 
in text accompanying notes 174-75 supra. 
249. On the other hand, if the six-month claims may properly be regarded as opcr• 
ating expenses of the fiduciary, having contributed to the production of the income 
subsequently earned by him (Union Trust Co. v. Illinois Midland Ry., 117 U.S. 434, 
464-65, 480-81 (1886); Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 122 
F.2d 326, 332 (8th Cir. 1941); see New York Dock Co. v. S.S. Poznan, 274 U.S. 117, 121 
(1927)), they may enjoy priority over antecedent federal claims under present law, 
although Section 3466 was not involved in the cases cited. But, under the language 
of the ABA proposal, not all such claims might qualify for priority as expenses of 
"preserving" the property. See text accompanying notes 226-32 supra. 
250. The ABA did not consider this matter and the writer makes no recommenda-
tions on this question of policy. It has been suggested, however, that since the Interstate 
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1(18) (1964), and § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205 
(1964) now assure that the railroad will continue to operate as long as public 
convenience and necessity require, or at least long past the institution of reorganization 
proceedings (see In re New York, N.H. &: H.R.R., 304 F. Supp. 793, 799-803 (D, Conn. 
1969)), the public interest may be better served by hastening the institution of reorgani-
zation proceedings than by deferring the evil day through e.xtensions of operating 
credit until all funds are exhausted. In re New York, N.H. &: H.R.R., 278 F. Supp. 592, 
598 n.10, 606 (D. Conn. 1967), affd., 405 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 
999 (1969). Cf. New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 490-92 (1970). 
251. See note 241 supra. 
252. See Moore v. Donahoo, 217 F. 177, 182 (9th Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 
706 (1915). 
253. Many circumstances may exist which may make it necessary and indispensable 
to the business of the road and the preservation of the property, for the receiver to 
pay pre-existing debts of certain classes, out of the earnings of the receivership, 
or even the corpus of the property, under the order of the court, with a priority 
of lien. 
Miltenberger v. Logansport Ry., 106 U.S. 286, 311 (1882) (emphasis original). 
254. See Gregg v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 197 U.S. 183, 187 (1905) ("payment of 
the employes [sic] of the road is more certain to be necessary in order to keep it run• 
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thus have priority over federal claims255 even though the amounts 
involved or the period in which they were earned fall outside the 
limits of the proposed express priority for wages.256 If one who is in 
a monopoly position refuses to furnish essential supplies unless 
previous obligations are paid, such payment may be a necessary cost 
of preserving the business of the estate.257 But if the creditor is re-
quired by law to provide services notwithstanding past delinquen-
cies, there may be no necessity established for payment of the 
arrears268 unless the conditions that the creditor is permitted to im-
pose regarding cash payment for current services would make con-
tinued operation difficult or impossible.259 If the creditor is not 
obliged to provide services and occupies a sufficiently monopolistic 
position that payment could have been forced, but is instead content to 
await the termination of the proceeding, "it is absurd to contend 
that it is necessary for continued operation that the claims be paid."260 
ning than the payment of any other class of previously incurred debts''); Moore v. 
Donahoo, 217 F. 177, 182-83 (9th Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 706 (1915). 
255. United States v. Wisconsin Valley Trust Co., 233 F. Supp. 73, 79 (W.D. Wis. 
1964) (accrued wages and vacation pay of union employees of truck line, operated by 
receiver to preserve it for sale as a going concern, preferred over Section 3466 priority; 
court "takes notice of the facts of business life in that these employees would not con-
tinue working had they not been paid the wages due them''). 
256. In Kavanas v. Mead, 171 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1948), it was held that the express 
provision of the Bankruptcy Act for priority of wages earned within three months pre-
cluded allowance in bankruptcy of priority for six months of wages under general 
equitable principles. Only the six-month principle was there involved, however; "nec-
essity of payment," which was not discussed, was plainly negatived by the fact that 
the back wages went unpaid during five years of bankruptcy, apparently without caus-
ing operations to cease. See note 260 infra. 
257. Miltenberger v. Logansport Ry., 106 U.S. 286, 311-12 (1882). See In re New 
York, N.H. &: H.R.R., 278 F. Supp. 592, 602 n.15 (D. Conn. 1967), afjd., 405 F.2d 50 
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969); Moore v. Donahoo, 217 F. 177, 182 
(9th Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 706 (1915). 
258. The "necessity of payment" rule was applied to interline ticket and freight 
balances that antedated the receivership in Miltenberger v. Logansport Ry., 106 U.S. 
286, 3ll-12 (1882), on the ground that denial of connecting service would cause great 
detriment to the business. It has been observed, however, that the connecting rail-
roads would now be required by the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) 
to transact business with the receiver or trustee, despite the arrears of payment for 
past services. This development might be "an argument that such a claim as was 
allowed, prior to this act, in the Miltenberger case, should no longer be entitled to 
priority." See Carbon Fuel Co. v. Chicago C. &: L.R.R., 202 F. 172, 174 (7th Cir. 1912). 
259. Southern Ry. v. Flournoy, 301 F.2d 847, 853-54 (4th Cir. 1962); In re Ten-
nessee Cent. Ry., 316 F. Supp. 1103, 1108-09 (M.D. Tenn. 1970), appeal docketed, No. 71-
1228, 6th Cir., 1971. 
260. In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 278 F. Supp. 592, 603 n.15 (D. Conn. 1967), 
affd., 405 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969). In Miltenberger v. 
Logansport Ry., 106 U.S. 286, 308 (1882), discussed in note 258 supra, the Court ap-
proved orders for payment entered at the inception of the receivership, in order to 
preserve the business. It does not follow that the same priority of payment would 
have been allowed if the question had arisen only at termination of the proceedings. 
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The Supreme Court has said that, to enjoy priority under this rule, 
it must be shown that the payment of the arrears was necessary to 
the business, not merely that the supplies or services previously fur-
nished had been necessary to its preservation;281 but this distinction 
has not been uniformly observed.262 
Although arrears of rent are not generally within the scope of the 
six-month rule,263 priority of payment for rent claims may in some 
cases be justified under the necessity rule if nonpayment would cause 
forfeiture of a valuable lease.264 Aside from that possibility, a land-
lord's claim, even though secured by a statutory lien on the tenant's 
property on the premises, is inferior to the federal priority286 in any 
insolvency proceeding not governed by Section 64 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act-under which, to the extent of the preceding three 
months' rent, a landlord's claim that is entitled to lien or priority 
status under state law ranks behind taxes but on a parity with federal 
nontax claims.266 Although the ABA proposal makes no specific 
mention of rent claims, it would improve their position by eliminat-
ing the priority of federal nontax claims. In Section 64 cases, this 
change would result in landlords' priority claims (subject to the 
three-month limitation) being paid before federal nonta.'I{. claims287 
while in reorganizations, decedents' estates, and other insolvency 
proceedings, such landlord claims ·would be at least equal whereas 
today they are inferior.268 The landlord who has a lien, if it is effec-
See Wham, Preference in Railroad Receiverships, 23 Ju.. L. REv. 141, 149 (1928) ("It is 
chiefly by 'shotgun' methods that preference as to the corpus of the road may be had."). 
261. Gregg v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 197 U.S. 183, 186-87 (1905). 
262. See note 241 supra. See also T. F1NLETIER, supra note 81, at 375-76, 382-84. 
263. In re Third Avenue Transit Corp., 138 F. Supp. 623, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), affcl., 
230 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1956). 
264. :Ball v. Improved Property Holding Co., 247 F. 645, 649-50 (2d Cir. 1917). 
265. See cases cited in note 18 supra. 
266. :Bankruptcy Act § 64a(5), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(5) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). The rules 
of § 64 apply in conventional bankruptcies and Chapter XI arrangements but 
not in railroad and other corporate reorganizations. See note 81 supra. 
267. With the elimination of the federal nontax priority, landlords would stand 
alone on the fifth level of priority under :Bankruptcy Act § 64a(5), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(5) 
(Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
268. Proposed § 3466(c), set out in note 60 supra, would place federal nontax 
claims on a parity with "all claims not otherwise entitled to priority under subsection 
(b)," and thus with both landlords' claims and those of general creditors. :But, under 
the circular priority rule (see pt. IV. :B. infra), the landlord with a priority over gen-
eral creditors might, at the expense of such creditors, obtain full payment from what 
remains after setting aside the Government's proportionate share of the general cred• 
itors' fund (rather than the full amount of its nontax claim as at present). If the pro-
posal to deny priority to federal nontax claims is rejected, it would seem desirable to 
insert a fifth level of priority in proposed § 3666(b) placing rent claims and federal 
nontax claims on a parity, as they are in bankruptcy. See 1959 REPORT, mpra note 47, 
at 732. 
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tive against general creditors and does not arise solely by reason of 
insolvency or the commencement of the rehabilitation or liquida-
tion proceeding, would be elevated above unsecured federal tax 
claims,269 except in proceedings (other than reorganizations) under 
the Bankruptcy Act in which landlords' liens are invalidated.270 
Liabilities for torts committed before the commencement of one 
of the pertinent proceedings ordinarily enjoy no priority, even un-
der the six-month rule, 271 and none is proposed by the ABA. How-
ever in some circumstances, prior payment of such antecedent claims 
might be sustained under the necessity principle in order to preserve 
customer good will.272 In addition, Congress has decreed that, in 
reorganizations of railroads under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act 
and in federal equity receiverships of railroads,273 claims for death 
or personal injury of employees occurring before the proceeding274 
"shall be preferred and paid out of assets of such railroad corpora-
tion as operating expenses of such railroad."275 Since the ABA pro-
posal subordinates the federal priority, not to "operating expenses" 
as such, but only to expenses of "collecting, preserving, and dis-
tributing" the property, it may be questioned whether the "prefer-
269. See text accompanying notes 178-81 supra. 
270. Bankruptcy Act § 67c(l)(C), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(l)(C) (Supp. V, 1965-1969), in-
validates "every statutory lien for rent and every lien of distress for rent, whether 
statutory or not," and reduces it to the priority status it would have under § 64a(5), 11 
U.S.C. 104(a)(5) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). However, the provision is inapplicable to rail-
road and other corporate reorganizations. Bankruptcy Act § 67c(5), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(5) 
(Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
271. In re New York, N.H. &: H.R.R., 92 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 
U.S. 650 (1938); Pitcairn v. Fisher, 78 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1935). Contra, McCullough v. 
Union Traction Co., 206 Ind. 585, 186 N.E. 300 (1933). See Annot., 90 A.L.R. 648 (1934). 
272. See In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 362 F.2d 111, 117 n.5 (2d Cir. 1966), report-
ing that an order for payment of claims for loss, damage, and delay of freight and 
baggage had been entered in the New Haven reorganization in order not to lose 
business to rival carriers. In an earlier reorganization of the New Haven, however, it had 
been concluded that it would be "utterly fantastic to suppose that any passenger 
would be deterred from traveling on a road because a judgment for any injuries he 
might suffer would not be a prior claim.'' In re New York, N.H. &: H.R.R., 92 F.2d 
428, 430 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 650 (1938). 
273. Carpenter v. Wabash Ry., 309 U.S. 23 (1940). Neither the extension of the 
rule to federal receiverships nor the exclusion of state court receiverships is likely to 
be of current concern, in view of the substantial pre-emption of the field by the Bank-
ruptcy Act. See New England Coal&: Coke Co. v. Rutland R.R., 143 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 
1944). A more significant omission, however, is the reorganization under Chapter X 
of a rail carrier that falls outside the definition of a "railroad" in Bankruptcy Act 
§ 77(m), 11 U.S.C. § 205(m) (1964). Augus v. Stichman, 273 F.2d 707 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 362 U.S. 988 (1960). 
274. The claim need not have arisen within the preceding six months. Thompson 
v. Siratt, 95 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1938). 
275. Bankruptcy Act § 77(n), 11 U.S.C. § 205(n) (1964). The preference extends not 
only to employee injury and death claims but also to unsecured claims of sureties on 
supersedeas, appeal, attachment, and garnishment bonds, whether in cases of that na-
ture or in any other. In re Chicago, R.I. &: P. Ry., 90 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1937). 
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ence" for such antecedent tort claims would prevail over federal 
claims.276 If such tort claims are meant to be preferred, some co-
ordination of vocabulary seems desirable. 
3. Charges Against Decedents' Estates 
Because bankruptcy does not in general concern itself with de-
cedents' estates,277 the ABA proposal recognizes two priorities that 
are foreign to the bankruptcy scheme on which it is modeled. These 
priorities are the expenses of the funeral and of the last illness of a 
deceased debtor,278 to the extent that they are preferred by the ap-
plicable local law over general unsecured creditors and are judicially 
approved.279 The funeral expense priority, although not heretofore 
expressed in the insolvency priority statute, has long been recog-
nized by implication on the theory that such expenses are not "debts 
due from the deceased," within the meaning of Section 3466, but 
charges upon the estate, which the fiduciary of the estate is bound 
to discharge before any debts can be satisfied.280 Last illness expenses, 
however, are debts of the decedent and have heretofore been sub-
ordinated to the absolute federal priority.281 Their priority, which 
is widely recognized under state laws,282 is advocated on humani-
tarian grounds in that "it would be unfortunate indeed if a man in 
his last illness could not be attended by a physician, and in his death 
276. If such claims, although superior to prior mortgages (Carpenter v. Wabash 
Ry., 209 U.S. 22 (1940)) and equal if not superior to general expenses of administra• 
tion (cf. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Missouri-Kansas-Te.xas R.R., 122 F.2d 226, 333.35 
(8th Cir. 1941)), are inferior to antecedent federal claims, the same circuity problem 
discussed above in connection with six-month claims (see note 242 supra) would arise. 
277. See text accompanying notes 225-40 infra. 
278. The expenses of the funeral and last illness of the debtor's spouse are not in-
cluded even when they die as a result of a common disaster, although it has been 
suggested that it would be "wise and salutary" to cover them. McCain v. Liberty Natl. 
Bank, 54-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ,i 9141 (N.D. Ga. 1953). Concerning the meaning of "last 
illness," see Annot., 9 A.L.R. 462 (1920). 
279. S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), provides: 
[Sec. ll466(b)] (2) FUNERAL AND LAST ILLNESS EXPENSES.-Expenses of the 
funeral and claims for the last illness of a deceased debtor of the United States, 
to the extent that other applicable law prefers them over general unsecured cred• 
itors and they are allowed by any court having jurisdiction thereof, shall be paid 
prior to claims of the United States. 
280. United States v. Eggleston, 25 F. Cas. 979, 981 (No. 15,027) (C.C.D. Ore. 1877); 
S.M. 5022, V-1 CUM. BULL. 109 (1926). 
281. United States v. Eggleston, 25 F. Cas. 979, 981 (No. 15,027) (C.C.D. Ore. 1877), 
282. Many state laws provide for payment of last illness expenses even ahead of 
debts due the United States, but such provisions are ineffective at present. In re 
Estate of Shoptaw, 54 Wash. 2d 602, 242 P.2d 740 (1959); In re Estate of Muldoon, 128 
Cal. App. 2d 284, 275 P .2d 597 (1954). Other states have bowed to the inevitable 
and listed such expenses for payment after federal claims although ahead of the state's 
claims, 
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not be interred without any assurance that the doctor and the under-
taker would be paid."283 
The ABA proposal properly makes no provision for priority 
over federal claims of the allowances for the support of widows and 
dependents that are provided by many state laws.284 Consequently 
the proposal may be construed by implication to nullify the prior-
ity which has heretofore, although not consistently, been accorded 
such allowances on the same theory applied to funeral expenses, 
namely, that they are not debts but charges on the estate.285 The 
fact that the money or property set apart for the family is not 
deemed part of the assets subject to administration, however, is not 
a sufficient legal ground for immunizing it from application to the 
decedent's federal tax liabilities. The funds created by such allow-
ances are analogous to the homestead or other exempt property set 
aside and excluded from a bankrupt estate, which is nevertheless 
subject to pursuit by the federal tax collector into the hands of those 
to whom it is delivered.288 Although family allowances are some-
times analogized to common-law dower-which ordinarily has pri-
ority over claims, including post-marital liens, for the husband's 
taxes287-they differ in the vital respect that the allowances are set 
aside only out of what the husband possesses at his death whereas 
dower ordinarily cannot be defeated by an inter vivos conveyance 
283. McCain v. Liberty Natl. Banlc, 54-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ,I 9141 (N.D. Ga. 1953). The 
relief would not be complete, however, unless the proposal and the Bankruptcy Act 
were amended to provide, in cases where an insolvency or bankruptcy proceeding is 
commenced before death, that the debtor's last _illness and funeral expenses shall be 
a charge upon the estate (at least to the extent that the decedent's post-divestment or 
post-petition accumulations are insufficient), with priority over all but administration 
expenses. Death does not abate bankruptcy proceedings begun during life (Banlcruptcy 
Act § 8, 11 U.S.C. § 26 (1964)) and the applicable priority rules continue to be those of 
the Banlcruptcy Act (In re Devlin, 180 F. 170, 172 (D. Kan. 1910)), which are at present 
ill-adapted to the situation. The recoupment of assets from the estate to meet needs 
resulting from the bankrupt's death has precedent in the Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 
541, § 8, 30 Stat. 549, which (before the 1938 amendment that is now 11 U.S.C. § 26 
(1964)) conditioned the transfer of title to the trustee upon the payment out of the 
estate of the statutory allowances to the widow and children if the banlcrupt died during 
the proceeding. Hull v. Dicks, 235 U.S. 584 (1915), discussed in note 290 infra. 
284. For a review of the pertinent state laws, see G. GLENN, THE LAw GOVERNING 
LIQUIDATION § 509 (1935), 
285. See authorities cited in note 9 supra. 
286. United States v. Heffron, 158 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 831 
(1947). Congress has determined that federal law exclusively shall determine what 
property is exempt from federal tax collection, whether in bankruptcy (Bankruptcy 
Act § 17a(l), 11 u.s.c. § 35(a)(l) (Supp. v, 1965•1969)) or otherwise (INT. REV. CODE 
of 1954, § 6334(c)). See Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next 
Decade II, 77 YALE L.J. 605, 605-08 (1968). 
287. G.C.M. 824, V-2 CUM. BULL. 54 (1926). See w. PLUl\m 8e L. WRIGHT, supra 
note 46, ch. 5, § 4. 
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by the husband.288 The family's rights are "vested," if at all, only 
in the limited sense that a forced heir's right to a share in a dece-
dent's estate is vested.289 In substance, provisions for such allowances 
are exemption laws rather than rules of property200 and claims 
created thereby are no more entitled to recognition against federal 
claims, particularly tax claims, than claims based on the usual home-
stead exemption law or statutory share in an estate.291 
4. Taxes Antedating the Proceeding 
The 1970 ABA proposal292 adopts the principle of parity among 
federal, state, and local taxes, which has been accepted under Section 
64 of the Bankruptcy Act for seventy-three years and the denial of 
which in insolvency cases has been a source of friction between the 
governments concerned.293 However, the proposal injects an unnec-
288. Where so-called dower, under local law, could be defeated by the husband's 
own transfers or by his creditors, it has not been recognized against federal ta....:: claims. 
United States v. Griffin, 164 S.2d 883 (Fla. App. 1964); Chandler v. Pilley, 60-1 U.S. 
Tax Cas. t;[ 9238 (Tenn. P. Ct. 1959); First Natl. Bank v. White, 58-2 U.S. Tax 
Cas. t;[ 9568 (Wis. Cty. Ct. 1958). See Weitzner v. United States, 309 F.2d 45, 48 (5th 
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963). 
289. See United States v. First Natl. Bank &: Trust Co., 297 F.2d 312, 315 (5th Cir. 
1961). In some states, the right is not "vested" even in that sense. Jackson v. United 
States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964). 
290. Seiden v. Southland Chenilles', Inc., 195 F.2d 899 (5th Cir. 1952). Cf. Bank-
ruptcy Act § 8, 11 U.S.C. § 26 (1964), which was amended in 1938 to overrule Hull v. 
Dicks, 235 U.S. 585 (1915), and to preclude double allowance of exemptions, both for 
the bankrupt himself and for his family (in the form of allowances for support), if 
the bankrupt died pending the proceeding. See IA w. COLLIER, BANKRUPrcY t;[ 8.01 
(14th ed. rev. 1971). 
291. If, on the other hand, contrary to its general policy against providing exempt 
havens from federal tax collection, Congress should decide to relent in favor of widows 
and orphans, it should impose uniform federal standards on the extent of the priority 
that is to be allowable. See Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next 
Decade II, 77 YALE L.J. 605, 615-16 (1968). 
292. S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), provides: 
[Sec. 3466(b)] (4) STATE AND LOCAL TAXES.-Taxcs legally due and owing 
by the debtor or estate to any State or subdivision thereof which would not be 
dischargeable in bankruptcy under section 17(a) of the Bankruptcy Act shall 
be accorded equal priority with ta.xes legally due and owing to the United 
States and not so dischargeable and shall be paid before any other claims of 
the United States. 
Such taxes legally due and owing to the United States shall be entitled to priority 
over all unsecured claims other than claims mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2), (3), 
and (4) of this subsection. In applying section ••• 17 of the Bankruptcy Act for 
purposes of paragraph ••• (4) of this subsection, the date of divestment of the 
debtor's title or right to possession or both title and right to possession, or the 
date of death in the case of an insolvent estate, shall be regarded as the date of 
"bankruptcy" •••• 
293. "The functions vested in the states by the people of the United States are of 
equal value and dignity with those vested in the central government, and neither is 
at liberty to cripple or destroy the other." Piedmont Corp. v. Gainesville &: N.W,R.R., 
30 F.2d 525, 528 (N.D. Ga. 1929). Within three months after that nonprophetic state-
ment was made, the Supreme Court, in County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U.S. 
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essary ambiguity by omitting to provide expressly, as the Bank-
ruptcy Act does,294 that the term "State" includes the District of 
Columbia296 and the territories and possessions of the United 
States.296 
Under the proposal, federal, state, and local taxes "legally due 
and owing" before the death of the debtor or the divestment of his 
property297 and not secured by prior liens298 would be junior to 
claims and expenses preferred under the rules above discussed but 
would enjoy priority over claims of general credi~ors, including 
federal nontax claims. However, again adopting a bankruptcy prin-
ciple, the proposal would deny priority status to any federal, state, 
or local tax that would be dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Act 
if a petition thereunder had been filed on the date of death or di-
vestment. Dischargeable taxes, in general, are those which fell due 
more than three years earlier299 but there are major exceptions by 
80 (1929) began its long series of decisions subordinating state taxes, with or without a 
lien, to the federal insolvency priority. See Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-
Agenda for the Next Decade III, 77 YALE L.J. 1104, 1104-10 (1968). 
294. See Bankruptcy Act § 1(29), 11 U.S.C. § 1(29) (1964). The ABA 1959 proposal 
was in accord. 1959 REPORT, supra note 47, at 732-33. 
295. The word "State" may or may not be construed to include the District of 
Columbia, depending on the court's view of 'the intent of Congress. Compare Talbott 
v. Silver Bow County, 139 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1891), with United States v. Whelpley, 125 
F. 616, 619 (W.D. Va. 1903). It is provided in D.C. ConE § 47-2609 (1967) that the gross 
sales tax of the District shall be "a prior and prefe1Ted claim" in a receivership, 
"bankruptcy," or assignment for the benefit of creditors. Although that provision was 
construed to oveiTide the federal insolvency priority (which it could validly do, since 
both were enacted by Congress) (United States v. Saidman, 231 F.2d 503, 508-10 (D.C. 
Cir. 1956)), it was held (despite its language) inapplicable in cases under the Bank-
ruptcy Act in which the rule of parity prevails. District of Columbia v. Greenbaum, 
223 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1955). The ABA 1959 proposal, in harmony with the purpose 
to make the insolvency priorities consistent with those in bankruptcy, would have 
assured that District sales ta.xes would be reduced, as other District taxes (like state 
taxes) would have been elevated, to parity. 1959 REPORT, supra note 47, at 735. 
296. In view of the unique status of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, it also 
seems desirable to refer to it expressly rather than leave the question of its parity 
to be infen-ed from the word "ten-itories," which may or may not be sufficiently inclu-
sive. See Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 368 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1966). 
297. For a discussion of the line between taxes "legally due and owing'' and those 
constituting administration expenses, see text accompanying notes 217-21 supra. 
298. For a discussion of taxes for which liens had arisen, see pt. III. supra and pt. V. 
infra. 
299. The general rule is that taxes "legally due and owing" more than three years 
before bankruptcy are dischargeable (Bankruptcy Act § 17a(l), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(l) 
(Supp. V, 1965-1969)), and hence are denied priority status under Bankruptcy Act 
§ 64a(4), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(4) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). The identical phrase, used for the 
purpose of distinguishing taxes provable as fourth priority ~ims from those con-
stituting administration expenses, has been construed to embrace taxes not yet due 
if the facts giving rise to liability have all occurred. See text accompanying note 219 
supra. It is held, however, for the purpose of starting the three-year discharge period, 
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which older tax liabilities are saved from discharge and loss of prior-
ity. 300 In conjunction with the proposal to preserve tax liens in in-
solvency whether or not the liability is dischargeable and whether 
or not notice of the lien has been filed,301 the downgrading of dis-
chargeable taxes will, at least in the case of federal taxes, be even 
less meaningful than it is in bankruptcy.302 
The interrelationship between federal and state unemployment 
taxes gives rise to unique problems,803 but they can better be dis-
cussed after the following description of the circuity rules. 
that a tax is "legally due and owing'' only at the date payment is due. In re Kopf, 299 
F. Supp. 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). See W. PLUMB &: L. WRIGHT, supra note 46, ch. 6, § 2. 
300. In addition to the exception discussed in note 355 infra, there are exceptions 
for cases in which a false or fraudulent return, or no return, is filed, and claims for 
tm,es withheld or collected from others (often a major factor in insolvencies) arc 
never dischargeable. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(l)(a), (b), (d) &: (e), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(l)(a), 
(b), (d) &: (e) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
301. See text accompanying notes 400-03 infra. 
302. For example, federal income taxes, regardless of age, arc nondischargeable if 
at the time of bankruptcy there was applicable "a prohibition on assessment pending 
the exhaustion of administrative or judicial remedies available to the bankrupt" (Bank• 
ruptcy Act § 17a(l)(c), 11 U.S.C. 35(a)(l)(c) (Supp. V, 1965-1969)); such a "prohibition" 
exists from the time the liability is incurred until the ta.xpayer either agrees to its 
assessment, fails to seek review of a notice of deficiency, or exhausts his remedy through 
the United States Tax Court and the appellate courts. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6213(a); 
In re Indian Lake Estates, Inc., 428 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 964 (1970). 
But cf. In re Michaud, 317 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Pa. 1970), appeal docketed, No. 71•1165, 
3rd Cir., 1971. Any of those events will be followed within a matter of days by an 
assessment, which gives rise to an automatic lien on all the ta.'i:payer's property without 
need for filing notice thereof (INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 6321-22); so an income tax 
liability would be vulnerable to loss of insolvency priority, under the proposal, only 
during that brief period of administrative delay. 
The bankruptcy provisions, although somewhat more meaningful, in that ta.x liens 
are not preserved if unfiled, have been roundly criticized. Marsh, Triumph or Tragedy? 
The Bankruptcy Amendments of 1966, 42 WASH. L. REv. 681, 682-97 (1967); Plumb, 
Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 YALE L.J. 228, 261-72 
(1967). A substitute draft has been suggested by this writer in Federal Tax Liens and 
Priorities in Bankruptcy-Recent Developments, 43 REF. J. 37, 45-46 (1969). But con-
sideration of the inadequacies of that legislation should not be permitted to complicate 
the present reform proposal, which merely incorporates by cross-reference the bank-
ruptcy rule and thus leaves the solution of the problems-hopefully-to the Bankruptcy 
Study Commission assembled pursuant to Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970), 
under the chairmanship of Professor Marsh himself. For this reason it is particularly de-
sirable that proposed § 3466(b)(4) in S. 2197 (set out in note 292 supra) be modified, 
in conformity with the ABA proposal (see 1970 REPORT, supra note 53, at 416) to refer 
to the bankruptcy provision "as amended from time to time," so that the tmc priority 
in insolvency will adjust automatically and not be frozen as it now c.xists in bank• 
ruptcy. See note 236 supra. 
Under the circuity principle, discussed in text accompanying notes 399-413 infra, 
state and local taxes that are denied priority under this rule but are preferred by 
state law may nevertheless be paid at the expense of other general creditors. 
303. See pt. IV. C. infra. 
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B. Reconciliation with State Priority Laws 
Many state laws establish their own hierarchies of priorities for 
application in administrations of insolvent decedents' estates, assign-
ments for the benefit of creditors, and receiverships under the jurisdic-
tion of the state. Such state laws are commonly applied in federal court 
proceedings, as a matter of equitable discretion304 if not of obliga-
tion, 305 in the absence of a controlling federal law to the contrary. 
A sampling of state laws (covering more than one third of the states) 
relating to decedents' estates, assignments for creditors, and other 
insolvencies discloses that, while they have certain points in common, 
their details are as diverse as the collective minds of fifty state legis-
latures might be expected to make them. Some prescribe equal treat-
ment for all creditors, subject to the overriding federal priority and, 
in many states, to a common-law priority for the state's own claims,306 
although this latter priority sometimes does not extend to subdivi-
sions of the state.307 Many states that assert such a priority, by com-
mon law or statute, extend it to nontax claims although some, as 
would the proposed federal law, confine it to taxes.308 While some 
of the state laws subordinate state claims to wage claims (within 
304. Dickinson v. Saunders, 129 F. 16, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1904); T.H. Mastin &: Co. v. 
Pickering Lumber Co., 2 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1933); Crampton v. Lautz Bros. &: 
Co., 274 F. 743 (W.D.N.Y. 1921). Cf. Schmidtman v. Atlantic Phosphate & Oil Corp., 
230 F. 769 (2d Cir. 1916). In Guaranty Trust Co. v. Galveston City Ry., 107 F'. 3ll, 
319-20 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 181 U.S. 622 (1901), the state priority statute was not 
applied on the ground that the state law had been construed as intended to cover 
only state court receiverships. 
305. Marshall v. New York, 254 U.S. 380, 384-85 (1920), held the priority, at 
least of a state's own claims, as declared by the courts of the state, to be conclusive 
in a federal court receivership. Since the state priority laws determine the outcome 
of the case, for the claimants affected, and not merely the availability of the remedy, 
it would seem that the "rules of decision" law, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964), and the under-
lying principle which it embodies (Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)) 
would compel the federal courts to apply such laws, so far as they are not in conflict 
with valid federal legislation, such as the statutory federal priority in insolvency and any 
laws enacted under the bankruptcy power. See text accompanying notes 323-42 infra. 
See also T. FINLE'ITER, supra note 81, at 357; Developments in the Law, Reorganizations 
Under tlze Bankruptcy Act-1934-36, 49 HARv. L. R.Ev. llll, 1180 (1936). 
306. E.g., In re Carnegie Trust Co., 206 N.Y. 390, 99 N.E. 1096 (1912). See T. F1N-
LE1TER, supra note 81, at 354-55; 1 R. CLARK, supra note 225, § 669; 42 AM. JUR. 2d, 
lmolvency § 81 (1969). Some states deny their inheritance of the crown prerogative. 
42 Az.r. JuR. 2d, supra. 
307. T. FINLE'ITER, supra note 81, at 355. State laws conferring priority on state 
claims may also be construed to exclude their subdivisions. Campion v. Village of 
Graceville, 181 Minn. 446, 232 N.W. 917 (1930). If the subdivisions enjoy priority, it 
may be junior to that of the state itself. 
308. United States Fidelity &: Guar. Co. v. Carter, 161 Va. 381, 170 S.E. 764 (1933). 
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prescribed limits)3°0 as do the Bankruptcy Act and the ABA pro-
posal, others place the wage priority behind the state's claims or at 
least behind claims for taxes.310 The wage priorities range from a 
top limit of $1,000311 down to $100312 (in contrast to $600 under the 
ABA proposal) but some state laws place no limit on the amount313 
and others fail to provide any priority for wages.314 The period 
within which the wages must have been earned (three months under 
the ABA proposal) ranges under state law from sixty days311i to 
one year316 and may even be unlimited.317 Some wage priorities 
created by state law may embrace broader classes of employees than 
the "workmen, servants, clerks, or traveling or city salesmen" cov-
ered by the Bankruptcy Act and the ABA proposal,318 and some 
include in the wage priority the welfare and pension fund contribu-
tions that the federal law excludes.319 All such state laws provide 
priority for funeral and administration expenses; but some make no 
309. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 202 (Smith-Hurd 1961) (Probate Act); MD. ANN, 
CODE art. 47, § 15 (1971) (assignment for creditors or receivership); R.I. GEN, LAws 
ANN. § 28-14-6.1 (1968) (assignment or other insolvency); WASH. REv. CODE § 11,76,110 
(1965) (decedents' estates); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 128.17 (1957) (assignments for creditors), 
310. MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 8-105 (1969) (decedents' estates); MAss. ANN. LAws 
ch. 198, § 1 (1969) (decedents' estates) and ch. 206, § 31 (1969) (receiverships); MICII, 
STAT. ANN. § 27A.5251 (1962) (assignments for creditors); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 316.05 
(1969) (receiverships) and 577.08 (1947) (assignments); R.I. GEN. LAws § 33-12-11 (1969) 
(decedents' estates). 
311. N.Y. DEBT.&: CRED. LAw § 22 (McKinney Supp. 1970) (assignments for creditors). 
312. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.20 (1964) (decedents' estates); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 198, 
§ 1 (1969) (decedents' estates) and ch. 206, § 31 (1969) (receiverships); Mo. REv. STAT, 
§ 513.055(1) (1969) (receiverships); R.I. GEN. LAws § 33-12-11 (1969) (decedents' estates). 
313. MD. ANN. CODE art. 47, § 15 (1971) and art. 93, § 8-105 (1969); MICH, STAT, ANN. 
§ 17.308(1) (1968) (insolvency); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 316.05 (1969) and 577.08 (1947) 
(assignment for creditors and receivership); MoNT. REv. CODE §§ 45-601, -603 (1961); 
WASH. REv. CODE § 11.76.110 (1965) (decedents' estates). 
314. D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1325 (1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1508 (1935); MICH, STAT, 
ANN. § 27.3178(420) (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.44 (1969); N.J. STAT. ANN, § 3A:24-2 
(1953); N.Y. SuRR. Cr. PROC. Ac::r § 1811 (McKinney 1967); VA, CODE ANN. § 64.1-157 
(1968) (all relating to decedents' estates). 
315. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.20 (1964); WASH. REV. STAT. § 11.76,110 (1965) (both 
relating to decedents' estates). 
316.,1'.ws. ANN. LAws ch. 198, § 1 (1969) and ch. 206, § 31 (1969). 
317. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.308.1 (1968) (insolvency proceedings). 
318. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 36-204 (1962) (receiverships); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 202 
(Smith-Hurd 1961) (Probate Act); MD. ANN. CODE art, 93, § 8-105 (1969) (decedents' 
estates). Frequently, however, when the word "employees" is used in conjunction with 
others s~ch as "workmen" and "servants," it is construed eiusdem generis to exclude 
from priority those in superior positions. 42 AM. JuR. 2d, Insolvency § 62 (1969). 
319. See Joint Indus. Bd. v. United States, 391 U.S. 224 (1968); United States v. 
Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29 (1959). 
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provision for the expenses of last illness320 and others impose limita-
tions thereon.321 
These diversities created little problem so long as the federal 
priority was superimposed as the first in rank or, by implication, 
behind only such universally recognized priorities as funeral and 
administration expenses.322 But great perplexities may result if the 
federal law is modified to place federal claims behind certain claims 
which, in the hierarchy established by state law, rank behind or on 
a parity with other claims which the federal law continues to sub-
ordinate to, or place on a parity with, federal taxes. There are three 
possible approaches to dealing with those diversities, which we may 
call the mandatory, the permissive, and the synthetic circuity ap-
proach. 
The mandatory approach would establish, by federal law, the 
complete sequence and amount of priorities to be followed in any 
distribution or reorganization of an insolvent estate, whether in bank-
ruptcy, receivership, assignment for creditors, or probate, whether 
the proceeding is in other respects conducted under federal or state 
law.323 There is some merit in the view that the choice or availabil-
ity of a particular form of proceeding for the administration of an 
insolvent estate should not affect the relative priority rights of any 
creditor, not only as against the United States,324 but as against other 
creditors as well.325 On at least one occasion, Congress has prescribed 
320. D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1325 (1967); N.Y. SuRR. Cr. PRoc. Acr § 1811 (McKinney 
1967). 
321. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.20 (1964) (last 60 days); VA. CODE § 64.1-157 (1960) (low 
dollar limit). 
322. We have observed, however, the circuity problem that sometimes arises when 
state law elevates an unsecured claim over a mortgage that is itself superior to the 
federal priority. See note 242 supra. 
323. An alternative would be to prescribe by federal law the sequence of prior-
ities down as far as the federal tax level and permit the states to prescribe additional 
priorities below that level-as they were permitted to do in bankruptcy before 1938. 
Act of May 27, 1926, ch. 406, § 15, 44 Stat. 667, amending Bankruptcy Act § 64b(7). 
But, if federal nonta.x claims are ranked with general creditors, as proposed, any addi· 
tional priorities provided by state law would be at the expense of such federal claims, 
a result which might make this alternative unacceptable. Under the pre-1938 bank-
ruptcy law the states could create priorities on a parity with but not above federal 
nonta.x claims; even this rule proved unacceptable to Congress in time. 
324. See notes 48-49 supra and accompanying te.xt. 
325. Cf. Leonard Levin Co. v. Star Jewelry Co., 54 R.I. 465, 175 A. 651 (1934), in 
which, as an equitable condition to granting a receivership, the court determined that 
wage creditors should be permitted the more favorable priority they would have had 
in bankruptcy but for the fact that their claims were too small to permit filing an 
involuntary petition without the cooperation of the other creditors who preferred a 
receivership. 
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the priority of nonfederal claims in equity receiverships, on the 
ground that there was no sound reason to discriminate between 
those proceedings and reorganizations carried out under the Bank-
ruptcy Act.326 The power of Congress to so prescribe was not doubted 
by the Supreme Court.327 Although, on that occasion, the effect of 
the statute was confined by its terms to receiverships in federal 
courts, there is no reason to suppose that the power to establish 
"uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies"328 is so limited. That 
power is not confined to regulating traditional bankruptcy proceed-
ings in which a discharge of the debtor is provided329 but extends 
to making "uniform laws on the subject of any person's general 
inability to pay his debts."330 While Congress may, in the exercise 
of this power, assume complete federal jurisdiction of proceedings 
normally conducted under state law and in the state courts,331 it 
may also elect to prescribe uniform rules for only certain aspects 
of the proceedings, leaving state laws otherw'ise in effect;332 it would 
seem equally permissible to prescribe such rules without assuming 
federal jurisdiction of the proceeding at all.333 
Such an assertion of Congressional power might be questioned 
in the case of insolvent decedents' estates, which constitute a sig-
nificant part of the cases to which Section 3466 is applicable. The 
"federal courts have no probate jurisdiction and have sedulously re-
frained, even in diversity cases, from interfering with the operations 
of state tribunals invested with that jurisdiction.''334 Generally, a 
326. H.R. REP. No. 1458, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939), relating to an amendment 0£ 
Bankruptcy Act § 77(n), 11 U.S.C. § 205(n) (1964), to c,,:tend to railroad equity re• 
ceiverships in federal courts the rule that claims for injury or death of employees 
and certain claims of sureties, antedating the proceeding, should be preferred as operat• 
ing expenses. See text accompanying notes 273-75 supra. 
327. Carpenter v. Wabash Ry., 309 U.S. 23, 28 (1940), 
328. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
329. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 513-14 (1938). 
330. Continental Ill. Natl. Bank&: Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. &: P. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 
670 (1935): Campbell v. Alleghany Corp., 75 F.2d 947, 952 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 
U.S. 581 (1935). 
331. Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438·39 (1940), 
332. Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605 (1918); Hanover Natl. Bank v. Moyscs, 186 
U.S. 181 (1902). 
333. Cf. Marine Harbor Properties, Inc. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78, 
83 (1942). Congress recently relied on the bankruptcy power to impose certain restric• 
tions on garnishments in the state courts (Pub, L. No. 90-321, § 30l(a), 82 Stat. 163 
(1968), 15 U.S.C. § 167I(a)(3) (Supp. V, 1965-1969)), asserting that disparities in garnish• 
ment laws had destroyed the uniformity of the bankruptcy laws and frustrated their 
purposes. That exercise of power was upheld in Hodgson v. Cleveland Municipal 
Court, 326 F. Supp. 419, 428-29 (N.D. Ohio 1971). 
334. Harris v. Zion's Sav. Bank &: Trust Co., 317 U.S. 447, 450 (1943). 
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decedent's estate cannot be~ome bankrupt, voluntarily335 or invol-
untarily,386 and preferences among creditors of the estate are "not 
within the purview of the bankruptcy laws."837 Nevertheless, in 
times past, Congress has permitted the representatives of insolvent 
decedents' estates to file petitions in bankruptcy or to avail of pro-
visions of the Bankruptcy Act.388 A bankruptcy proceeding com-
menced in the debtor's lifetime-even though process had not been 
served upon him-does not abate or give way to probate jurisdic-
tion on the death of the debtor339 and the priority rules of the Bank-
ruptcy Act are applicable rather than those of the probate law.340 
There is no defect of power, therefore, to prevent Congress pre-
scribing uniform rules of priorities, even for insolvent decedents' 
estates, without asserting federal jurisdiction over the administration 
itself, for the bankruptcy power over the subject matter of "any 
person's general inability to pay his debts"341 is as supreme over the 
probate law as over other areas of state law with which it may col-
lide.s42 
Nevertheless, in deference to the general reluctance of Congress, 
and of the bar, to interfere with state law in matters of probate and 
in recognition of the difficulties of applying a single, fixed system of 
priorities to a variety of proceedings of differing nature and pur-
335. In re Estate of Hiller, 240 F. Supp. 504 (N.D. Cal. 1965). 
336. In re Fackelman, 248 F. 565, 568 (S.D. Cal. 1918). 
337. White v. Cormier, 3II Mass. 537, 540, 42 N.E.2d 256, 258 (1942). 
338. Section 1 of the abortive Bankruptcy Act of 1841 permitted voluntary peti-
tions to be filed for decedents' estates. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, .ch. 9, § I, 5 Stat. 444, 
repealed by Act of March 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614. Former Section 74(m) of the 
Bankruptcy Act, 48 Stat. 922 (1934) (superseded in 1938 by Chapters XI, XII and XIII, 
which contain no comparable provisions) permitted representatives of decedents' estates 
to petition for composition or extension of debts with the permission of the probate 
court. Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. § 203 (which by its terms expired in 
1949), permitted farmers and the personal representatives of deceased farmers (id. 
§ 75(r)) to petition for extension and composition of debts (id. § 75(c)) and, if that 
failed, to be adjudged bankrupt (id. § 75(s)), without specifying that authorization of 
the probate court was required. That jurisdiction was upheld where such authorization 
had been obtained (In re Estate of Brusaschetto, 38 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Cal. 1941)) but 
the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction could not be exercised without such 
authorization-not on the basis of lack of constitutional power but of a strong pre-
sumption against congressional intent to interfere with the jurisdiction of the probate 
court. Harris v. Zion's Sav. Bank &: Trust Co., 317 U.S. 447 (1943). 
339. Bankruptcy Act § 8, II U.S.C. § 26 (1964); Hull v. Dicks, 235 U.S. 584, 588 
(1915); Shute v. Patterson, 147 F. 509 (8th Cir. 1906). 
340. In re Devlin, 180 F. 170, 172-73 (D. Kan. 1910). 
341. Continental Ill. Bank &: Trust v. Chicago, R.I. &: P. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 670 
(1935); Campbell v. Alleghany Corp., 75 F.2d 947, 952 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 
581 (1935). 
342. Harris v. Zion's Sav. Bank &: Trust Co., 317 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1943) (dissenting 
opinion). The majority did not deny the constitutional power. See note 338 supra. 
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pose,343 the ABA did not propose to apply the mandatory approach. 
Rather, the 1959 version of its proposal took the permissive approach 
by providing that administration expenses, funeral expenses, and the 
prescribed amount of wages may be paid before claims of the United 
States and that state and local taxes may be accorded equal priority 
with federal taxes and may be paid before other federal claims, but 
only if and to the extent that state law provides for such priorities.344 
If state law allowed priority for wages only to the extent of $100 
per claimant, that amount would be paid first and federal and state 
tax claims would be paid next, or federal taxes alone if the state 
had failed to provide parity for its own taxes. General creditors, 
who are the beneficiaries of the state's policy to limit priorities, 
would get just what they get today-i.e., whatever is left after paying 
the amount of the federal claim and such priorities as the state has 
seen fit to allow. There would be unavoidable circuity problems if 
state law makes state taxes senior to wage claims or if it provides for 
priorities not recognized by the federal law and makes them senior to 
those which are recognized. But such problems would be kept to 
a minimum under this approach and may be readily resolved, if 
funds are insufficient, at the expense of the claims less favored by 
state law, without altering the amount paid on the federal claims.341i 
The ABA 1970 proposal accepts the permissive approach with 
respect to funeral and last illness expenses, which are to be allowed 
priority only to the extent that they are preferred under state law 
and are allowed by the court.346 But in all other respects it adopts 
what I call the synthetic circuity approach by purporting to honor 
the priority of certain claims in excess of the priorities recognized 
by state law. These excess priorities inevitably result in circuity and, 
without benefit to those whom Congress seeks to prefer, cause fed-
eral taxes and other federal claims to be subordinated to claims the 
priority of which was never contemplated by Congress. 
On their face, the proposed provisions for priority of wages and 
state taxes read as if the mandatory approach were to be applied: 
Wages shall be paid before federal claims, to the extent provided 
in the Bankruptcy Act; state and local taxes, if not dischargeable in 
bankruptcy, shall be accorded equal priority with nondischargeable 
federal taxes and shall be entitled to priority over all claims, in-
cluding other federal claims, not granted priority by the federal 
343. See note 81 supra. 
344. 1959 REPORT, supra note 47, at 732. 
345. See note 242 supra. 
346. See proposed § 3466(b){2), set out in note 279 supra. 
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law.847 But these priorities are illusory to the extent that state law 
gives such claims a lesser ranking, because the proposal goes on to 
provide, in effect, that after the amount allowable to priority claim-
ants has been determined in accordance with the federal statute and 
the balance remaining for the United States has been set aside, the 
pot available for nonfederal creditors shall be divided in accordance 
with "other applicable law"348-i.e., generally state law.349 
Three examples will illustrate the operation of the proposed law: 
I. The law of State M provides the following order of priorities 
for claims against an insolvent decedent's estate: (1) administration 
and funeral expenses, (2) last illness expenses, (3) widow's allowance, 
(4) state and local taxes and other debts owed to the state, (5) wages 
not in excess of $100 per claimant earned within three months. A 
dies, leaving gross assets of $42,000, against which there are the fol-
lowing expenses, allowances and debts: 
Administration and funeral expenses 
Widow's allowance 
Last illness expense 
Federal taxes (nondischargeable) 
State and local taxes (nondischargeable) 
Nontax debt to state 
Wages of 30 employees (each exceeding 











Under the ABA 1970 proposal, it would first be determined how 
much the United States is entitled to under its priority, applying 
347. See proposed § 3466(b)(3) 8: (4), set out in notes 236 8: 292 supra. 
348. 1970 REPORT, supra note 53, at 420-22. S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), pro• 
vides: 
[Sec. 3466] (f) CIRCULAR PRIORITIES.-
(2) The amount to which a claim of the United States is entitled shall be 
determined pursuant to subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) [providing for priorities 
among unsecured claims, subordination of penalties, and preservation of liens] 
without regard to other priority or lien laws except as provided in such sub-
sections. After the allowance to the United States has been so determined, the 
order of distribution to other claims shall be as prescribed by other applicable 
law. 
(Bracketed explanation added.) 
349. Presumably "other applicable law" would embrace not only statutory priorities 
but also the common-law sovereign priority of certain states (see note 306 supra) and 
the sbc-month rule if court decisions make it applicable (see notes 238-50 supra and 
accompanying text). Cf. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 66 (1938); Marshall v. 
New York, 254 U.S. 380, 384-85 (1920). But cf. In re Chicago Express, Inc., 332 F.2d 
276, 279 (2d Cir. 1964), which held that the she-month rule developed by federal court 
decisions was not' a priority provided "by the laws of the United States," within the 
meaning of Bankruptcy Act § 64a(5), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(5) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). It is 
unclear whether state law would be the "other applicable law" if the proceeding is 
in a federal court. See notes 304-05 supra and accompanying text. 
64 Michigan Law Review [Vol, '10:1 
the federal scheme of priorities without reference to state law, by 
deducting from the $42,000 of gross assets the administration and 
funeral expenses ($8,000), the last illness expense ($4,000), and $18, 
000 of the wages (30 X $600), and then dividing the remaining 
$12,000 in the proportion that each tax bears to the total taxes 
($30,000), that is, $2,000 to the state and local taxes and $10,000 
to the federal taxes. After setting aside the $10,000 for federal taxes, 
the remaining $32,000 would be divided, not in accordance with the 
federal scheme of priorities but under the state law, as follows: 
Administration and funeral expenses $ 8,000 
Last illness expense 4,000 
Widow's allowance 5,000 
State and local taxes 5,000 
Nontax debt to state 3,000 
Wages (30 X $100) 3,000 
Balance for nonpriority claims 4,000 
$32,000 
The balance remaining for debts not entitled to priority status would 
permit a 10 per cent dividend, as follows: 
Balance of federal claim ($15,000)360 
Balance of wages ($17,000) 





Humanitarians may applaud the foregoing result, since it permits 
the widow to enjoy her allowance at the expense of the Government. 
But, if that result is acceptable to Congress, her priority-subject 
perhaps to some limitation-should be provided for in all cases801 
and not made dependent upon the fortuitous existence of other 
claims from whose recognized priority she can benefit. 
If we apply the permissive approach adopted by the ABA 1959 
proposal to the same facts, the federal share would be determined 
as before, except that the amount set aside on account of wages 
would be not the $18,000 to which the Bankruptcy Act, if appli-
cable, would have entitled the wage claimants, but the $3,000 to 
which they are entitled under the applicable state priority rule. 
There would thus be $27,000, not $12,000, left for the combined 
federal, state, and local tax claims; proportionate division gives $22, 
350. It is only an assumption on my part that the Government would be permitted 
to share in tbis balance. On its face, proposed § 3466(£)(2) (set out in note 348 supra) 
says tbat "the amount to which a claim of the United States is entitled" shall be deter• 
mined by deducting the federally recognized priorities and then the "other claims" 
shall be paid from the pot in accordance with other applicable law. Perhaps the excess 
portion of tbe federal claim would not even share witb general creditors. 
351. See text accompanying notes 284-91 supra. 
November 1971] Insolvency 65 
500 to the federal priority, leaving $19,500 of the $42,000 of gross 
assets for expenses and other claims. Since the widow's allowance 
and the nontax debt to the state have a state law priority that is 
not recognized as against the federal claim, they would displace the 
entire wage claim and a part of the state and local tax claims-
resulting in nonfederal distribution as follows: 
Administration and funeral e.xpenses 
Last illness expense 
Widow's allowance 
State and local taxes (37 ½% of $5,000) 







As this example illustrates, the permissive approach would not 
eliminate all circular priority, an irreducible minimum of which 
is inevitable in a dual system. But, given the necessary evil of cir-
cuity, the law under this approach would not go out of its way to 
increase the incidence and effect thereof by synthesizing priorities 
that under no circumstances would be applied under the law appli-
cable to the proceeding. The contrary approach would have no conse-
quence except to create a fund from which other claimants, who enjoy 
no recognized priority under federal law, may nevertheless be paid at 
the expense of the federal priority claims. Here, the $3,000, which 
the state law and the ABA 1959 proposal would allow as the wage 
priority, may in some cases actually reach the wage claimants if 
they are not supplanted by others with higher standing under state 
law. But the additional $15,000 that would be set aside in their name 
under the 1970 ABA proposal can never in fact reach the wage 
claimants-except perhaps incidentally if a fund for general cred-
itors is thereby created-but would necessarily and in every case 
352. It happens that, on the particular facts assumed, the wage earners, as the 
least favored priority class under the hypothetical state law, would fare better under 
the synthetic circuity approach. But that is not the inevitable result. If there were 
only 15 wage claimants with claims of $10,000 (each claim exceeding $600 and earned 
within three months) and the facts were otherwise the same, there would be nothing 
left for them even under the ABA 1970 proposal since the federal share would then 
be $17,500 (computed by reducing $42,000 of gross assets by the administration and 
funeral expenses ($8,000), last illness expenses ($4,000), and $9,000 of the wages (15 X 
$600), and dividing the remaining $21,000 proportionately-$3,500 for the state and 
local taxes and $17,500 for the federal); the $24,500 left after setting aside the federal 
share would be actually applied to the administration and funeral expenses ($8,000), 
last illness expense ($4,000), widow's allowance ($5,000), state and local taxes ($5,000), 
and nontax debt to the state ($2,500), leaving nothing for the wage claimants. It was 
the fortuitous existence, in this example, of a sufficiently large claim for wages that 
would have been entitled to priority in bankruptcy but enjoy a much more limited 
priority under state law, that created the fund, at the expense of the federal claim, 
from which the federally unrecognized claimants benefit, with incidental partial benefit 
to the wage claimants themselves at the end of the line. 
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benefit other claims not intended by federal law to be favored over 
federal tax claims. 
2. The law of State N provides that, in an assignment for the 
benefit of creditors, all debts shall be paid pro rata and without 
priorities. B, who has neglected his ranch for a disastrous fling in 
Las Vegas, makes an assignment for creditors and, after deducting 
expenses, the fund available for distribution is $15,000. He owes 
debts as follows: 
Federal taxes (nondischargeable) 
State and local taxes (nondischargeable) 
Wages of 20 ranch hands (each exceeding 
$600 and earned within three months) 
Other business debts 







Under the ABA 1970 proposal, the amount of the federal priority 
would be determined by deducting from $15,000 the first $12,000 
of wages (20 X $600) and apportioning the balance in the proportion 
that each tax bears to the total taxes ($30,000), that is, $500 to the 
state and local taxes and $2,500 to the federal taxes. There being no 
priorities under local law, the $12,500 remaining after deducting 
the amount of the federal priority would provide a 12 1 /2 per cent 
dividend, as follows: 
Balance of federal ta."<es ($22,500)353 
State and local taxes ($5,000) 
Wages ($25,000) 
Other business debts ($20,000) 







The Government thus recovers, at most, only $5,312.50, but the in-
tended beneficiaries of the demotion of the federal priority get only 
$3,750 of the balance thus made available and general creditors take 
$5,937 .50.354 
The permissive approach, while overcoming the above objec-
tion, works rather badly in the circumstances of this example, since 
the absence of a system of priorities established by state law would 
result in the federal claim being paid, as at present, to the exclu-
353. See note 350 supra. 
354. In this instance the wage claimants would have had a strong incentive to add 
to the burdens of the bankruptcy court if the debtor were not a farmer (Bankruptcy 
Act § 4, 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1964)). He himself might voluntarily choose bankruptcy if he 
would rather have his farmhands paid but the nondischargeability of any unpaid 
balance of his taxes, together with a little pressure from his gambling creditors, might 
deter him. 
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sion of all the others. However, until the state responds to the per-
mission granted, that result seems preferable to creating an artificial 
priority fund computed on the basis of what the priorities might 
have been in bankruptcy and then dividing that fund indiscrim-
inately at the expense of the federal claim. 
3. The law of State O provides the following order of priorities 
in an assignment for the benefit of creditors: (1) administration ex-
penses, (2) wages not in excess of $300 per claimant earned within 
three months, and (3) state taxes. C makes an assignment for cred-
itors and, after deducting expenses, the fund available for distribu-
tion is $3,500. He owes unsecured debts as follows: 
Wages of 10 employees (each exceeding 
$600 and earned within three months) 
Federal withholding taxes (nondischargeable in 
bankruptcy, but not traceable into a trust fund) 
Other federal taxes (dischargeable) 






Of the tax claims, only the federal withholding taxes would qualify 
for priority un<lw:--0iiie proposed federal law. But, since it is nec-
essary first to deduct from the available assets the $6,000 of wages 
(10 X $600) that would enjoy priority under the scheme of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, there is nothing left for the federal priority. The wage 
claimants do not take the entire fund, however, for it is to be dis-
tributed under "other applicable law," and the law of State O would 
give $3,000 to the wage claimants (10 X $300) and $500 to the state. 
Thus, standing in the shoes of the wage claimants, the stale and 
dischargeable state tax is collectible ahead of both the dischargeable 
and nondischargeable federal taxes.355 
In this example, since the order of priorities under state law is 
consistent with the federal law, there would be no circuity if the 
permissive approach is applied. The wage claimants, having a $3,000 
priority over state claims and no one in a position to displace them 
under state law, would take that amount, just as under the ABA 
1970 proposal. But the happenstance that the wage claimants would 
have been entitled to a greater priority under the Bankruptcy Act 
would not result in the creation of any artificial additional fund for 
the benefit of state law priorities not recognized by federal law. Con-
sequently, the remaining $500 of assets would be applied to the 
355. Assuming the Bankruptcy Act permits (see note 49 supra), the disadvantaged 
creditors might alter the result by filing an involuntary petition. On the assumed 
facts, however, the United States has no incentive to do this since the wage claimants 
would then take the entire fund, and the added expenses would probably absorb any 
benefit the wage claimants might hope for. 
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nondischargeable federal withholding tax claim rather than to the 
state taxes, which, on these facts (being stale and dischargeable in 
bankruptcy), lack a federally recognized priority.856 
Plainly, the generosity of the Government in yielding its prior-
ity would often miss the mark under either of the ABA proposals. 
The remedy for the inequities evident in the foregoing examples 
would rest in the hands of the state legislatures which may, if they 
choose, bring their systems of priorities more closely in line with the 
permitted limits and arrange them so that each creditor would en-
joy his intended share, no more and no less. It is no doubt the hope 
of the draftsmen that, if the results of applying the circuity rules 
are sufficiently bizarre, the state legislatures will be induced to con-
form. But it must be remembered that the state priority rules apply 
in many instances in which federal claims may not be significant. 
Furthermore, the greatest beneficiary of the above-described circu-
ities is very frequently the state itself, which may be reluctant to 
bring its law into line. This reluctance will be particularly evident 
if Congress adopts the 1970 proposal which, at federal expense, arti-
ficially enlarges the fund available for othenvise unrecognized state-
law priority creditors whenever the state inadequately provides for 
wage priorities.357 
The draftsmen of the 1970 proposal considered supplementing 
the carrot with a stick by framing a provision designed to "encour-
age" the states to conform their priority rules to the federal standard, 
as well as to prevent any creditor with a federally unrecognized pri-
ority from trading on the recognized priority of another. The provi-
sion would have prescribed that "in no event" shall the federal 
356. In the examples heretofore stated, it has been assumed that the state laws 
themselves were silent on the priority ranking of federal claims. While that is 
frequently the case, there are numerous instances in which either "taxes" or "debts due 
the United States" are expressly directed to be paid before wages and state debts and 
taxes, and usually also before the expenses of the last illness. Although no doubt 
enacted in deference to the federal statutory priority, such provisions do not refer to 
the federal law and are not dependent upon it, so that, until such state laws arc 
amended, the "other applicable law" to which the proposed amendment refers may 
simply reinstate the absolute priority. In order to obviate the need to await amend-
ment of such state laws before the new rules become operative, the definition of "other 
applicable law" should be revised to exclude any provision of state law that prescribes 
the priority of federal claims. 
357. In some states (see notes 311 &: 313 supra and accompanying text), the provision 
for wage priorities is "excessive" by bankruptcy standards and would be unrecognized 
by either ABA draft (until the bankruptcy standard is changed to reflect inflation), If 
state claims are junior to wages under state law, the excess wages would be satisfied 
at state expense. If state claims are senior in rank under state law and hence in• 
vulnerable, the unrecognized excess wage priority would simply drop to the level next 
below federal taxes (although a circuity problem may still arise if there arc federal 
nonpriority claims which, under the proposal, must be paid on a parity with, not 
behind, claims not recognized as prior under the proposal). 
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priority be subordinated "if and to the extent that a claim ·not in-
tended to be benefited" by the federally recognized priorities "would 
receive in a distribution of the debtor's property more than it would 
have received if" such provisions "had not been enacted." However, 
apparently having discovered, as had their predecessors in the 1959 
version,358 that such a drastic measure cannot be confined within 
reasonable bounds, even by the seemingly limiting phrase, "to the 
extent that," the draftsmen abandoned the project. To illustrate 
with a simplified example, suppose that the measure of wage prior-
ities under state law is the same as the federal standard but that state 
law puts state taxes above wages and draws no distinction between 
dischargeable and nondischargeable taxes. The fund available, after 
expenses, is $10,000 and the claims are 
Federal taxes (nondischargeable) 
State taxes (over three years old and dischargeable) 





Under either of the ABA proposals, without the contemplated re-
striction, the amount of wages with priority would exhaust the fund 
and nothing would be applied on the federal claim. Under the cir-
cuity rule, the state would then take $500 of the amount set aside 
for the wage priority. But, if the restriction were adopted, the Gov-
ernment's subordination to wages would be inapplicable "to the 
extent that" the state became an unintended beneficiary of the fund 
made available for wages. Giving the Government the first $500 of 
the fund, however, would not exhaust the effect of the restriction, 
for the state, by force of its priority under state law, would then 
claim the second $500 which, in turn, it would have to disgorge to 
the Government, and so on until the entire wage fund had been 
absorbed by the federal priority in pristine rigor. Thus, if the afore-
mentioned provision had been adopted, the relaxation of the fed-
eral priority would, to a large extent, be a dead letter in any state 
until the legislature brought its system of priorities into line. No 
doubt this situation would provide a strong impetus to conformity, 
but if Congress is that convinced that uniformity of priorities in all 
states in all forms of proceedings is so desirable that it should be 
coerced, it might better act directly by adopting the mandatory ap-
proach-at least in the absence of · persuasive indication that its 
power does not extend so far.359 
358. Compare (the preliminary) Report of the Special Committee on Federal Liens, 
83 ABA ANNUAL REPORT 502, 519-21 (1958), with 1959 REPORT, supra note 47, at 713. 
359. See text accompanying notes 323-42 supra. 
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A more limited, but more workable, inducement to conformity, 
in the principal area in which circuity is likely to frustrate the pro-
posed federal policy, would be to provide that wages not in excess 
of the bankruptcy limitation have priority over federal claims only 
if-and, under the permissive approach, to the extent that-they 
are entitled to priority over unsecured claims of the state under other 
applicable law.360 This rule would penalize wage claimants in states 
not providing such priority, in cases involving claims exceeding the 
amount which the state would take from them under the circuity 
rule. But, by denying the state the opportunity to profit from this 
circuity, it would remove one deterrent (although it is not the only de-
terent) to the states bringing their priority rules into conformity in 
this respect, without forcing them to abdicate their entire system of 
priorities. Such a rule would not, however, resolve the principal 
problem that will arise, under either ABA proposal, in the case of 
decedents' estates: the absorption of the wage fund (under the cir-
cuity rule) by family allowances enjoying priority under state but 
not federal law. A more effective way to implement the limited 
objective of giving workmen a protective cushion against economic 
displacement caused by an employer's insolvency,361 without need 
for state action but without unduly interfering with state priority 
systems, wot1-ld be to adopt the mandatory approach in this special 
instance. A provision using this approach would specify that, not-
withstanding any other applicable law, wages and commissions equal 
to the bankruptcy limitation shall have priority not only over fed-
eral taxes but also over all other expenses, claims, and allowances 
not embraced in the first two priorities established by any proposed 
federal law. 
Without some such assurance that the federal largess will be en-
joyed by its intended beneficiaries, I seriously doubt that Congress 
will be inclined to yield the traditional federal priority over unse-
cured claims. If uniformity of priority rules in federally and state 
regulated proceedings is not bonum in se-and the case for unifor-
mity (the mandatory approach) must be regarded as "not proven" 
-we should at least strive to minimize the "intolerable inconsis-
tencies and confusion [that] would result if [state] insolvency law 
360. The ABA 1959 proposal allowed wage priorities, subject to the bankruptcy 
limits, "if and to the extent that they are entitled to priority under state law," without 
specifying over what claims the wages must have priority. 1959 REPORT, supra note 47, 
at 732. 
361. See United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29, 33 (1959). Since the 
dependents of an insolvent decedent also suffer "economic displacement," this approach 
might be combined with a carefully limited recognition of the priority of family 
allowances, See note 291 supra. 
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be given effect while the national Act is in force."362 That result, I 
submit, can best be realized by adopting, with certain possible ex-
ceptions, the permissive approach of the 1959 proposal.363 
C. Unemployment Taxes: The Monkey Puzzle364 
The federal unemployment tax was enacted, not as a means of 
raising federal revenue, but to encourage the states to establish tax-
supported unemployment compensation systems.365 The liability 
for the 3.2 per cent federal tax, therefore, may be abated, up to a 
maximum of 2.7 per cent of taxable wages,366 by a credit for pay-
ments by the employer into approved state systems. The federal 
government collects and uses the remaining 0.5 per cent for its own 
expenses of administration of the system, for assistance to the states 
in their administrative costs, and for advances to the states to meet 
unusual needs for unemployment benefits.367 If the employer's pay-
ment of the state tax is delayed beyond the due date of the federal 
return, whether through his own perversity or neglect or because 
of financial difficulty or insolvency, the credit for state tax payments 
ultimately made is reduced to 90 per cent of the amount otherwise 
allowable (i.e., to a maximum of 2.43 per cent), thus increasing the 
net federal liability in general to 0.77 per cent, which, of course, is 
in addition to the state tax liability of 2.7 per cent or more.368 If 
362. ~ee International Shoe Co. v. Pin1ms, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929). 
363. There should be added to the ABA 1959 proposal, however, a provision based 
on the last sentence of § 67c(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(2) (Supp. V, 
1965-1969), so that, if a claim for wages or for state or local taxes is secured by a lien 
which first becomes effective upon insolvency, etc., and hence is denied recognition 
as a lien against federal claims (see note 172 supra), it would at least be considered to 
enjoy a "priority" under state law and hence would be preferred over federal claims 
within the limits prescribed by the proposal. 
364. The phenomenon described in the text following has been named, although 
only by the author, for a South American tree (araucaria araucana) the branches of 
which are intricately intertwined. 
365. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585-90 (1937). 
366. Initially the federal tax was 3% and the maximum credit was 90% thereof. 
The federal rate is now 3.2% (INT. ltEv. CODE of 1954, § 3301) and has been as high as 
3.5% (Treas. Reg. § 31.3301-3(a) (1963)), but the maximum credit is frozen at 90% of 
3%, or 2.7% (INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 3302(c){l) and (d)(l)). State tax rates, while 
frequently fixed at 2.7%, may range higher (e.g., 4% in Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 43, § 781.I (1964)), with no credit allowable for the excess. Additional credits above 
actual payments to the state are allowed, subject to the over-all 2.7% limitation, to 
employers entitled, e.g., by reason of experience rating, to pay less than the highest 
rate under state law. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 3302(b), 3303. The maximum credit 
allowable may be reduced if the state is indebted to the federal fund {INT. REv. CODE 
of 1954, §§ 3302(c)(2) and (3)) and the additional federal collections resulting are 
applied in reduction of the state's obligation (42 U.S.C. § llOI(d) (1964)). 
367. 42 u.s.c. §§ 1101-05, 1321 (1964). 
368. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 3302(a)(3). 
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the state tax goes unpaid by reason of the employer's insolvency, the 
full 3.2 per cent federal tax, without offsetting credit, may be col-
lected under the federal priority and the state may get nothing. 
In the view of the Supreme Court, Section 3466, which overrides 
even a prior lien obtained by the state,360 requires that the gross 
federal unemployment tax (unreduced by any credit for state taxes 
yet unpaid at the date of insolvency) as well as all other federal 
claims, be paid out of the insolvent estate before anything is applied 
on the state unemployment contribution obligation. Furthermore, 
even if there is money left after payment of federal priority claims, 
and any other claims that outrank the state under local law,370 so 
that all or part of the state unemployment contributions can be 
paid, no credit for such payment will be allowed to reduce the fed-
eral tax. The Court declared that the credit provision must yield 
to the insolvency priority statute, which gives absolute, not con-
ditional or defeasible, priority to federal claims as they exist on 
the date when the priority attaches.371 This assertion, of course, is 
nonsense, because the priority statute does not make absolute an ob-
ligation that by the very terms of its creation is conditional.372 
Nevertheless, this is the law today and, in consequence, the state 
either fails to get paid from the fund that Congress in effect made 
available for such payment by providing the credit, or, if funds are 
sufficient for both, the federal government takes its 3.2 per cent 
of wages and the state takes up to 2. 7 per cent in addition-a total 
of 5.9 per cent as against 3.2 per cent payable by a solvent non-
delinquent employer; truly a "double proof" allowed at the expense 
of junior creditors.s13 
The inequity is mitigated but not adequately resolved by the 
rule applied in bankruptcy, which the ABA proposal may possibly 
extend to other insolvency administrations. Although this rule places 
federal and state taxes, if nondischargeable in bankruptcy, on a par-
369. Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946). 
370. Relatively few state laws give top priority rating to claims for unemployment 
contributions. See Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 632 n.35 (1948). 
371. Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 624-29 (1948). 
372. It could as well be said that, if the Government had sold property by war• 
ranty deed to one who then becomes insolvent, the property must be paid for out of 
the estate although the title later fails, or that an insolvent may not carry back net 
operating losses against his unpaid pre-insolvency income taxes-although the carry• 
backs would be allowable, by way of refund to the estate, if the earlier taxes had been 
paid. Cf. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966) (bankruptcy). To the Government's 
credit, it may be noted that it tried to concede that credit would be allowable against 
the federal unemployment tax for whatever the state recovered but the Court rejected 
the concession as a matter of law. 
373. See Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 638 (1948) (dissenting opinion). 
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ity,874 they would nevertheless not be paid in proportion to their nor-
mal shares of the combined tax liability because of a remarkable feat 
of algebraic legerdemain that also has the blessing of the Supreme 
Court. Algebra must be resorted to because credit is allowable only 
for what the state collects on its claim. This amount can be deter-
mined only when the amount of other tax claims, including the 
federal unemployment tax, ranking on a parity with it are known, 
which, in turn, cannot be determined until the amount to be paid 
on the state claim is ascertained. 375 Since the bizarre effects of this 
formula on the principle of parity must be seen to be believed, I 
have set out two examples in the footnote.376 
374. Although generally labeled "contributions,'' payments into state unemploy-
ment systems are deemed taxes for priority purposes in bankruptcy. Missouri v. 
Gleick, 135 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1943); In re William Akers, Jr., Co., 121 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 
1941). Cf. Carmichael v. Southern Coal&: Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937). For a discussion 
of dischargeable taxes, see notes 299-302 supra and accompanying text. 
375. United States v. New York, 315 U.S. 510, 518 (1942). The equation was set 
out and explained by the trial court, sub nom. In re Independent Auto For-
warding Corp., 38 F. Supp. 976, 978 (W.D.N.Y. 1940). At that time, the reduction of 
the allowable credit on account of late payment was not applied when timely payment 
was prevented by bankruptcy or receivership. Social Security Act Amendments of 
1939, ch. 666, § 609, 53 Stat. 1387. Modified to reflect the present 10% reduction of 
the credit for late payment (INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 3302(a)(3)) and ignoring further 
modifications that would be necessary, e.g., if the state tax differs from 2,7%, the 
equation is: 
(A+ B) -',/(A+ B)2 - 4(.9AT) 
X=------------
2 (.9A) 
with A being the state unemployment tax, B being the sum of all other taxes on a 
parity with it (including the gross federal unemployment tax), T being the fund re-
maining after allowing for higher priorities, and X being the percentage of each tax 
claim that can be paid. 
376. Assume that the gross federal tax liability, at 3.2 per cent, is $32,000, and the 
unpaid state tax, at 2.7 per cent, is $27,000, and there are no other unpaid tax liabili-
ties. This is a situation in which a solvent employer would pay $27,000 to the state and 
$5,000 to the United States, or $7,700 ($32,000 less 90 per cent of $27,000) to the 
United States if the payment to the state is late. It is also a situation in which, in an 
insolvency administration subject to Section 3466, the United States would take the 
first $32,000, and the state would take $27,000 in addition if funds were available. How 
would the rule of "parity" work? 
I. Suppose, first, that the fund available after satisfaction of higher priorities is 
$20,164. Application of the algebraic formula establishes that 41.152 per cent cif each 
tax claim can be paid. Hence, $11,111 can be paid to the state. The allowable credit, 
reduced for late payment, is $10,000, leaving a remaining federal tax liability of $22,000, 
of which 41.152 per cent, or $9,053, can be paid, thus exhausting the fund. The 
government thus takes nearly twice the dollar amount and nearly three times the per-
centage of the total collections that would have been its right if the employer had 
been able to meet his obligations in the normal course. , 
2. Now suppose that the fund available is only $4,691. By the formula, we de-
termine that 8.230 per cent of each tax can be paid. Hence, $2,222 can be paid to the 
state, resulting in a credit of 90 per cerlt thereof, or $2,000. The remaining federal 
tax liability is $30,000, of which 8.230 per cent, or $2,469, can be paid. Obviously, with 
the fund so small, the federal government gets fewer dollars than it would from a 
solvent employer. But its percentage share of the available fund is 52.6 per cent, in 
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Those anomalies and inequities should be corrected by amend-
ing the Internal Revenue Code377 along with the bankruptcy and 
insolvency statutes.378 One source of the difficulty is the tax law con-
cept that the credit is to be allowed only to the extent that the state 
tax is paid. That concept is designed to assure that the amounts 
for which credit is allowed actually reach the state fund. But when 
assets are insufficient, the concept has the opposite effect of depriv-
ing the state fund of its proportionate share while sometimes giving 
contrast to 44.9 per cent in the example with the larger fund and 16.7 per cent 
in the normal case of a solvent employer. This is parity? 
In the foregoing, I have assumed that, since the ABA proposal places state and 
federal taxes on the same level, as does the Bankruptcy Act, the bankruptcy formula-
which, in its distorted way, allows reduction of the federal claim by the credit 
subsequently earned-would be applied. But nothing in the draft proposal would 
preclude the courts from construing proposed Section 3466 as the present statute 
has been construed, save only that the federal claim that becomes fixed and immutable 
at the date of death or divestment (beyond possibility of further reduction by credit) 
would rank equally with the state claim rather than ahead of it. In Massachusetts v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 611, 624-29 (1948), discussed in text accompanying note 371 
supra, the "debts due to the United States," which Section 3466 requires to be "first 
satisfied," were those existing at divestment, with no later reduction permitted. In 
bankruptcy the "taxes which became legally due and owing" to the United States and 
which enjoy fourth priority under Section 64a(4) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 104(a)(4) (1964) were not thus viewed as unchangeable. United States v. New York, 315 
U.S. 510, 518 (1942), discussed in note 375 supra and accompanying text. The ABA 1970 
proposal, however, defines "claims" as those "legally due and owing by the debtor 
as of the date of the divestment of his property [or his death]" (see proposed § 3466(g), 
set out in note 60 supra (emphasis added)), and thus could readily be construed, as 
is present Section 3466, to freeze the amount of a federal claim as of that date. In 
that event, the Government would take 54.24 per cent (32/59) of the available fund in 
each example and the state would take 45.76 per cent (27 /59) and, if the fund re-
maining after higher priorities was between $32,000 and $59,000, the two claims 
would absorb it all-at the expense of lower grades of claims. 
Even if that forbidding prospect is foreclosed by appropriate revision of the draft, 
the ABA proposal involves complications ordinarily not present in bankruptcy, in 
which federal law controls the priorities. Whether the synthetic circuity approach of 
the 1970 proposal or the permissive approach of the 1959 proposal is followed, the 
state claim may not in fact be paid from funds made available by the federal law 
for the tax level of priority since it is state law that determines the distribution of 
the portion of the fund not set aside for the federal share. See pt. IV. B. supra. If state 
law places claims for state unemployment contributions behind other state ta.xes 
or behind such federally unrecognized items as widows' allowances or wages in excess 
of the bankruptcy limitations, so that the state claim is supplanted under the circular 
priority principle described in the preceding section, the allowable credit will be 
further reduced to the extent that the state claim consequently goes unpaid. The 
federal claim will be enlarged thereby, to the further detriment of the subordinate 
state claim as well as of other creditors. A similar situation may arise, in bankruptcy 
as well as in other insolvencies, if the federal government first obtains a perfected lien, 
which thereby reduces the amount which the state may collect and for which credit may 
be allowed. Perhaps Einstein could have devised equations for dividing the fund in 
such cases, but I shall not attempt it. 
377. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 3302. 
378. See Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade 111, 
77 YALE L.J. 1104, 1114 (1968). 
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the federal government more dollars (and always giving it a greater 
percentage) than it would have if assets were sufficient-thereby 
penalizing the state fund for the employer's inability to pay.879 The 
Government should be satisfied, under the principle of parity in 
bankruptcy (and, as proposed, in insolvency), to divide the available 
fund in the proportion that the net amount of federal tax, after full 
credit, bears to the state tax. 
The other source of this problem is the fact that, outside of 
bankruptcy (and in any case where liens have arisen), these closely 
integrated federal and state taxes may occupy different priority levels. 
I suggest that provision be made for the United States to make a 
claim in bankruptcy or insolvency, as it does now, for the gross fed-
eral tax, reduced only by credits earned before the proceeding by 
earlier partial payments of state or federal tax or by virtue of ex-
perience ratings, etc., that reduce the state tax payable. Any amount 
so collected by the United States should be held for the account of, 
and divided between, both governments concerned in the propor-
tion that the state tax (not to exceed 2.7 per cent) bears to the net 
federal tax after deduction of the credit that would be allowable if 
the state tax were fully paid.380 If the state tax exceeds 2.7 per cent, 
the state would make claim for the excess. In dividing the fund, due 
379. It may be responded that the discriminatory effect is neutralized since the 
federal government guarantees the solvency of the state funds by making advances 
under certain circumstances (42 U.S.C. § 1321 (1964)). See Massachusetts v. United 
States, 333 U.S. 611, 632 (1948). But the burden of repaying any such advances, and 
thus of bearing the cost of abnormal unemployment in a particular state, falls ulti-
mately on that state's employers through reduction of the credit against the 
federal tax (thereby increasing their aggregate tax) so long as the advances remain 
outstanding. See note 366 supra. See also 42 U.S.C. §§ llOl(d)(l), 1103(b)(2), 1322 (1964). 
That federal guaranty, therefore, hardly justifies further depleting the state fund 
through a discriminatory priority rule that is out of harmony with the general 
principle of parity between state and federal imposts. 
380. In Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. United States, 328 U.S. 8, 11 (1946), the Court 
rejected under present law the argument that the credit provision makes the state 
claim "tantamount to a claim of the United States." But if Congress provides expressly 
for collection by the United States on behalf of both, in insolvency or bankruptcy, with 
the benefit of the federal priority, there seems no defect of power to do so (Small 
Business Admin. v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446, 451-53 (1960); Bramwell v. United States 
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 299 F. 705, 706 (9th Cir. 1924), afjd., 269 U.S. 483, 487 (1926)); nor 
should it involve any practical difficulty since collections of state unemployment contri-
butions are in any event initially deposited by the states in an Unemployment Trust 
Fund in the United States Treasury (42 U.S.C. § 1104 (1964)) and credits to and from 
the states' accounts therein are now provided for in certain circumstances. This pro-
cedure seems preferable to having the Government claim and collect only the net 
tax after deducting the full credit and regarding the rest as a claim to be made by the 
state since there would be no assurance, in the latter case, that the amount for which 
credit was allowed would actually reach the state if state law ranked some other 
item not enjoying priority under federal law above state unemployment contribu-
tions. See Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 632-33 (1948). 
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allowance should; of course, be made for collections by either gov-
ernment antecedent-to the proceeding.381 
However, the circuity effect may sometimes enhance rather than 
reduce the amount the-state may collect from the insolvent estate. 
If, for example, state unemployment contributions outrank wage 
claims under the state insolvency law the state may collect, in the 
shoes of the wage claimants, a larger proportion of its claim than it 
would in bankruptcy (assuming that the mandatory approach is not 
applied to wage priorities, as heretofore suggested). A similar conse-
quence may follow if the state first obtains a lien which, under the 
Bankruptcy Act or under the ABA insolvency proposal, would be 
recognized as superior to the federal claim. Given the general poli-
cies of the ABA proposal to recognize prior liens and to permit 
state legislative policies favoring certain unsecured claims-within 
the limitations of the circular priority rules-to pre-empt the posi-
tion of nonfederal claimants favored by the federal law, there 
appears to be no reason in this particular situation not to let the 
state unemployment fund avail itself of any greater sum it may be 
able to collect in this manner. Therefore, if it appears advantageous 
for the state to claim in its mm right, it may be permitted to do so. In 
this event, the amount allowed on the federal claim should be 
reduced by a credit for whatever the state thus collects independently 
and the division of the amount collected on the federal claim should 
be adjusted accordingly.as2 
381. For example, The gross federal tax is $32,000, and the state tax is $27,000, 
all of which would qualify for credit if paid. The employer had paid $10,000 with 
his state tax return but had paid no federal tax. When insolvency occurs, the United 
States files claim for $22,000. Preferred wage claims arc $7,000 and the amount avail• 
able after expenses is $21,000, leaving $14,000 for taxes. There arc no other tax 
claims. To calculate the division of the tax fund, the $14,000 should be "grossed up" 
by including the prior collections. The resulting $24,000 should be divided in the 
ratio of the net federal liability to the state liability (5 to 27), that is, $3,750 to the 
United States and $20,250 to the state, of which amount the state has previously 
received $10,000. Thus, in the federal-state "partnership" in financing and ad-
ministering unemployment compensation, no advantage would be gained by one 
government's having collected an amount outside the proceeding. 
382. Assume the same facts as in note 381 supra, except that state law favors state 
taxes over wage claims. The state would file claim for its unpaid $17,000 in order to 
take advantage of that priority but the United States would still make a contingent 
claim for $22,000 since it may not be known initially how much the state will collect 
in the shoes of the wage claimants. To avoid duplication, the state claim should be 
allowed for an amount equal to the pre:empted wage claims ($7,000) and the $15,000 
balance should be .allowed as a federal claim. The $14,000 fund available for tax 
claims would be diyided by "gross_ing 'Up" to reflect the $17,000 collected by the state 
before and in the proceeding ~nd the $31,000 which would be apportioned in the 
5 to 27 ratio, $4,687.50 to the United States and $26,312.50 to the state, against which 
is charged the $17,000 collection. The general rule proposed for circular priorities 
is that the federal share should be determined by applying the federal scheme of 
priorities without reference to state law and the entire benefit of any circuity is en-
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Implicit in the foregoing recommendation~ although not an 
indispensable part of it, is the view that the 10 per cent reduction 
in the allowable credit should not be applied to the detriment of 
the state or of junior creditors if bankruptcy or an insolvency 
administration has intervened. The general policy of the bankruptcy 
law is to avoid saddling the estate with penalties for the debtor's 
defaults that "would serve not to punish the delinquent taxpayers, 
but rather their entirely innocent creditors."383 The ABA has rec-
ommended extending this policy to other insolvency situations.384 
The denial of 10 per cent of the otherwise allowable credit if 
payment to the state is delayed increases the net liability to the 
federal government, at present rates, by 54 per cent (from 0.5 per 
cent to 0.77 per cent) and is certainly as penal in its effect as any 
delinquency penalty.385 It is a sheer euphemism to say, as some 
district courts have, that the denial of the credit is not a penalty 
imposed for late payment but reflects the failure of the taxpayer to 
qualify for a reward or favor in the form of a tax reduction which 
was tendered in order to encourage timely payment.386 Although 
the Supreme Court has agreed that the additional federal tax re-
sulting from denial of the credit was not a penalty disallowable in 
bankruptcy, the case before it was not one involving merely a 
delayed payment but one in which, by reason of the algebraic formula 
described above, the portion of the state tax for which credit was 
denied could never be paid at all.387 Congress may have had the lat-
ter type of case in mind when, in 1939, it sought to "set at rest the 
joyed by those favored by the state law. See proposed § 3466(£)(2), set out in note 348 
supra. Here, the federal share ($4,687.50) exceeds what it would be in the absence of 
circuity ($3,750, see note 381 supra) as a portion of the state's priority advantage inures 
to the Government. This result, however, seems consistent with my suggested principle 
that the "partners" in the unemployment fund should gain no advantage over each 
other by independent collections, whether before or in the insolvency proceeding. 
383. Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38, 40-41 (1962); Bankruptcy Act § 57j, 11 
u.s.c. § 93G) (1964). 
384. See pt. VI. infra. 
385. Cf. New York v. Jersawit, 263 U.S. 493, 496 (1924). 
386. In re Illinois Art Indus., Inc., 27 F. Supp. 334, 335 (W.D. Mich. 1939); In 
re Richmaid Creameries, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 828, 829 (S.D. Cal. 1937), revd. on stip. sub 
nom. Boteler v. Rogan, 97 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1938). Contra, In re Hy-Grade Meat & 
Grocery Co., 26 F. Supp. 294, 295 (D.N.J. 1938); In re Standard Composition Co., 23 F. 
Supp. 391, 395 (E.D. Mich. 1938). 
387. United States v. New York, 315 U.S. !HO, 516-17 (1942). The algebraic formula 
which the Court approved (see note 375 supra) in fact took into account the full 
credit for that portion of the state tax which it was possible to satisfy. By virtue of 
§ 902(a) of the Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, 53 Stat. 1399, in certain cases 
of bankruptcy or receivership, full credit was allowed for amounts in fact paid, however 
long delayed. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 609, 53 Stat. 1387. 
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question involved by expressly providing that no part" of the federal 
unemployment tax shall be deemed a penalty for purposes of the 
Bankruptcy Act,388 for it provided in the same legislation that no loss 
or reduction of credit should occur merely on account of lateness of 
payment if the "taxpayer's assets, at any time during the period 
from [the] last day for filing a return for such year to June 30 next 
following such last day, both dates inclusive, are in the custody or 
control of a receiver, trustee, or other fiduciary appointed by, or 
under the control of, a court of competent jurisdiction."889 However, 
Congress eliminated that relief provision in 1943, declaring that it 
"does not appear to be warranted" in view of a further amendment 
then made by which the credit was no longer wholly forfeited for 
late payment but 90 per cent of the credit could be earned by pay-
ment at any time.390 But I submit that a relatively small penalty for 
a delay which is "necessitated by law if the courts are properly to 
preserve and protect the estate for the benefit of all interests in-
volved"391 is no more warranted than a large one. 
I suggest, therefore, that the amount which I have proposed that 
the federal government collect on behalf of itself and the state, in 
bankruptcy or insolvency, should not be enlarged at the expense of 
the state or of junior creditors by any reduction of the credit that 
would have been allowable for timely payment. This principle 
should apply, unlike the relief in effect from 1939 to 1943,392 whether 
or not the administration was in progress during the period immedi-
ately following the taxable year because, even if the employer had 
already forfeited a portion of the credit by his delinquency before 
the administration began, that forfeiture should be remitted, as is 
any penalty for the debtor's past defaults, when bankruptcy or 
insolvency follows. The same principle should also apply when the 
default occurs after the administration has begun since it "is pre-
posterous for taxing agencies to penalize an insolvent estate for the 
mere fact that it is insolvent, the very reason for which it is in the 
hands of the court."393 Consideration sl!ould also be given to extend-
388. S. REP. No. 734, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1939), describing § 902(i) of the Social 
Security Act Amendments of 1939, 53 Stat. 1400. 
389. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 609, 53 Stat. 1387. 
390. H.R. REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1943), referring to § 601 of the 
Revenue Act of 1943. Before the 1939 Act, the entire credit was lost if payment of 
the state tax was a day late. From 1939 until passage of the 1943 Act, 90 per cent 
of the credit could be earned if payment was made by June 30, but none if it was 
later, except in the cases of bankruptcy or receivership that were relieved of forfeiture. 
391. See Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 163 (19•16). 
392. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 609, 53 Stat. 1387. 
393. Wurzel, Taxation During Bankruptcy Liquidation, 55 HARV. L. REv. 1141, 11'16 
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ing the relief to cover assignments by an insolvent for the benefit of 
creditors, which were excluded from the 1939 relief because they 
were not under the control of a court.394 
V. ANTECEDENT FEDERAL LIENS AND OTHER TAX LIENS 
Even though federal claims may be secured by mortgage or lien, 
they are embraced in the present Section 3466 priority395 and may, 
in some circumstances, improve upon the standing that they would 
enjoy as against competing liens and claims in the absence of 
insolvency.396 Under the ABA 1970 proposal the new priority rules 
would not "impair" any pre-existing federal lien,397 but that pro-
hibition would not preclude secured federal claims from still gaining 
an advantage from the insolvency priority. The proposal also states 
that nothing therein shall entitle an unsecured federal claim to 
priority over a nonfederal lien that meets certain minimum re-
quirements.398 But it should further be made clear that the insol-
vency priority is not to detract from the standing that qualified 
competing liens would have as against secured federal claims, and 
that the relative priority of these liens shall be determined under 
the laws and judicial doctrines applicable in the absence of an 
insolvency administration. 399 
(1942). Although the Supreme Court has sustained penalties for the fiduciary's own 
failure to file returns (which, not being penalties imposed on the bankrupt, are not 
subject to disallowance under Bankruptcy Act § 57j, 11 U.S.C. § 930)(1964)) it has 
indicated that its earlier decision in Boteler v. Ingels, 308 U.S. 57 (1939), which penalized 
the estate for mere nonpayment, "may be open to some question.'' Nicholas v. United 
States, 384 U.S. 678, 694 (1966). 
394. People v. Advertising Review Pub. Co., 329 Ill. 29, 36-37, 62 N.E.2d 537, 540-41 
(1945), af!d. sub nom. Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. United States, 328 U.S. 8 (1946). 
395. United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953); W.T. Jones & Co. 
v. Foodco Realty, Inc., 318 F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1963). 
396. See United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351, 357-59 (1964). See also text accom-
panying notes 238-50 supra. 
397. S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), provides: 
[Sec. 3466] (e) CERTAIN LIENS PRESERVED.-Nothing in this section shall-
(!) impair any lien in favor of the United States existing at the time of the 
divestment of the debtor's property in the manner provided in this section (or 
at the time of death in the case of an insolvent estate) •.•• 
3~8. See proposed § 3466(e)(2), set out in note 172 supra. 
399. It has been held in bankruptcy cases that priority between antecedent federal 
and other liens is determined by the lien law, not the bankruptcy law. United States 
v. First Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 386 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1967); California State Dept. 
of Employment v. United States, 210 F.2d 242, 243 (9th Cir. 1954); In re Freeze-In 
Mfg. Corp., 128 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. Mich. 1955). The rules of priority between 
federal tax liens and other liens and security interests, in the absence of an in-
solvency proceeding, were liberalized in INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323, as amended 
by the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125. No comparable 
liberalization of the "federal common law" of lien priorities, including the infamous 
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Since executors, receivers, and other :fiduciaries acting in insol-
vency administrations not conducted under ·the Bankruptcy Act do 
not enjoy the special status that a trustee in bankruptcy has as a 
universal judgment lien creditor,400 the preservation of federal liens 
and security interests as against unsecured claims in such insolvencies 
is not dependent upon such liens and security interests having been 
duly filed or recorded,401 and the ABA apparently found no sufficient 
reason to grasp the nettle by proposing otherwise.402 The proposed 
elevation of state and local taxes to parity with federal taxes in in-
solvency, therefore, would apply only where the federal tax is not 
"choateness" doctrine (see notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text) has yet been 
enacted with respect to federal nontax liens. See Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-
Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 YALE L.J. 228, 285-96 (1967). Therefore, such liens 
might still prevail, with or without insolvency, over competing liens deemed "inchoate" 
by federal standards, even though the ABA insolvency proposal would honor such liens 
against unsecured federal claims. The bolder courts, however, in decisions that border 
on judicial legislation, have applied the "spirit" of the federal tax lien amendments 
to liberalize the priorities of competing liens as against other types of federal liens on 
which Congress has failed to take action. Ault v. Harris, 317 F. Supp. 373 (D. Alaska), 
afjd., 432 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1970); Standard Sav. &: Loan Assn. v. Evans, 255 S.C. 207, 
178 S.E.2d 145 (1970). Contra, Agsten &: Sons, Inc, v. Huntington Trust &: Sav. Bank, 
388 F.2d 156, 160 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1025 (1968). 
400. Having the rights of a judgment lien creditor under Bankruptcy Act § 70c, 
11 U.S.C. § ll0(c) (Supp. V, 1965-1969), the trustee prevails over unfiled federal liens 
that are invalid against such creditors. United States v. Speers, 382 U.S. 266 (1965): 
112 CONG. REC. 22226 (1966). 
401. In re Gibson Lithograph Co., 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,J 9749 (S.D. Cal. 1964) 
(assignment for creditors). Except as against the classes expressly protected by INT. 
REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323 (purchasers, holders of security interests, mechanic's lienors, 
and judgment creditors), the federal tax lien relates back to the time of assessment 
and is valid without filing. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6322; United States v. City of 
New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 87-88 (1954). 
402. See Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 
YALE L.J. 228, 254 (1967). The matter of the bankruptcy trustee's protection against 
unfiled tax liens was a center of controversy in connection with the 1966 amendments 
of the Bankruptcy Act. S. REP. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-6 (1966); Letter from 
assistant Treasury Secretary S. Surrey, Sept. 8, 1961, reproduced in S. REP. No. 277, 
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 18 (1965), and quoted in part in United States v. Speers, 882 
U.S. 266, 276 n.21 (1965). That controversy having been settled, however, there may be 
less justification for not extending the principle to insolvency administrations, although 
the circumstances are not truly the same. Administrations of insolvent decedents' 
estates, of course, occur without volition on the part of creditors, and in some other 
situations such as liquidations of banks and insurance companies, there may be no more 
favorable course that might have been taken if the lien were known. In other cases, a 
reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act might have been chosen, in which the trustee 
or debtor in possession would enjoy the same rights as a trustee in straight bankruptcy 
(Bankruptcy Act §§ 77(c)(3), 186-88, 11 U.S.C. §§ 205(c)(3), 586-88 (1964)), including 
the rights of a judgment lien creditor; but that advantage would be meaningless to 
creditors in the absence of amendment (as suggested in text accompanying notes 89-92 
supra) of the statutory requirement that any plan, to be approved, must provide for 
payment of federal taxes, whether secured by valid lien or not. In any situation where 
straight bankruptcy is an available alternative, however, creditors may be misled to 
their detriment by the absence of filed notice of an antecedent tax lien and a require• 
ment of filing could be justified in such cases. 
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secured by an antecedent li!;!n, filed or unfiled: And the reduction of 
federal nontax. claims, as well as federal tax claims that are discharge-
able in bankruptcy, to the level of general creditor claims in insol-
vency proceedings would apply only to claims not secured by lien.403 
The one qualification that the proposal makes to the preservation 
of the priority of antecedent tax liens is that every tax lien on 
personal property, not accompanied by possession at the time of the 
debtor's death or the divestment of his property, would be postponed 
to administration expenses, funeral and last illness expenses, and 
preferred wage claims.404 This change is modeled on a similar pro-
vision in the Bankruptcy Act405 which reflects the view of Congress 
that, with the ever-increasing burden of tax.es, "[i]t would be grossly 
unfair for the bankruptcy court and the attorneys who have labored 
to wind up the bankrupt's affairs and to accumulate an estate for 
distribution to receive nothing for this labor," and that "it is also 
socially desirable that the claims of the wage earner who is normally 
entirely dependent upon his wages for the necessity of life should be 
paid to the extent of the restriction in section 64a(2) [$600 earned 
within three months] before the estate is subject to the heavy burden 
of all tax liens."406 While Congress may have less concern with 
403. For a discussion of dischargeable taxes, see text accompanying notes 299-302 
supra. It is provided in Bankruptcy Act § 17a(l), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(l) (Supp. V, 1965-
1969), that the discharge "shall not release or affect any tax lien." While the discharged 
liability cannot become a lien on after-acquired property, it enjoys lien priority status 
against property owned at the time of bankruptcy. United States v. Sanabria, 424 F.2d 
1121 (7th Cir. 1970); In re Braund, 289 F. Supp. 604 (C.D. Cal. 1968), affd., 423 F.2d 718 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 823 (1970). See Marsh, Triumph or Tragedy? The 
Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1966, 42 WASH. L. REv. 681, 710-12 (1967). Such lien 
would likewise not be "impaired" by anything in the insolvency proposal. See proposed 
§ 3466(e)(l), set out in note 397 supra. 
404. S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), provides: 
[Sec. 3466] (e) CERTAIN LIENS PRESERVED.-
Notwithstanding the preceding sentence [set out in notes 172 & 397 supra], every 
tax lien on personal property not accompanied by possession at the time of divest· 
ment (or at the time of death in the case of an insolvent estate) shall be post-
poned to the claims specified in paragraphs (I), (2), and (3) of subsection (b) of 
this section [set out in notes 199, 236 & 279 supra]. 
Presumably neither the general interdiction against impairment of antecedent liens 
(see note 397 supra) nor the limited terms of the exception would affect the general 
principle that, if the proceeding is instituted for the enforcement of a federal lien (e.g., 
under INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7403(d)), the liened property, of whatever character, 
is chargeable with expenses of the proceeding. United States v. Kensington Shipyard & 
Drydock Corp., 187 F.2d 709, 715-16 (3d Cir. 1951). 
405. Bankruptcy Act § 67c(3), 11 U.S.C. § I07(c)(3) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). Probably by 
oversight, the ABA proposal omits a qualification found in § 67c(5) of the Bankruptcy 
Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(5) (Supp. V, 1965-1969), that the postponement shall not apply 
to liens enforced by sale before the proceeding, even if possession is not taken. 
406. H.R. REP. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1965). See also the history o.'.: the 
original 1938 amendment, set out in Goggin v. Division of Labor Law Enforcement, 
336 U.S. 118, 127-29 n.8 (1949). 
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compensating the probate and other local courts and the fiduciaries 
and attorneys who administer proceedings therein,407 the principle 
of comity would favor extension of the above rule to proceedings 
other than in bankruptcy;408 and the social policy of enhancing the 
This subordination of tax liens may result in circuity if the postponed lien is 
itself superior to another lien or security interest that is recognized and indefeasible 
in the proceeding. For example, a decedent's personalty may be subject to federal tax 
liens of $8,000 (not reduced to possession) and to an indefeasible security interest of 
$4,000, which is junior to the tax lien. Suppose administration and funeral expenses 
and wage and last illness claims total $3,000 and the net proceeds of the personalty 
are $10,000. In order to accomplish the purpose of the postponement without diminish-
ing what the junior but nonpostponable security interest would otherwise be entitled 
to, the ABA proposal applies a principle adopted, in 1966, by Congress in § 67c(3) 
of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(3) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). Under this principle 
the circuity would be resolved by first setting aside an amount equal to the senior tax 
lien ($8,000) and applying the balance to the junior security interest. The priority items 
would then be satisfied from the amount set aside for the tax lien. See S. 2197, 
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), which provides: 
[Sec. 3466] (f) CIRCULAR PRIORITIES.-
(1) If a tax lien on personal property not accompanied by possession referred 
to in subsection (e) [set out in note 404 supra] is prior in right to liens indefeasible 
under other applicable law, the proceeds derived from the sale of the personal 
property to which the tax lien attaches, less the actual cost of sale, in an amount 
not in excess of the tax lien, shall be apJ?lied to the expenses and claims specified 
in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (b). If the amount realized from the 
sale exceeds the total of such e.xpenses and claims, after allowing for prior inde-
feasible liens and the cost of the sale, the excess up to the amount of the difference 
between the total paid to the expenses and claims specified in paragraphs (1), (2), 
and (3) of subsection (b) of this section and the amount of the tax lien, is to be 
paid to the holder of the tax lien. 
For a more detailed explanation of the working of the rule as applied in bankruptcy, 
see Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Amendments of 1966, l GA. L. REv. 149, 160-66, 41 
REF. J. 5, 9-11 (1967). The proposal, like that on which it is based, "is, perhaps, subject 
to some criticism on grounds of clarity," in that the first sentence "does not, in so 
many words, specify that after the amount of the tax is deducted from the available 
proceeds, the junior indefeasible lien is to be satisfied to the extent possible," and 
the second sentence "does not really shed any additional light." 4 W. CoLLIER, BANK• 
RUPTCY 11 67.2'1[3.l] (14th ed. rev. 1969). 
407. It has been pointed out that the National Bankruptcy Conference and other 
organizations wanted to eliminate the postponement provision, which had been added 
to the Bankruptcy Act at their instance in 1938 but had caused serious circuity 
problems, but the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, viewing such 
elimination as "a threat to the continued health of the Referees' Salary and E.\'.pense 
Fund," was insistent upon its retention and the Judicial Conference would not approve 
a bill without the postponement provision. Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Amendments of 
1966, I GA. L. R.Ev. 149, 160 n.45, 41 REF. J. 5, 9 n.44 (1967). The ABA 1959 proposal 
refrained from recommending extension of the then controversial postponement rule 
to the area covered by Section 3466. 
408. Although the postponement provision, Bankruptcy Act § 67c(3), 11 U.S.C, § 
107(c)(3) (Supp. V, 1965-1969), is not now made applicable in reorganizations under the 
Bankruptcy Act (see Bankruptcy Act § 67c(5), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(5) (Supp. V, 1965-1969), 
which overturns the contrary interpretation of the pre-1966 law in In re American 
Health Studios, Inc., 1'18 F. Supp. 553 (S.D. Tex. 1959)), the current state of the law 
does not appear to indicate a fixed congressional policy against making the postpone-
ment applicable in the type of proceedings to which Section 3466 applies. The same 
practical effect may be achieved by the prescription that, from whatever source, ad-
ministration expenses must be provided for if a reorganization plan is to be approved 
(Bankruptcy Act §§ '17(e) &: 216(3), 11 U.S.C. §§ 205(e) &: 616(3) (1964)); if prior tax 
November 1971] Insolvency 83 
assurance that wages, and perhaps also the funeral and last illness 
expenses that have no counterpart in the bankruptcy law, will be 
paid despite the fortuity that a tax was assessed before rather than 
after the date of death or divestment would seem to be the same 
whatever the form of the proceeding. 
Not just federal tax liens, but state and local tax liens as well, are 
intended to be postponed under this proposal. This recommendation 
is consistent with the Bankruptcy Act and is premised upon the not 
unreasonable assumption that Congress would be resistant to post-
poning federal taxes if similarly situated state and local taxes 
escaped such treatment. Nevertheless, under what I have called the 
synthetic circuity approach to the priority of nonfederal claims,409 
the futility of the postponement rule is assured to the extent that 
state or local tax liens on personalty coexist with federal tax liens. 
To illustrate: A dies, leaving only personalty worth $4,000. The 
personalty is subject to a $10,000 lien for federal taxes and to a 
junior lien of $3,000 for state taxes, neither of which has been 
reduced to possession. Administration and funeral expenses and 
preferred claims for wages and last illness amount to $3,000. Under 
the synthetic circuity rule, adopted by Section 3466(£)(2) of the ABA 
1970 proposal, the amount to which the United States is entitled is 
first to be determined by application of subsections (b) through (e), 
the last of which includes the rule preserving antecedent tax liens 
but postponing them, in the circumstances here assumed, to the 
specified priority items. The remaining fund is then to be dis-
tributed in accordance with "other applicable law."41O In our ex-
ample, therefore, the amount of the priority items ($3,000) would 
be set aside from the fund othenvise available for the senior federal 
tax lien and the remaining $1,000 of the proceeds would be applied 
on the federal tax lien;411 but the $3,000 set aside would be used to 
satisfy, not the priority items favored by Congress, but the junior state 
tax lien, unless state law makes provision for postponement of 
state tax liens to such items. Thus the purpose of the postponement 
provision can be achieved only if, in this circumstance if in no other, 
Congress asserts its supreme power under the bankruptcy clause of 
the Constitution, and makes it mandatory that unenforced state, as 
liens leave insufficient funds for that purpose and no plan can be approved, an adjudi-
cation of bankruptcy will result and postponement under § 6~c(3) will then apply. 
409. See pt. IV. B. supra. This is to be distinguished from the more specialized 
circuity rule described in note 406 supra. 
410. See proposed § 3466(£)(2), set out in note 348 supra. 
411. See proposed § 3466(f)(l), set out in note 406 supra. 
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1vell as federal, tax liens on persort~ty yield to the priority items.412 
If Congress doubts its power or prefers the carrot to the stick, it 
might adopt the permissive approach and prescribe that unenforced 
federal tax liens on personalty shall be postponed only to such of the 
designated priority items, if any, as are preferred over like state and 
local tax liens under state law. Then, if the state policy does not value 
the priority items sufficiently to subordinate the state's own taxes, 
the federal government would not do so either. 
VI. PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES 
In bankruptcy, although penalties and forfeitures may be im-
posed by federal, state, and local governments upon the estate for 
acts or omissions of the trustee or debtor in possession,413 those pen-
alties and forfeitures that were incurred by the debtor before bank-
ruptcy are not allowable claims, except to the extent of the actual 
pecuniary loss sustained,414 and even those secured by liens perfected 
before the proceeding may not be enforced for the disallowed 
amount.415 In receiverships and assignments for creditors, on the 
412. See text accompanying notes 323-42 supra. Oddly enough and perhaps not by 
design but as a result of the structure of the draft, the mandatory approach would 
apparently be applied under the ABA 1970 proposal if there happened to exist a 
nontax lien or security interest junior to the ta.x liens. Let us assume the same facts 
as in the text, except that there is also a junior security interest of $1,000 in A's 
personalty. In that event, the applicable circuity rule is that prescribed in proposed 
§ 3466(£)(1) (set out in note 406 supra), which directs that when a postponed tax 
lien is prior in right to another indefeasible lien the net proceeds ($4,000) "shall be 
applied" to th_e priority items ($3,000) up to an amount not in excess of the postponed 
tax liens (emphasis added). The language here is mandatory. And the other, more 
general, circuity rule of proposed § 3466(£)(2) (set out in note 348 supra), which 
nullifies the equally mandatory language of subsections (b) through (e) and divides 
the nonfederal fund in accordance with state law, would not apply since the payment 
of priority items is here directed, not by subsections (b) through (e), but by subscc• 
tion (f)(l). Thus, the fortuitous presence or absence of a junior indefeasible lien or 
security interest would determine whether the postponement provision accomplishes its 
purpose of assuring funds for payment of administration and funeral expenses and 
wage and last illness claims or whether it merely enables the satisfaction of junior 
state and local tax liens at the expense of federal tax liens. 
413. Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678, 692 (1966); Boteler v. Ingels, 308 U.S. 
57, 60-61 (1939); In Te Samuel Chapman, Inc., 394 F.2d 340, 341 (2d Cir. 1968). But cf, 
In Te New York, N.H. &: H.R.R., 304 F. Supp. 1121, 1135 (D. Conn. 1969). See Plumb, 
Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 YALE L.J. 228, 282-83 
(1967), for criticism of the imposition of penalties in such circumstances. 
414. Bankruptcy Act § 57j, 11 U.S.C. § 93(j) (1964). 
415. Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U_.S. 38 (1962). The same principles apply in re• 
organizations and other rehabilitative proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act (Simonson 
v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38 (lll62), Tevg. United States v. Harris, 287 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 
1961) (Chapter X}: California State Bd. of Equalization v. Goggin, 183 F.2d 489, 493 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 891 (1950) (Chapter XI)), with the possible exception of 
railroad reorganizations under Section 77 (compare In Te Chicago, M. &: St. P.R.R., 27 
F. Supp. 685 (N.D. Ill. 1939), with In Te Tennessee Cent. Ry., 316 F. Supp. 1103, 1118-14 
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other hand (and no _doubt also in insolvent decedents' estates),41~ 
Section 3466 now requires that penalties owed to the United States, 
without regard to pecuniary loss and whether or not secured by lien, 
shall be paid before the claims of other creditors.417 
The ABA 1970 proposal would amend Section 3466 to provide 
that such penalties and forfeitures, to the extent that they exceed 
the pecuniary loss sustained, shall be paid only after claims of all 
other creditors, including general unsecured creditors but excluding 
similar state and local claims for penalties and forfeitures, have first 
been satisfied.418 In this. respect, the proposal follows the policy of 
the Bankruptcy Act not to make innocent creditors suffer the penalty 
for the debtor's ·wrongful acts but, consistent with the nature of 
insolvency administrations not under the Bankruptcy Act, this pur-
pose would be accomplished by subordination rather than by dis-
allowance and discharge.419 Unlike the rule in bankruptcy, however, 
the priority of penalties for which liens had arisen before the debtor's 
death or the divestment of his property would apparently not be 
impaired.42° Further, as in bankruptcy, penalties incurred during 
(M.D. Tenn. 1970), appeal docketed, No. 71-1228, 6th Cir., 1971). See 5 W. COLLIER, 
BANKRUPTCY 1111 77.10, .20 (14th ed. rev. 1970). 
416. Civil tax penalties are not abated by the death of the erring taxpayer. Estate 
of Rau v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 51 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962). 
417. County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U.S. 80, 93 (1929); Jobbers Credit Assn., 
Inc. v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 22 (E.D.N.Y. 1958); Rev. Rul. 68-574, 1968-2 
CUM. BULL. 595. 
418. S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), provides: 
[Sec. 3466] (d) PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES.-All claims, other than claims 
of any State or subdivision thereof arising from a penalty or forfeiture, shall be 
paid prior to any claim of the United States arising from a penalty or forfeiture. 
Claims of any State or subdivision arising from a penalty or forfeiture shall be 
subordinated to claims of the United States not arising from a penalty or forfeiture 
and shall be paid ratably with any claim of the United States arising from a pen-
alty or forfeiture. For purposes of this section, a claim shall not be regarded as 
arising from a penalty or forfeiture to the e.xtent that it is for the amount of 
the pecuniary loss sustained by an act, transaction or proceeding out of which 
the penalty or forfeiture arose, with reasonable and actual costs occasioned thereby 
and such interest as may have accrued on the amount of such loss according to law. 
The ADA 1959 proposal did not undertake to deal with this matter. 
419. Since the penalties would have to be paid if the debtor had any funds left, 
the objection raised in 5 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1111 77.10, .20 (14 ed. rev. 1970) to dis-
allowing and discharging penalties in rehabilitative proceedings would not be appli-
cable. 
420. Proposed § 3466(d) (set out in note 418 supra), draws no distinction betlveen pen-
alties that are and those that are not secured by lien, but proposed § 3466(e)(l) (set out in 
397 supra), is an overriding provision that nothing in the section shall impair any lien 
in favor of the United States existing at divestment or death, and proposed § 3466(e)(2) 
(set out in note 172 supra) similarly would preclude subordinating state and local 
penalties, if secured by lien, to any unsecured federal claim. It is true that the Court 
in Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38 (1962), was not deterred by the Bankruptcy Act's 
express recognition of statutory liens from o_verriding such liens when they secured 
penalties. But the overriding provision in that case (Bankruptcy Act § 57j, II U.S.C. 
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the administration for acts or omissions of the fiduciary would not 
be affected.421 
As does the lien postponement provision discussed in Part V, the 
penalty provision makes a show of treating state and local govern-
ments no more favorably than the United States. Under the wording 
of the proposal, all other claims are to be paid ahead of federal non-
pecuniary loss penalties and forfeitures except similar state and local 
penalties and forfeitures, which "shall be subordinated" to all other 
federal claims and "shall be paid ratably" with the federal penalties 
and forfeitures.422 But, here as elsewhere in the proposal, such parity 
of treatment is illusory because of the overriding "circular priority" 
provision which requires that after setting aside an amount for the 
United States calculated on the basis of the proposed federal law, the 
balance of the fund shall be divided according to "other applicable 
law."423 Unless state laws are in conformity, therefore, the actual 
effect of the proposal to subordinate state and local penalties will 
generally be to take a corresponding amount away from the other 
creditors whose superior equity the proposed federal law purports 
to recognize.424 That effect can be fully overcome only by making 
mandatory the subordination of state and local penalties and for-
feitures, regardless of state laws to the contrary. If Congress is 
reluctant to test its power in that regard, it might adopt the per-
§ 930) (1964)) prescribed that the penalty "shall not be allowed," and the lien fell wilh 
the debt. The parallel provision here would merely rank such penalties behind all 
other claims, without disallowing them, and would thus yield more readily to the man• 
date that nothing in the proposed section shall impair any antecedent lien. 
421. Only "claims" for penalties would be subordinated, and "claims" are defined 
as those which became legally due and owing before the debtor's death or the divest• 
ment of his property. See proposed § 3466(g)(2), set out in note 60 supra. 
422. See proposed § 3466(d), set out in note 418 supra. 
423. See proposed § 3466(£)(2), set out in note 348 supra. 
424. To illustrate: A makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors. Sale of his 
property produces $30,000. The expenses and claims are 
Administration expenses $1,000 
Preferred wage claims 2,000 
Federal taxes 20,000 
Federal fraud penalty 10,000 
State taxes 6,000 
State fraud penalty 3,000 
General creditors 1,000 
State law ranks state taxes, including penalties, immediately after administration ex-
penses and ahead of wages. Under the proposal, the federal share of the fund would 
be determined by deducting $3,000 for administration expenses and wages, setting aside 
the next $26,000 for the federal and state ta.xes on a parity, and assigning the remaining 
$1,000 to general creditors, whose claims are superior to the penally claims. The federal 
share is thus $20,000, and the other $10,000 is to be divided according to state law-
$1,000 to administration expenses, $9,000 to the state for taxes and penalty, and nothing 
to the wage claimants and general creditors. 
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missive approach and provide for subordination of federal non-
pecuniary loss penalties and forfeitures only if state law makes 
similar provision respecting those penalties and forfeitures imposed 
by state and local governments. 
VII. THE FIDUCIARY'S PERSONAL LIABILITY 
An essential adjunct of the federal insolvency priority is the 
companion provision (Section 3467 of the Revised Statutes) which 
imposes personal liability upon "[e]very executor, administrator, or 
assignee, or other person who pays, in whole or in part, any debt due 
by the person or estate for whom or for which he acts before he 
satisfies and pays the debts due to the United States from such 
person or estate.''425 Read literally, and without reference to its 
historic association with the insolvency priority statute, that language 
would even require the management of a solvent business, not under 
administration, to act at its peril in paying other debts while federal 
claims are owing, for if the business should later become unable to 
pay the federal claims the management could be liable; further, the 
provision would impose personal liability even on one who pays other 
debts innocently and with no reason to suppose that there may be 
obligations owing to the United States. But the courts have rejected 
such sweeping constructions of Section 3467426 and the ABA 1970 
proposal would amend the provision principally to clarify those mat-
ters and to conform the provision to the changes proposed in Section 
3466.427 
425. 31 U.S.C. § 192 (1964), set out in note 1 supra. 
426. See notes 429 &: 436 infra. 
427. S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), provides: 
[Sec.] 3467. LIABILITY OF FIDUCIARIES. 
Every person who pays, in whole or in part, any claim against an insolvent 
debtor or estate for whom or for which he acts before he pays the claims of the 
United States against such debtor or estate of which he has actual knowledge and 
which under the preceding section [Section 3466] are entitled to priority over the 
claims so paid, shall become answerable in his own person and estate to the extent 
of such payments for the claims of the United States, or for so much thereof as 
may remain due and unpaid. 
A person shall be deemed for purposes of a particular transaction to have 
actual knowledge of any fact from the time such fact is brought to the attention 
of the individual conducting such transaction, and in any event from the time 
such fact would have been brought to such individual's attention if the _person 
had exercised due diligence. A person exercises due diligence if he mamtains 
reasonable routines for communicating significant information to the individual 
conducting the transaction and there is reasonable compliance with the routines. 
Due diligence does not require an individual acting for the person to communicate 
information unless such communication is part of his regular duties or unless he 
has reason to know of the transaction and that the transaction would be materially 
affected by the information. 
The definitions of "claim" (see proposed § 3466(g)(2), set out in note 60 supra) and 
"insolvent" (see proposed § 3466(g)(4), set out in note 107 supra) in proposed Section 
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One proposed· amendment, already discussed,428 would make 
clear that the personal liability would be incurred only if the pay-
ment of a nonfederal claim is in derogation of the federal insolvency 
priority under Section 3466 (as proposed to be modified), thus con-
firming the judicial rejection of the Government's attempt to give 
Section 3467 a life of its own by imposing liability on the officers of 
a solvent, going business.429 
A further amendment purports to "codify the present rule under 
which the fiduciary is relieved of liability if he has no reason to 
know of a claim of the United States."430 The proposed amendment, 
however, is not expressed in terms of having "no reason to know" of 
a federal claim, nor does it conform to the decisions which would 
have charged the fiduciary if he had acted in disregard of such 
knowledge as would put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry.481 
Rather, the proposal would relieve the fiduciary unless he had 
3466 would be applicable for purposes of Section 3467. The second paragraph, above, 
is broader in S. 2197 than was proposed by the ABA (1970 REPORT, supra note 53, at 
418-19), which-following the precedent of the Uniform Commercial Code (§ 1-207(27)) 
and the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 (INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 6323(i)(l))-would 
have charged vicarious "knowledge" to an "organization" (e.g., a trust company) rather 
than to a "person," 
428. See text accompanying notes 149-62 supra. 
429. United States v. Lutz, 295 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1961). Liability would be incurred, 
therefore, only by fiduciaries in proceedings involving general administration of assets 
for the benefit of creditors (see pt. II. A. supra) other than in bankruptcy (see text 
accompanying notes 93-105 supra), and only if the estate at the time of payment is 
insolvent in the sense of having insufficient assets to pay debts (see note 151 supra) and 
the claim which the fiduciary prefers is not one entitled to priority over the federal 
claim that goes unpaid. Because of the difficulty of knowing the precise time a solvent 
operating administration becomes insolvent, I have suggested the adoption of a more 
objective standard for subjecting the fiduciary to personal responsibility for seeing that 
federal claims are paid in accordance with their priorities. See text accompanying 
notes 155-57 supra. 
430. 1970 REPORT, supra note 53, at 423. 
431. Leroy K. New, 48 T.C. 671, 676 (1967); Irving Trust Co., 36 B.T .A. 146, 148 
(1937); United States v. Vibradamp Corp., 257 F. Supp. 931, 937 (S.D. Cal. 1966); United 
States v. Clark, 25 F. Cas. 447, 450 (No. 14,807) (C.C.N.Y. 1826); Treas. Reg. § I.64l(b)-
2(a) (1956); Rev. Rul. 66-43, 1966-1 Cul\l. BuLL. 291. Although the rule is expressed in 
Treas. Reg. § 301.687l(a)-2(c) (1957) in terms of "notice" and in Want v. Commis-
sioner, 280 F.2d 777, 783 (2d Cir. 1960), in terms of "actual notice," both these terms 
embrace the concept of a duty of inquiry extending to matters that are fairly suggested 
by the facts really known. See note 435 infra. It has been held, however, that the 
fiduciary is not chargeable with mere record notice of a federal claim. Livingston v. 
Becker, 40 F.2d 673 (E.D. Mo. 1929). Yet, it might not be an undue burden on a 
fiduciary charged with paying the debts of an insolvent to require that he avail him-
self of so readily available a source of information (as a trustee in bankruptcy must, 
see note 105 supra); but a rule of reason should be applied, lest a fiduciary be deterred 
from serving by the risk of there being federal ta.x liens on file in the county of some 
past residence of the debtor of which the fiduciary may be unaware. See Plumb, Fed-
eral Liens and Priorities-'-Agenda for the Next Decade 11, 77 YALE L.J. 605, 652 (1968), 
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"actual knowledge" of . the federal claim.432 While it is true that 
"actual knowledge" has, in some statutes, been construed to em-
brace "information on which to base inquiries" on which "a reason-
able man would usually act ... in the ordinary course of human 
affairs,"433 other interpretations hold that those words require more 
than mere "reason to believe"434 and are narrower than the term 
"actual notice," which includes both actual knowledge and such 
knowledge as reasonable investigation would have disclosed.435 It is 
desirable to express some form of notice requirement in the statute 
in order to stifle recurrent government arguments that, under the 
literal terms of Section 3467, the fiduciary "acts at his peril if he 
distributes the estate without first making certain that no branch of 
the federal government is holding a claim against the estate that it 
might assert in the near or remote future."436 But the nature of the 
duties of a fiduciary of an insolvent estate makes it appropriate to 
require at least that he make reasonable inquiries concerning pos-
sible federal liabilities,437 and the proposed amendment-at least if it 
is to be represented as a mere codification of existing decisions-
should not be so worded as to suggest that the fiduciary need not 
assume that responsibility.438 
Another proposed change in Section 3467 is the substitution of 
the word "claims" for "debts" wherever it appears, but since "claims" 
432. See proposed § 3467, set out in note 427 supra. 
433. E.g., Davidson v. Benno, Inc., 272 Minn. 97, 101, 137 N.W .2d 567, 571 (1965). 
In cases not involving construction of statutory language, it has also been said that 
"(a]ctual knowledge consists, not only as to what one certainly knows, but it also 
consists in the information which he might obtain by investigating facts which he 
does know and which impose upon him the duty to investigate." Smith v. Pacific Mut. 
Life Ins. Co., 192 F.2d 248, 252 (6th Cir. 1951), quoting Cable Piano Co. v. Lewis, 
195 Ky. 666, 672, 243 S.W. 924, 926 (1922). 
434. Roberts Constr. Co. v. Brown, 272 Ala. 440, 442, 131 S.2d 710, 712 (1961). 
435. The Tompkins, 13 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1926). Accord, Flack v. First Natl. Bank of 
Dalhart, 148 Tex. 495, 499-501, 226 S.W .2d 628, 631-32 (1950). This distinction is also 
found in § 1-201(25) of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
436. This argument was made and rejected in United States v. Vibradamp Corp., 
257 F. Supp. 931, 935 (S.D. Cal. 1966). 
437. Concerning the extent of the duty of inquiry, see· Plumb, Federal Lien~ and 
Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 YALE L.J. 228, 259-60 (1967). See also 
note 431 supra, 
438. A proposal by the Committee on Estate and Gift Taxes of the Section of 
Taxation of the ABA, which was never passed upon by the ABA, would have condi-
tioned the fiduciary's personal liability upon whether he "knows, or reasonably should 
know" of the federal claim. ABA SECTION OF TAXATION, 1960 PROGRAM & CoMMl'ITEE 
REPORTS 35-37. The ABA 1970 proposal does incorporate a "due diligence" test (see 
proposed § 3467, set out in note 427 supra) but it relates to the duty of others acting 
for the responsible person to communicate their knowledge to him, rather than to 
the duty of such person to make further inquiries suggested by known facts. 
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must, by express definition, be amounts "legally due and owing,"430 
it appears that no change in meaning is intended. It has been held 
under existing law that a liquidating trustee who distributes corpo-
rate property to stockholders does not thereby pay "any debt due," 
and hence does not incur personal liability for federal debts left 
unpaid;440 the distributees' rights with respect to their stock would 
appear to be no more in the nature of "claims ... legally due and 
owing," under the proposed language, than they are a "debt due."441 
On the other hand, the Government contends, with some support 
in the case law,442 that a beneficiary's distributive share of an estate 
is a "debt due," the payment of which may make an executor or 
administrator liable for unpaid obligations to the United States.448 
It may well be appropriate to provide a remedy against the erring 
fiduciary in either or both of such cases, despite the availability of an 
alternative remedy (possibly ineffective or unduly burdensome) 
against the distributees,444 but if Congress intends that such pay-
ments cause personal liability to be imposed, it should use language 
more descriptive than either "debts" or "claims."440 
VIII. EFFECTIVE DATE 
The ABA proposal would make the new rules of priority effec-
tive immediately upon enactment and applicable in pending ad-
439. See proposed § 3466(g)(2), set out in note 60 supra. 
440. Leon G. Grieb, 36 T.C. 156 (1961); Edward G. Leuthesser, 18 T.C. 1112, 1126·28 
(1952). 
441. Cf. J.P. Morgan 8: Co. v. Missouri Pac, R.R., 85 F.2d 351, 352 (8th Cir. 1936), 
cert. denied, 299 U.S. 604 (1937), declaring (for purposes of Bankruptcy Act § 77(c)(7), 
11 U.S.C. § 205(c)(7) (1964)) that "[a] stockholder has an interest in a corporation, 
eve7:1 th?ugh e~?tled to no specific part of it, but can hardly be said to have a claim 
agamst 1t •.•• 
442. Viles v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 376, 379 (6th Cir. 1956). See Want v. Commis• 
sioner, 280 F.2d 777, 783 (2d Cir. 1960), citing United States v. Munroe, 65 F. Supp. 
213 (YI .D. Pa. 1946), in which the court's reliance on Section 3467 was unnecessary 
since the executrix was also the distributee of the estate and was liable in that capacity. 
443. Treas. Reg. § 25.2502-2 (1958) (gift ta.x). 
444. When the fiduciary mispays a debt in disregard of the priority rights of otl1ers, 
the fiduciary himself may (or may not) have a right to recover the payment (see Annot., 
105 A.L.R. 1519 (1936)), but the priority claimant himself has no direct right of action 
against the recipient of the payment. Mills v. Ross, 39 App. Div. 563, 57 N.Y. Supp, 
680 (1899), affd., 168 N.Y. 673, 61 N.E. 1131 (1901). When the fiduciary distributes assets 
to stockholders or beneficiaries, on the other hand, creditors have a direct right to 
recover the distribution under the trust fund doctrine (Neill v. Phinney, 2•15 F.2cl 
645, 651-52 (5th Cir. 1957) (liquidated corporation): Viles v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 
376, 379 (6th Cir. 1956) (decedent's estate)), eitller by suit (Leighton v. United States, 
289 U.S. 506 (1933)) or alternatively, in the case of claims for tlle principal forms of 
federal taxes, by a transferee assessment (INT. REv. _CODE of 1954, § 6901), but a multi• 
plicity of proceedings against scattered persons may in some cases be necessary. See 
Plumb, Federal Tax Liens and Transferee Proceedings, 13 TULANE TAX INST, 1'18, 
188-89 (1964). 
445. See Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 
YALE L.J. 228, 257-58 (1967). 
November 1971) Insolvency 91 
ministrations to the extent that distributions had not already been 
made by that date.446 Therefore, any payments already made to the 
United States in accordance with its present priority would not be 
recoverable for the benefit of those to whom the amendment would 
grant a higher priority, but any funds still in the hands of the fiduci-
ary would be distributed first to the more favored claimants. The 
exception for previous distributions would have one possibly un-
anticipated effect, however, in that a fiduciary who had earlier 
improperly paid a claim which, under the amendment, would be 
entitled to priority over the United States, would suffer personal 
liability under Section 3467 even though the still unpaid federal 
claim had lost its priority status and the Government would not 
have been entitled to the misapplied funds if they remained on 
hand. Perhaps a separate effective date provision ought to be con-
structed for the Section 3467 amendment.447 
The proposal to apply the new priorities to existing claims and 
pending proceedings conforms to the practice that has been followed 
since 1926 in amendments altering bankruptcy priorities,448 as well 
as to the precedent of the several enactments liberalizing the priori-
ties of private creditors as against federal tax liens.449 No question of 
the validity of such retroactive application can arise since either the 
synthetic circuity approach of the ABA 1970 proposal or the per-
446. Section 2 of S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), provides: 
The amendments made by the first section of this Act [amending Rev. Stat. §§ 
3466 and 3467) shall apply-
(!) to administrations for the benefit of creditors pending on the date of enact-
ment of this Act, to the extent that distributions have not theretofore been made; 
(2) to any such administration commencing on or after that date; and 
(3) to the estate of a debtor of the United States who dies on or after that date. 
In the case of any bond given to the United States before the date of enactment 
of this Act, if the amount recoverable by the surety out of the estate and effects 
of an insolvent or deceased principal, pursuant to the priority provided by Section 
3468 of the Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 193), is reduced as a consequence of the 
provisions of this Act, the United States shall indemnify the surety to the extent 
of such reduction, but the obligation of the bond shall not othenvise be affected. 
The bill departs significantly from the ABA proposal (1970 REPORT, supra note 53, 
at 419) in malting the amendments applicable to pending proceedings only in the case 
of administrations for the benefit of creditors, while denying the benefit thereof in 
pending administrations of decedents' estates. 
447. Experience with § 114 of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 1146, 
has demonstrated the folly (see note 97 supra) of making an effective date provision, 
framed ,vith the priority rules in mind, serve generally for a variety of other sections 
involving matters other than priorities. 
448. E.g., Act of May 27, 1926, ch. 406, § 18, 44 Stat. 667-68; Act of June 22, 1938, 
ch. 575, § 6(b), 52 Stat. 940; Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 579, § 56(b), 66 Stat. 438; 
Pub. L. No. 89-496, § 5(b), 80 Stat. 271 (1966). Before 1926, the practice was to make 
amendments prospective only. See In re John G. Gasteiger &: Co., 25 F.2d 642, 643 
(2d Cir. 1928). 
449. Revenue Act of 1939, § 401, amending INT. REv. CODE of 1939, § 3672(b)(3); 
INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 785l(a)(6)(B) (effective date for liberalized rules in § 6324); 
Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, § 114(a) &: (b). See 1959 REPoRT, supra note 47, at 730-3f, 
for a review of the precedents. 
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missive approach favored in 1959 and generally herein would take 
nothing from any existing nonfederal creditor but would merely 
redistribute funds which today would be taken by the United 
States.450 But, even if it should be decided in some limited respect to 
apply the mandatory approach, and thus derogate from the existing 
priority of a nonfederal claim, there would still be no doubt of the 
power to apply the new rules retroactively, at least if only unsecured 
claims (e.g., state nonpecuniary loss penalties)461 were affected.41i2 On 
the other hand, if the mandatory approach should be applied to sub-
ordinate nonfederal liens (e.g., state and local nonpossessory tax 
liens o.n personalty) to certain expenses and claims,41i3 the advisabil-
ity, if not the constitutionality, of applying the rule to existing liens 
might be questioned. 454 
A surety who satisfies the obligation on a bond given to the 
United States, for taxes or othenvise, is entitled, except as against 
unsatisfied federal claims, to the same priority in the insolvent prin-
cipal's estate that the United States would enjoy under Section 
3466.455 The proposal to eliminate retroactively the priority of fed-
eral nontax claims and to inject other priorities ahead of or on a 
parity with federal tax claims would increase the risk on existing 
450. Plainly the Government may abrogate or reduce its own priority in pending 
proceedings. Cf. In re Pioneer Sample Book Co., 374 F.2d 953, 957 (3d Cir. 1967), 
451. See text accompanying note 424 supra. 
452. Retroactive alteration of priorities under Bankruptcy Act § 64a, 11 U.S.C. § 
104(a) (Supp. V, 1965-1969), has uniformly been sustained. New York Credit Men's 
Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. A. Jesse Goldstein &: Co., 276 F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1960): 
Coin Mach. Acceptance Corp. v. O'Donnell, 192 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1951): In re 
Old Algiers, 100 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1938); City of Chelsea v. Dolan, 24 F,2d 522 (1st 
Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 606 (1928). Retroactive application of the Section 3466 in-
solvency priority in favor of a new class of federal claims was sustained in Reconstruc-
tion Fin. Corp. v. Flynn, 175 F.2d 761 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 859 (1949). 
453. See note 412 supra. It is there observed that the ABA 1970 proposal, perhaps 
inadvertently, does apply the mandatory approach to lien postponement in limited 
circumstances. 
454. The 1938 and 1952 amendments (cited in note 448 supra) which adversely 
affected liens were construed (despite general provisions directing retroactive applica-
tion "so far as practicable'') as not invalidating or subordinating existing liens; these 
liens were viewed as vested property rights-in contrast to mere priorities, which could 
be changed. Ginsberg v. Lindel, 107 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1939); In re Freeze-In Mfg. Corp., 
128 F. Supp. 259, 261 (E.D. Mich. 1955); In re Edmunds, 27 F. Supp, 196 (M.D, Pa, 
1939). See 4 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ,i 67.20[7] (14th ed. rev. 1969). On the other hand, 
retroactive legislation preferring certain unsecured claims (for pre-reorganization em-
ployee injuries) over existing mortgages has been upheld. Thompson v. Siratt, 95 F.2d 
214, 218 (8th Cir. 1938). As against the bankruptcy power, a secured debt or lien is 
"a no more sacred kind of property than an unsecured debt." Campbell v. Alleghany 
Corp. 75 F.2d 947, 954 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 581 (1935). See also In re Prima 
Co., 88 F.2d 785, 788-89 (7th Cir. 1937). 
455. REv. STAT. § 3468, 31 U.S.C. § 193 (1964). See United States v. National Surety 
Co., 254 U.S. 73 (1920). 
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bonds by impairing the surety's ability to reimburse himself out of 
the debtor's estate. While the surety may be said to have contracted 
with reference to the power of Congress to change the priorities 
established by law,456 so that the bond would not be legally dis-
charged in whole or in part by the unanticipated increase in the 
risk,467 it seems inequitable that such an added burden should be 
imposed by the Government-the party indemnified on the bond.458 
The ABA proposal, therefore, would relieve the surety, under a 
bond entered into before the amendment, to the extent that the 
recovery from the debtor is reduced as a result of the changes in 
priorities. 459 
IX. AMENDING nm PROPOSED AMENDMENT 
I might close this regrettably critical commentary with a simple 
challenge to the draftsmen, "Back to the old drawing boardl"460 But 
one who participated in the deliberations (failing under the pres-
sures of the time to see some of the problems and being overruled 
on other matters) and who earnestly desires to see the early com-
pletion of the reform of federal priorities that was no more than 
begun with the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966461 has a responsibility 
to move the project along by embodying his suggestions in a new 
proposed draft, lest the doubts and difficulties that have been raised 
should deter congressional action. 
Therefore, without pride of authorship and with an invitation 
to comment and criticism, I submit this revision of the draft, with 
alternatives offered where policy choices may be made, and with 
456. Cf. note 452 supra. 
457. Cf. Wm. W. Bierce Ltd. v. Waterhouse, 219 U.S. 320, 336-37 (1911); United 
States v. Powell, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 493, 501-02 (1872). 
458. It is noted that where Congress, in order to preclude indirect preference of 
the person obtaining the judicial lieii, voided the security for surety bonds that were 
given to dissolve judicial liens obtained within four months before bankruptcy (Bank-
ruptcy Act § 67a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 107(a)(2) (1964)), it provided for discha.rging the surety 
from liability on the bond to the extent of the value of the security of which it was 
deprived (Bankruptcy Act § 67a(5), 11 U.S.C. § 107(a)(5) (1964)). Wl).ile the situation 
is not strictly comparable, since the surety here is deprived of a priority rather than a 
security interest, the equity is similar. 
459. See proposed Section 2 of S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), set out in note 446 
supra. See also 1970 REPORT, supra note 53, at 424. A similar provision was included in 
the earlier ABA proppsals altering the priorities of liens for federal taxes (See 1959 RE-
PORT, supra note 47, at 700-01), but Congress omitted such provision in enactinz the 
Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966. 
460. Cf. Marsb, Tiiumph or T-ragedy1 The Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1966, 
42 WASH. L. R.Ev. 681, 735 (1967). 
461. See Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade, '17 YALE 
L.J. 228 (1967). 
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footnote references to the points in the preceding discussion where 
the explanations of changes from the ABA 1970 proposal may be 
found. 
Sec. 101. Priority in Insolvency. 
Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 191) (relating to prior-
ity in insolvency) is amended to read as follows: 
"Sec. 3466. PRIORITY IN INSOLVENCY. 
"(a) APPLICABILITY.-
"(!) IN GENERAL.-This section shall apply whenever any 
person indebted to the United States is divested of the title or right 
to possession, or both title and right to possession, of all or substan-
tially all of his property462 for the purpose of effecting general 
administration tl1ereof, whether with a view to liquidation, rehabili-
tation or reorganization,463 or whenever the estate of any deceased 
debtor of the United States is in the hands of an executor or admin-
istrator, if in either case such property or estate is at any time during 
the administration thereof464 insufficient to pay the debts of the 
debtor or decedent.46G 
"(2) BANKRUPTCY.-This section shall not be applicable to 
proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act except to tl1e extent ex-
pressly provided therein.466 
"(b) PRIORITY OF EXPENSES AND CLAIMS.-The following 
expenses and claims467 shall be entitled to the priority specified: 
"(l) ADMINISTRATION468 EXPENSES.-Costs and expenses 
of administration allowable under other applicable law, to the 
extent that they are comparable in nature to the costs and expenses 
entitled to priority under section 64(a)(l) of the Bankruptcy Act 
(11 U.S.C. 104(a)(l)) as amended from time to time,460 including 
Federal, State and local taxes, with interest and penalties thereon,410 
becoming legally due and owing following divestment or death,471 
shall be paid prior to the claims of the United States: Provided, 
462. Or "of all or a greater portion of his property." See note 7'i supra. 
463. See text accompanying notes 166-69 supra. 
464. See pt. II. C. supra. 
465. See note 158 supra. 
466. See pt. II. B. supra. The express provisions referred to arc in tc.xt accompany• 
ing notes 524-25 infra. 
467. Although the term "claims" is defined (see proposed § 3466(g)(2), set out in 
note 60 supra) to embrace only pre-proceeding obligations, the ABA proposal tl1en 
loosely uses it in five places in a sense that embraces administration and funeral 
expenses. In those places, the words "expenses and claims" have been substituted, 
468. See note 204 supra. 
469. See text accompanying notes 202-13 &: 251-62 supra. See also note 236 mpra, 
470. Cf. Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678, 680, 692-95 (1966), which treated 
interest and penalties incurred during bankruptcy as administration expenses. 
4-71. See text accompanying notes 217-21 supra. 
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however, That expenses incurred in continuing the business of the 
debtor or decedent (exclusive of taxes and expenditures necessary 
for the protection and preservation of the physical properties and 
public franchises of the business) shall not be allowed priority over 
the claims of the United States except out of income derived from 
such continuation of the business, unless (A) such expenses in excess 
of income accrue not later than __ days after divestment or 
death, or (B) if the Secretary of the Treasury consents to such 
priority (which consent shall be conclusively presumed if, within 
__ days after receipt from the fiduciary of notice of his intention 
to continue the business, the Secretary fails to file objection to such 
priority with the court, or with the fiduciary if there is no court hav-
ing jurisdiction), then not later than __ days after notice of 
withdrawal of such consent is filed with the court or with the 
fiduciary, as the case may be.472 If the property is insufficient to pay 
all costs and expenses entitled to priority under this paragraph, they 
shall be paid in such order of priority as may be provided by other 
applicable law or by lawful court order: Provided, That taxes and 
other expenses becoming legally due and owing to the United 
States following divestment or death shall be paid in an amount 
not less than the lesser of (A) tl1e amount which bears the same ratio 
to the total property as the sum of such taxes and expenses owing to 
the United States bears to the total costs and expenses entitled to 
priority hereunder, or (B) the excess of the total property over the 
sum of the judicial costs, if any, and the reasonable compensation 
of the fiduciary and his attorney and auditor.473 
"(2) EXPENSES OF FUNERAL AND LAST ILLNESS.-Ex-
penses of the funeral and claims for expenses of the last illness of a 
deceased debtor of the United States, to the extent that other 
applicable law prefers them over general unsecured creditors and 
they are allowed by any court having jurisdiction thereof, shall be 
paid prior to claims of the United States. If such debtor dies fol-
lowing divestment of his property in tl1e manner provided in this 
section, the expenses of his last illness and funeral may, if other 
applicable law so provides, be paid out of the property under ad-
ministration, with priority over claims of the United States, but 
only to the extent that the debtor's property not under administra-
tion is insufficient therefor.474 
"(3) WAGES AND COMMISSIONS.-Notwithstanding any 
other applicable law, claims for wages and commissions described in, 
and subject to the limitations of, section 64(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy 
Act (II U.S.C. 104(a)(2)) as amended from time to time, shall be 
paid prior to claims of the United States and prior to any other 
472. This proviso is suggested if such restriction is desired. See te.xt accompanying 
notes 214-16 supra. 
473. This is one possible resolution of the matters discussed in text accompanying 
notes 222-34 supra. 
474. See note 283 supra. 
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expenses, claims and allowances except those entitled to priority 
under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection.47G 
"(4) TAXES.-
"(A) IN GENERAL.-Claims for taxes470 of any State or sub-
division thereof which would not be dischargeable under Section 
17(a)(I) of the Bankruptcy Act (II U.S.C. 35(a)(I)) as amended from 
time to time, and which are entitled to priority over general un-
secured creditors under other applicable law,477 shall be accorded 
equal priority with claims for taxes of the United States which arc 
not so dischargeable, and shall be paid prior to any other claims of 
the United States. Claims for taxes of the United States which are 
not so dischargeable shall be paid prior to all other claims and 
expenses478 except those entitled to equal or higher priority under 
this subsection or subsection (e). 
"(B) UNEMPLOYMENT TAXES.-Whenever the United 
States and a State both present claims for unemployment taxes with 
respect to the same wages for any ta."<able year, the principal amount 
of the claim of the United States shall be limited to (i) the amount of 
tax (adjusted for amounts previously collected) which would have 
been payable to the United States if credit were allowable for full 
and timely payment of the State tax, plus (ii) any additional amount 
which the State elects to have allowed as a claim of the United 
States rather than of the State.479 If the credit allowable is subject 
to reduction pursuant to section 3302(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954, the additional tax resulting shall be allowed as a claim 
of the United States but shall be subordinated as provided in sub-
section (d) of this section.4so 
"(c) OTHER CLAIMS.-Except as provided in subsection (d), all 
475. This provision adopts the mandatory approach, in order to preclude diversion 
of the wage fund to other claims and allowances favored by state law. See te.;:t ac-
companying note 361 supra. If the permissive approach of the ABA 1959 proposal 
(see 1959 REPORT, supra note 47, at 732) is preferred, this subsection might read: 
(3) WAGES AND COMMISSlONS,-Claims for wages and commissions de• 
scribed in, and subject to the limitations of, section 64(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 
(11 U.S.C. 104(a)(2)) as amended from µme to time, but only if and to the extent 
that such claims are entitled to priority over general unsecured creditors [or 
"over unsecured state ta.xes," see text accompanying note 360 supra] under otlier 
applicable law, shall be paid prior to claims of the United States. 
Both suggested drafts utilize the device adopted in the ABA 1970 proposal of cross• 
referring to the terms of the Bankruptcy Act "as amended from time to time" 
rather than setting them out in full, thereby enabling Section 3466 to keep pace with 
changes in th.at Act. See 1970 ;REPORT, supra note 53, at 420. 
476. Since the word "claims" is definecj. in proposed Section 3466(g)(2) ;ind imports 
the concept of "legally due and owing," it is unnecessary to use those words here, as the 
ABA drafts do. 
477. See note 302 supra. This clause adopts the permissive approach, in order to 
avoid creating circuities, for the benefit of creditors other than the state or local 
government, where no priPrity is provided by ~tate law. $ee notes 306-07 sµpra and 
accompanying text. · 
478. See note 467 supra. 
479. See text accompanying notes 379-82 supra and te.;:t accompanying note li80 
infra. 
480. See text accompanying notes 383-94 supra and tc.xt. accompanying notes 
526·28 infra. 
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claims of the United States other than thQse referred t9 .in. p~.ragr~ph 
.(4) of subsection (b) shall be paid without prippty cJ.n9- Q!l .a pru:jty 
with all claims not otherwise entitle.cl. to prioJ:'.ity µp.der in-lb~~i;goµ 
(b)J81 
''(d) PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES.e=--Notwithstanding 
any other applicable law;4e2 all claim~ of the Upited States or of any 
481. In the event that Congress rejects the proposal to deny priority for federal 
claims other than nondischargeable taxes, subsection (c) would 9e -<;I,eleteci1 ~pd a 
new paragraph (5) should be added to s»bsection (I?), p.s .foijo}l',s: 
(5) OTHER CL4IMS.-Claims for rent to the exten~ of the a,ip.ount legally due 
for actual use and occupancy during the three months before di-vestment or 
death shall, if entitled to priority under state l;tX>' pr ~nder $ql_is,ect,ion (h)(8) of 
tpis .section, be accorded e9.ual priority wHh i;la_ims of we United $tates other 
than those entitled to priority under paragraph (4) pf this subsectiol]. .. Such claims 
of the United States shall be paid prior to all unsecured claims and e."<penses 
other than those entitled to .a higher pri9r,ity 1,2nder tJµ~ sups~ti~n. 
See note 268 .supra. In addition, _a new subsectio~ (c) migl].t be ~dded, as ,fol.lows: 
(c) CI,,MMS ASSIGNEI:> OR TMNSfERRED TO UNIT~D $TAT.E$.-
(l) The priority provided for claims of the United States under paragraph (5) 
of subsection (b) shall extend to claims assigned or otherw;ise transf.en-eci .to the 
United States-
(A) Pur_suap.t to the terms of a co11t1q.ct by the United St;i.tes for igsurance or 
guaranty of or participation in a loan to tlie debtor, whether mtjl assignment 
or other .transfer occur~ befor.e or after divestrµe11/: .or death, bl).t pply if 
(i) the recorded evidep.~e .of the mortgage or other §ecurity i_nterest, if any, 
securing the loan or a separate instrument recorded J;herewitl]. disclosed 
the fact of insurance, guaranty or participati9n by the United States, or (ii) 
,notice 9f such insurance, guaraJ1t3/ or participaµon or of such a,ssignm!mt or 
other transfer was filed in the place and m~nner proyicied in .section 63~3(£) of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 for filin~ notices of federal tax liens on 
personal property of the debtor. 
(B) In any other case, i_f such assignmen~ or .-0tp.er transfer occurs before 
divestment or death, ,but ·.only if notice thereof is filed ii]. .the pla~e ~nd man-
ner provided in para~ph (l)(A)(ii) of this subsection. 
(2) If th.e notice proyjdec;l jn pa~graph (1) of this s.ubse~tio_n Il_la3/ not bi_: filed 
jn the .office designated by S,tate Jaw for filing notices .of f~d.er.al ta_x li,ens, or if no 
such office has been designated, such no.tice shall be effective if filed in the office 
of the clerk of the United States district court for the judicial district in ,which 
the debtor resides. 
(3) Any person who became .a cr~flitor pefore such r~cord~ng or filing pf notice 
as provided in this subsection, without actual notice or knowledge of the jnterest 
of the United States, shall receive in the distrib.ution .of .the estate of t,he .debtor 
or decedent an amount no.t ,less than he would .haye received if the Upit,eci ,States 
had no interest in the claim. The claims o_f the United States en.titl.ed to priority 
shall be postponed to other claims to the extent necessary to prevent any claim-
ant from being prejudiced by the Qp,er:J.tioi;i. of .this par,igraph_. • 
See notes 56 & 60 supra. The need for the second sentence of -paragraph {3) ma,y 
be illustrated thusly: The Government guarantees an unsecured loan for $50,000, but 
delays filing notice of its interest. A becomes a creditor for :$2-0,000 before sucp 
filing and without actual notice or knowledge of the guaranty. B becomes a creditor 
for $30,000 after such filing or with knowledge. In insolvency, there is $80,000 left 
after claims and expenses of higher priority. Under the above provision, A would be 
entitled to the $16,000 which he would have received in a -pr-0 rata distribution if the 
United States were not involved. But without the last sentence above, -the burden would 
simply fall on JJ, over wholl_l the U,nited ,State_s 4as priority, ~.ince .$~ f1:1_ll fe~~r:J.J .claim 
of $50,000 -would be paid immediately after .A's $.16,!)0l), leaving o.l)l:y .$.14,0Q,!) foJ JJ. 
That sentence -postpone$ the fede.~I clp.im Jo ~(;: ~'f..t~P..t pec~gry t9 ~§$1,Ir~ tlJ.!!t !} 
will get no less than the $18,000 he wpuld ~ye J~ceiv~~ .jf t,he Q9yerj11Ilent h;ig ~-
joyed priority over both A and JJ, who then shared pro_p9rti9n~tely ill tg~ $P9,000 
remaining. 
482. This language adopts the mandatory approach with r,espect to $late -and Jocal 
penalties, placing such claims, in any insolvent estate, i11, -~ pg_siµ,q_i;i. t.I?-,~y ~y,ould 
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State or subdivision thereof arising from a penalty or forfeiture, 
whether or not secured by lien,483 shall be subordinated to all other 
claims against the debtor or estate.484 For purposes of this subsection, 
a claim shall not be regarded as arising from a penalty or forfeiture 
to the extent of the amount of the pecuniary loss sustained by the 
act, transaction or proceeding out of which the penalty or forfei-
ture arose, ·with reasonable and actual costs occasioned thereby and 
such interest as may have accrued on the amount of such loss ac-
cording to law. 
"(e) CERTAIN LIENS PRESERVED.-Except as provided in 
subsections (d) and (£), nothing in this section shall: 
"(l) impair any lien in favor of the United States existing at 
the time of divestment or death: Provided, That in the case of 
any debtor who at the time of divestment was subject to being 
adjudged an involuntary bankrupt pursuant to section 4(b) of 
the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. 22(b)) as amended from time to 
time, no such lien of the United States shall be valid in the pro-
ceeding if it would not have been valid at such time against a 
trustee in bankruptcy,485 
"(2) entitle an unsecured claim of the United States to pri-
ority over a competing claim secured by a lien existing at the 
time of divestment or death if such lien is recognized in the pro-
ceeding under other applicable law and would have been valid 
against a trustee in bankruptcy under sections 67 and 70 of the 
Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. 107 and 110) if bankruptcy had oc-
curred at sucl1 time (whether or not the debtor or decedent was 
subject to be adjudged a bankrupt),48G nor 
"(3) entitle a secured claim of the United States to priority 
over a competing claim secured by a lien which is recognized in 
the proceeding under other applicable law if such claim of the 
United States would not have been prior to such competing lien 
apart from this section.4s7 
"(£) CERTAIN TAX LIENS POSTPONED.-Notwithstancling 
subsection (e), and notwithstanding any other applicable law,488 
every tax lien on personal property not accompanied by possession 
at time of divestment or death and not theretofore enforced by 
sale489 shall be postponed to the expenses and claims4oo specified in 
occupy in bankruptcy, except that they would not be discharged. See text accom• 
panying notes 422-24 supra. 
483. See note 420 supra. 
484. Concerning penalties arising during the proceeding, which arc not within the 
definition of "claims,'' see text accompanying note 470 supra. 
485. See note 402 supra. 
486. See te.xt accompanying notes 177-88 &: 195 supra. Alternatively: "if such 
lien would have been valid against a lien under section 6321 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954 if notice thereof had been duly filed at the time of divestment or 
death." See text accompanying notes 189-94 supra. 
487. See note 399 supra. 
488. See te.xt accompanying notes 410-12 supra; note 412 supra. 
489. See note 405 supra. 
490. See note 467 supra. 
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paragraphs (I), (2) and (3) of subsection (b) of this section;491 and 
any lien of the United States shall be postponed to the expenses 
specified in paragraph (I) of subsection (b) if the proceeding was 
instituted for the foreclosure or enforcement of such lien.492 The 
proceeds of sale of the property subject to liens, after providing for 
the actual cost of the sale, shall be set aside for the claims secured by 
liens, in the order of their priority without regard to this subsection. 
The amounts set aside for the most junior of the liens subject to 
postponement under this subsection shall then be applied first to 
the expenses and claims to which such liens are postponed, in order 
of their priorities. The postponed liens shall next be satisfied, to the 
extent possible, from the balance of the amount set aside for them 
and from the funds, if any, which would otherwise have been appli-
cable to the expenses and claims to which such liens were post-
poned. 403 
"(g) CIRCULAR PRIORITIES.-The amount to which the 
United States is entitled shall be determined pursuant to subsections 
(b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) without regard to other priority or lien laws 
except as provided in such subsections. After the amount to be paid 
to the United States has been so determined, the order of distribu-
tion among other expenses and claims404 shall be as prescribed by 
other applicable law, except so far as reference to such other law is 
expressly excluded by this section. 
"(h) DEFINITIONS.-For the purposes of this section and sec-
tion 3467-
"(l) 'divestment or death' means the divestment of the title 
or right to possession or both title and right to possession of the 
property of a debtor in the manner described in subsection (a), 
or the death of a debtor in the case of property not previously 
under administration as therein provided, and 'divestment' in-
cludes a mortgage or pledge of property of a debtor for the 
benefit of all or a substantial portion of his creditors, whether or 
not for the purpose of rehabilitation with a reversion to the 
debtor;496 
"(2) in applying provisions of the Bankruptcy Act referred to 
in this section, the date of divestment or death shall be regarded 
as the date of 'bankruptcy' or -the date of 'commencement of the 
proceeding,' as the case may be;496 
"(3) 'claims' means claims found to be legally due and owing 
491. See notes 407-08 supra. 
492. See note 404 supra. 
493. Sec note 406 supra. 
494. See note 467 supra. Since the approach of this draft would never create a fund 
for general creditors before federal priority claims have been fully paid, the problem 
discussed in note 350 supra does not arise. However, if the "synthetic circuity" ap-
proach of the ABA 1970 proposal is adopted, it should be made clear that "other 
claims" includes any unsatisfied federal priority claims. 
495. See notes 163 &: 165 wpra. 
496. This provision is derived from the flush material at the end of § 3466(b) 
in the ABA 1970 proposal (set out in notes 236 &: 292 supra), but has been moved to 
give it more general application. 
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by the debtor as of the time of divestment o:r death, subject tQ 
reduction by reason of any proper credit or other event there. 
after occurring;~o1 
"(4) an amount shall be considered 'legally due and owing' 
when all the events have occurred giving rise to a liability to pay 
such amount, whether or not the amount is then ascertained or 
has become payable;4os 
"(5) 'taxes' includes contributions payable into an unemploy-
ment fund maintained under the unemployment compensation 
law of a State;4P9 
'
1(6) a 'general unsecured creditor' means a creditor with 
a claim that is neither secured by a lien nor entitled to priority; 
''(7) the term 'lien' means an interest in real or personal 
property which secures payment or performance of an obligation 
or indemnifies against loss or liability,uoo whether arising by 
agreement, statute or other rule of law, application of principles 
of equity, judgment, levy, or other judicial proceedings or dis-
traint, 501 but such term does not include any lien which first 
'becomes effective upon the insolvency of the debtor, upon an 
assignment by the debtor for the benefit of creditors, upon the 
commencement of any other proceeding intended to rehabilitate 
the debtor or liquidate his property, or upon execution against 
his property levied at the instance of one other than the 
lienor;~0~ 
"(8) any claim secured by a lien existing under other appli-
cable law, which is not recognized as valid against the United 
States under the preceding paragraph or under subsection (e), 
shall be considered for purposes of subsection (b) to be a claim 
entitled to priority under other applicable law;6P3 
''(9) 'other applicable law' means the statutes and judicial 
doctrines604 of the State in which the property of the debtor or 
decedent is administered,G06 except so far as such law purports to 
prescribe the priority of claims of the United States;0011 and 
"(10) 'State' includes the District of Columbia, the Terri-
tories and possessions, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,lio7 
''(i) EFFECT OF OTHER LA WS.-Except as expressly pro-
vided herein, this section shall prevail over any other law to tl1e 
extent inconsistent herewith."5os 
497. $ee note 376 ~upra. 
498. See text accompanying notes 217-21 supra. 
499. See note 374 supra. 
500. See note 173 supra. 
501. Limitations qn the, reco&nition of certain liens woµJcj. be imposed by 
§ 3466(e)(2). See text accompanyin~ note 486 supra. 
502. See µoti:s l74-75 suprq. 
SQ3. See not,: 31?3 $Upr<Z, 
504. See note -349 supra. 
505. See notes 304-05 supra and accompanying text. 
p0G. ~ee tex~ accompanying pqte S56 sttpra, 
507, ~ee 11,c;ite§ i9!>-~6 ~µpra, 
508. See note 295 supra. 
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Sec. 102. · Liability of Fiduciaries. 
(a) Section 3467 of the Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 192) (relatirtg 
to liability of fiduciaries) is amended to read as follows: 
"Sec. 3467. LIABILITY OF FIDUCIARIES. 
"(a) LIABILITY IMPOSED.-Except as provided in subsections 
(b), (c) and (d), every person (other than a trustee or other officer sub-
ject to the power of a bankruptcy court to surcharge his account)509 
"(I) who pays, in whole or in part, any claim against the debtor 
or estate for whom or for which he acts510 before he pays the claims 
of the United States against such debtor or estate which under the 
preceding section are entitled to priority over or parity of payment 
with511 the claims so paid, or 
"(2) who pays, in whole or in part, any expense of administration 
(other than judicial costs and the reasonable compensation of the 
fiduciary and his attorney and auditor) without paying or provid-
ing for payment, on account of expenses of administration then 
owing to the United States, of the proportionate amount to which 
the United States would be entitled under paragraph (I) of subsec-
tion (b) of the preceding section if the administration were then 
terminated, 512 
shall become answerable in his own person and estate to the extent of 
such payments for the claims and expenses then owing to the United 
States, or for so much thereof as may remain unpaid. 
"(b) ABSENCE OF NOTICE OR KNOWLEDGE OF EXPENSES 
OR CLAIMS.-No liability shall be imposed under subsection (a) with 
respect to any claim of or expense owing to the United States of which 
such person did not, at the time of such payment, have actual notice or 
knowledge. A person shall be deemed to have actual notice or knowledge 
of a claim or expense if its existence, whether liquidated or unliquidated, 
had been brought to his attention in any manner subsequent to his as-
sumption of the administration of the property or estate, or was actually 
known to him at that time or at any subsequent time before the pay-
ment giving rise to liability under subsection (a), or if at any such time 
he possessed such information as would put a reasonably prudent fidu-
ciary upon inquiry.513 Such person shall be chargeable with notice of 
any tax claims of the United States which would have been disclosed 
by a search for federal tax liens made at the time of diV'estment or death 
in the office prescribed by section 6323(£) of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954 as in effect at that time, at the residence of the debtor at such 
509. See text accompanying notes 93-105 supra. 
510. If it is intended that liability be incurred by the fiduciary for distributions 
to beneficial owners (see text accompanying notes 440-45 supra), insert "or who makes 
any distributions to shareholders, legatees or other beneficial owners" at this point, and 
insert "or distributions so made" after "claims so paid." 
5II. The words "or parity of payment with" have been added to the ABA pro-
posal since the Government can be injured by premature payment of claims having 
equal standing as well as of claims of lower rank. 
512. See text accompanying note 234 supra. 
513. See text accompanying notes 430-38 supra. 
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time and at each place where the debtor then owned real property 
which comes under the administration of such person;614 and he shall 
be chargeable with notice of any tax liability constituting an adminis-
tration expense, for the then current or any preceding tax period, which 
he should reasonably anticipate will be asserted by the United States on 
the basis of facts then known to him, whether or not he acknowledges 
such tax liability. 
"(c) OPERATION OF BUSINESS.-No liability shall be imposed 
under paragraph (1) of subsection (a) upon a person who, under the 
terms of his appointment or by subsequent order of the court, if any, 
having jurisdiction, is directed or empowered to continue the operation 
of a business of the debtor or decedent unless-
"(!) at the time of divestment or death the fair realizable value 
of the property or estate under administration was insufficient to 
pay the reasonably anticipated expenses of administration and all 
the claims of which such person had acquired actual knowledge 
prior to the payment giving rise to liability; 
"(2) subsequently, but prior to the payment giving rise to liabil-
ity-
"(A) the property or estate under administration has been 
found by the court, if any, having jurisdiction over the adminis-
tration, to be insufficient (after expenses) to pay the debts of 
the debtor or decedent, or has been ordered by such court to be 
liquidated, or 
"(B) if the administration is not under the jurisdiction of a 
court, the person responsible for the administration had actual 
knowledge of facts from which he should reasonably conclude 
that the fair realizable value of the property or estate under ad-
ministration was insufficient to pay the reasonably anticipated 
expenses and the debts of the debtor or decedent, or has deter-
mined that the property is to be liquidated; or 
"(3) the payment giving rise to liability was made under such cir-
cumstances that, under the law applicable to the proceeding, the 
person responsible for the administration was obligated to make 
provision for the priolities or equal rights of other creditors.61u 
"(d) SUFFICIENCY OF ASSETS FOR EXPENSES.-No liability 
shall be imposed under paragraph (2) of subsection (a) unless-
"(!) at the time of the payment giving rise to such liability the 
court, if any, having jurisdiction over the administration had deter-
mined that the property or estate under administration was insuf-
ficient to pay all expenses of administration; 
"(2) if the administration is not under the jurisdiction of a court, 
the person responsible for the administration had actual knowledge 
at such time of facts from which he should reasonably conclude 
that the fair realizable value of the property or estate under admin-
istration was insufficient to pay all expenses of administration; or 
"(3) the payment giving rise to liability was made under such 
circumstances that, under the law applicable to the proceeding, the 
514. See note 431 supra. 
515. See text accompanying notes 155-57 supra. 
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person responsible for the administration was ol;)Iigated to make 
provision for the rights of others to whom administration expenses 
were mring. 516 
"(e) ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE.-A person shall be deemed for pur-
poses of a particular transaction to have actual knowledge of any fact 
from the time such fact is brought to the attention of the individual 
conducting such transaction, and in any event from the time such fact 
would have been brought to such individual's attention if the person 
had exercised due diligence. A person exercises due diligence if he main-
tains reasonable routines for communicating significant information to 
the individual conducting the transaction and there is reasonable com-
pliance with the routines. Due diligence does not require an individual 
acting for the person to communicate information unless such commu-
nication is part of his regular duties or unless he has reason to know 
of the transaction and that the transaction would be materially affected 
by the information.''517 
(b) The amendments made by this section shall apply to payments 
made on or after the date of its enactment, and shall also apply to pay-
ments theretofore made-
(!) -in administrations pending on such effective date, if such 
payments were consistent with the priorities made applicable by 
the amendments made by section 101;518 and 
(2) in any case, if the imposition of liability would be precluded 
by subsection (b), (c), (d) or (e) of Section 3467 of the Revised Stat-
utes, as amended hereby, if such amendments had been in effect on 
the date of the payment. 
Sec. 201. Death of a Bankrupt 
Section 8 of the Bankruptcy Act (II U.S.C. 26) (relating to death 
or insanity of bankrupts) is amended by changing the period at the end 
thereof to a colon and adding the following proviso: 
"And provided further, That upon the death of a .bankrupt during 
the proceedings, the e..xpenses of his last illness and funeral shall be 
paid out of the property under administration, with priority over 
all debts except costs and expenses of administration, but only to 
the extent that the debtor's property not under administration is 
insufficient therefor.''510 
Sec. 202, Claims for Unemployment Taxes in Bankruptcy. 
Section 57 of the Bankruptcy Act (II U.S.C. 93) (relating to proof 
and allowance of claims) is amended by adding at the end thereof the 
following new subsection: 
"o. Whenever the United States and a State both present claims 
for unemployment taxes 1rith respect to the same wages for any tax-
516. See text accompanying note 234 supra. 
517. See note 427 supra. 
518. See text accompanying note 447 supra. 
519. See note 283 supra. 
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able year, the pnrtdpal amount of the claim of the United States 
sha:ll be limited to the amount of ta:lC (adjusted for amounts pre• 
viously collected) which would have been payable to the United 
States if credit were allowable for full and timely payment of the 
State tax."020 
Sec. 203. Priority of Wages in Bankruptcy. 
0 
Clause (2) of suhsectiori a 0£ section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 
U.S.C. l04(a)(2)J (relating to priority of wages) is amended by adding 
at the end thereof the following: 
"and for the purposes of this clause the term 'proceeding' shall in-
clud<:! any receivership, trusteeship, or general assignment for cred-
itors constituting an act of bankruptcy, if followed by a proceeding 
under this Act;"521 
Sec. 204. Priority of Debts Other Than for Taxes in Bankruptcy. 
Claus~ (5) of subsection a of section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 
U,S.G, 104(a)(5)) (relating to priority of debts other than for taxes) is 
amended by striking out the words: 
"debts othet than for taxes owing to any person, including the 
United States, who by the laws of the United States is entitled to 
priority, and"1122 
Sec. 205. Postponement of Tax Liens. 
Paragraph (3) of subsection c of section 67 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 
U.S.C. 107(c)(3)) (relating to postponement of certain tax liens) is 
amended by striking out the second and third sentences thereof and 
substituting the following: 
''The proceeds of sale of the property subject to Hens, after provid-
ing for the actual cost of the sale, shall he set aside for the claims 
secured by liens, in the order of theit priority without regard to 
this paragraph. The amounts set aside for the most junior of liens 
subject to postponement under this paragraph shall then be ap• 
plied fitst to the expenses and liens to which such liens are post-
poned; in order of their priorities. The postponed liens shall next 
be satisfied, to the extent possible, from the balance of the amount 
set aside for them and from the funds, if any* which would other-
520. See notes 379•81 supra. By omission, the effect of the languagt: would be to 
disallow any portion of the tax resulting from reduction of the credit on account of 
late payment, without need to label the amount a pertalty under sectiort 5'1j of the 
Bimkrllptcy Ad, 11 U.S.C. § 93(j) (1964). See text accompanying notes 383•94 wprd, 
521. This provision adopts the rule of Manly v. Hood, 37 F.2d 212 (4th Cir, 
1930). See note 237 supra, Wages earned during the superseded proceeding, if unpaid 
at the time of bapkruptcy, Would enjoy priority under the rule of Randolph v. 
Scruggs, 190 U.S. 533 (1903). 
522. See note 80 supra. Additional amendments to § 64a oE the Bankruptcy 
Act, II U.S.C. § 104(a} (Supp. V, 1965-1969), as well as to § 1'7a, 1I U.S.C, § 35(a) 
(Supp. V, 1965-1969), relating to the priority -and dischargeabilhy of ta.'{eS in bank-
ruptcy, are proposed in Plumb, Federal Tax Liens and Priorities in Banhruptty-
Recent Developments, 43 REF. J. 37, 45-46 (1969), and will not be repeated here. 
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wise have been applicable to the expenses and claims to which such 
liens were postponed.''523 
Sec. 206. Railroad Reorganizations. 
The second and third provisos of the third paragraph of subsection 
(e) of section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act (II U.S.C. 205(e)) (relating to 
claims of the United States in railroad reorganizations) are amended to 
read as follows: 
"Provided further, that if, in any reorganization proceeding under 
this section, the United States is a secured or unsecured creditor, 
no plan which does not provide for first payment in cash of the 
value of the interest of the United States as determined by the judge 
in accordance with the priorities established by section 3466 of the 
Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 191) (which value, if the plan makes 
provision £or shareholders, other than £or new capital, shall be not 
less than the full amount of the claims) shall be confirmed except 
upon the acceptance, certified to the court, of a lesser amount or 
of payment in another form or at a later time by the President of 
the United States or the officer or agency designated by him pursuant 
to the provisions of the preceding paragraph hereof: Provided fur-
ther, That if the President of the United States or such officer or 
agency shall fail to accept or reject such lesser amount or such other 
form or time of payment for more than ninety days after receipt of 
written notice so to do from the court, accompanied by a certified 
copy of the plan, the consent of the United States shall be con-
clusively presumed.''524 
Sec. 207. Corporate Reorganizations. 
The second sentence of section 199 of the Bankruptcy Act (II U.S.C. 
599) (relating to claims of the United States in corporate reorganizations) 
is amended to read as follows: 
"If, in any proceeding under this chapter, the United States is a 
secured or unsecured creditor, no plan which does not provide for 
first payment in cash of the value of the interest of the United States 
as determined by the judge in accordance with the priorities estab-
lished by section 3466 of the Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 191) (which 
value, if the plan makes provision for shareholders, other than for 
new capital, shall be not less than the full amount of the claims) 
shall be confirmed except upon the acceptance, certified to the court, 
of a lesser amount or of payment in another form or at a later time 
by the Secretary of the Treasury.''525 
Sec. 301. Unemployment Tax. 
(a) Paragraph (3) of subsection (a) of section 3302 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to credits against unemployment taxes) 
is amended to read as follows: 
523. This is merely a clarification. See note 406 supra. 
524. See text accompanying notes 88-92 supra; notes 81-82 supra. 
525. See id. Similar amendment of Bankruptcy Act § 455, 11 U.S.C. § 855 (1964), 
relating to real property arrangements, should be considered. 
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"(3) If contributions for any taxable year are paid after the last 
day upon which the taxpayer is required under section 6071 to file 
a return for such year, the credit against the tax shall not exceed 90 
percent of the amount which would have been allowable as credit on 
account of such contributions had they been paid on or before such 
last day: 526 Provided, that this paragraph shall not apply if the tax-
payer's assets, at any time during the period from such last day for 
filing a return for such year to June 30 next following such last clay, 
both dates inclusive, are in the custody of a receiver, trustee, assignee 
for the benefit of creditors, or other fiduciary charged with the ad-
ministration thereof for the benefit of creditors,627 and if the con-
tributions are paid during or within ___ days after termination 
of such administration."02s 
(b) Section 3302 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is further 
amended by adding at the end of subsection (a) the following new 
paragraph: 
"(5)(A) Any amount of the tax for any taxable year which is col-
lected in any proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act or to which 
section 3466 of the Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 191) is applicable, 
or by setoff or levy or proceeding to enforce a lien,u20 shall be deemed, 
to the extent provided in subparagraph (B), to be a collection of 
tax on behalf of the unemployment fund of the State or States to 
which the employer is liable for any unpaid contributions for the 
period to which such collection relates.580 
"(B) The proportionate shares of the State or States and the 
United States in any amount so collected shall be determined by-
"(i) Adding thereto any other amounts collected at any time 
by the United States and by the State or States as unemployment 
tax or contributions for the taxable year;631 
"(ii) If the employer is liable for or has made contributions to 
unemployment funds of two or more States for the taxable year, 
dividing the amount determined under clause (i) in proportion 
to the amount of wages with respect to which contributions are 
payable to each State;;:;32 
526. The foregoing language is simply a less circumlocutory restatement of the 
provision now in effect. 
527. This clause is drawn from the 1939 provision quoted in text accompanying 
note 389 supra, with the addition of relief in the case of assignments for the benefit of 
creditors even though not under court control. See te.xt accompanying note 39·! supra. 
528. This last condition was not imposed by the 1939 provision but there is no 
apparent reason to relieve the employer of the 10 per cent reduction of the credit if 
the property reverts to him without the contributions having been paid. As under 
the 1939 provision, the employer would also not be relieved of the reduction if he 
was already delinquent in his contributions, by more than a limited period, at the 
time the administration of his assets for the benefit of creditors commenced. This 
reduction of the credit would not, however, prejudice the state (see text accompanying 
note 533 infra) or other creditors. See text accompanying notes 480 & 520 sttpra, 
529. See note 376 supra. 
530. See note 380 supra. 
531. See note 381 supra. 
532. Alternatively, the division between states might be made in proportion to the 
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"(iii) Dividing the amount apportioned to a State under clause 
(ii) in the proportion which the total liability for contributions 
to the unemployment fund of such State for the taxable year 
bears to the amount of tax imposed by section 3301 reduced by 
the credit which would have been allowable under this section 
if full and timely payment of the contributions to the unemploy-
ment fund of the State had been made;633 and 
"(iv) Subtracting from the State's share determined under 
clause (iii) the amount at any time collected by the State from 
or on account of the employer as contributions to its unemploy-
ment fund for the taxable year.u34 
"(v) In no event shall the share of any State in collections by 
the United States, as determined under this paragraph, exceed 
the amount of the employer's liability for contributions to the 
State unemployment fund for such taxable year, exclusive of in-
terest and penalties, reduced by the amount collected by the State 
at any time on account of such contributions."636 
(c) Subsection (d) of section 901 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C 
IIOI(d)) (relating to transfers from the employment security adminis-
tration account) is amended by renumbering paragraph (3) as paragraph 
(4) and inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph: 
"(3) To the account (in the Unemployment Trust Fund) of a State 
the amount determined pursuant to paragraph (5) of section 3302(a) 
of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act as such State's share of any 
tax collections described therein. Proper adjustments shall thereafter 
be made to reflect recomputation of the State's share in the event of 
subsequent collections by either the State or the United States on 
the same liabilities."036 
Sec. 401. Effective Date. 
Except as othenvise provided in section 102(b), the amendments made 
by this Act shall be effective upon the date of its enactment, and shall 
apply to proceedings pending on such effective date, to the extent that 
distributions have not theretofore been made::-;37 Provided, however: 
That no lien existing on that date, other than a lien of the United 
States, shall be denied any priority to which it would have been entitled 
if this Act had not been enacted.638 
liabilities for contributions to the respective states, thereby giving a greater share to 
the state imposing a higher rate of tax on the employer. 
533. See note 379 supra. 
534. See note 381 supra. 
535. This limitation secures to the United States any amount attributable to the 
10 per cent reduction of the credit if not relieved by proposed § 3302(a)(3) (see 
text accompanying note 527 supra), but only after the state has recovered the full 
principal amount of the contributions owed to its fund, so that the fund will not be 
penalized for the employer's delinquency. 
536. See note 380 supra. 
537. See note 446 supra. 
5~8. See note 454 supra. 
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Sec. 402. Surety :Bonds. 
In the case of any bond given for taxes or other debts owing to the 
United States before the date of enactment of this Act, if the amount 
recoverable by the surety out of the estate and effects of an insolvent or 
bankrupt principal, pursuant to the priority provided by Section 3468 
of the Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 193 (1964)) or by subrogation, is 
reduced as a consequence of the provisions of sections IOI, 202, 204, 206 
or 207 of this Act, the United States shall indemnify the surety to the 
extent of such reduction, but the obligation of the bond shall not other-
wise be affected,539 
539. See text accompanying notes 455-59 supra. 
